760F.62/1124: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 26—9:10 p.m.]
1602. Just after seeing Bonnet this evening I saw Daladier. If Bonnet was devious and weak Daladier was sure of himself and strong.
He said that he had been delighted by the President’s message and hoped that the President had been pleased with his reply. Since I [Page 668] had spoken with the Under Secretary over the telephone I was able to assure him that the President had been most pleased by his answer.
Daladier went on to say that shortly after his arrival in London Chamberlain had said to him that he wished to speak to him alone without Bonnet or anyone else. Chamberlain had then read to him a personal letter which he had prepared to send to Hitler. This letter suggested that there should be a series of modifications in the demands in the note which Hitler had handed to him at Godesberg and had contained the statement that Hitler’s demands were totally impossible of acceptance by the British Government. It had also contained assurances to Hitler that there would be no delay in handing over the Sudeten regions to Hitler.
In addition to this communication Chamberlain had sent a handwritten letter to Hitler. At this point Daladier hesitated and finally said, “I will show you this as a personal friend, not as an Ambassador.” He then drew from his wallet a handwritten copy of Chamberlain’s second letter to Hitler.
In this letter Chamberlain stated that he had just been informed by Daladier that if German troops should cross the frontier of Czechoslovakia the French Army would attack Germany at once. He was certain that this was true. He desired to state to Hitler that in case this should occur Great Britain would enter the war at once on the side of France with all her forces.
Daladier asked that the existence of this note be kept as a complete secret and I trust that you will be careful to avoid any possible leakage.
Daladier commented that his impression of Chamberlain was that in spite of his being a cold and limited man when he shook hands with you and said he was with you you could count on him.
Daladier went on to say that he did not know what Hitler would say in his speech tonight. If Hitler should order general German mobilization he would order general French mobilization at 10 o’clock this evening. If Hitler should send one soldier across the Czechoslovak frontier he would attack Germany at once. Hitler’s latest note to Chamberlain had been an attempt not simply to achieve the aims of Germany in Czechoslovakia but also to humiliate England and France. To fight and die was better than to submit to such a humiliation.
People had doubted the spirit of France for the past few years. The spirit of France during the past few days had shown itself to be the same old spirit which had meant so much to the world. The war would be long and terrible but whatever the cost in the end France would win.
We then referred to the general position and especially that of Poland. Daladier said that he considered that Poland was playing the part of a vulture. I referred to the demands of Poland for a [Page 669] common undertaking with Hungary. Daladier said that so long as he was Prime Minister he would never assent to any such dismemberment of Czechoslovakia; and finally with a twinkle in his eye said that he hoped to live long enough to pay Poland for her cormorant attitude in the present crisis by proposing a new partition of Poland to Czechoslovakia.
In the course of the conversation a member of Daladier’s Cabinet, whose voice I recognized as that of Patenotre, telephoned and referred to the activities of Malvy and others, attempting to prove that Daladier was trying to drive France into war. Daladier replied, “Please say to Malvy and the rest of his friends that I have only two sons who will go to the front at once when war breaks out. I am of course hoping to prevent the butchery of French youth. I am hoping that war will begin at once as that will give me the opportunity to place him and his associates in a concentration camp where they will have outlet for their venom in breaking rocks.”
Daladier went on to say that he still hoped a moment might come soon when it might be possible to call a conference to organize genuine peace in Europe. He felt that such a call must come from President Roosevelt. It was obvious that European peace must be organized on a new basis but it was also obvious that France could not submit to the infliction of gross injustices on small countries because of a threat of war. France must and would remain worthy of herself.
In my opinion Daladier represents today the genuine reaction of France to the present crisis. It is perhaps because he is a baker’s boy who spent a poverty stricken youth delivering bread. This country has never been more magnificent in spirit than today and I am glad that at least the President du Conseil represents it so well.
I was unable to determine whether Bonnet in asserting that he had no knowledge of the contents of Chamberlain’s communications to Hitler (see my 1601 of September 26, 8 p.m.) was lying or whether Daladier admitted him to his confidence. I am inclined to believe that Daladier had informed him of the contents of Chamberlain’s second and secret note to Hitler but under such pledge of secrecy that he did not dare tell me.