760C.60F/249: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 26—3:50 p.m.]
1595. I talked with the Polish Ambassador today at his invitation. He said to me that he confidentially [confidently?] expected Bonnet to return from London with the Teschen District on a platter to present to him as a gift to Poland. He said that this gift would not change in any [way?] the attitude of Poland. Poland did not need to have the Teschen District handed to her by France or anyone else. She could and would take the Teschen District when she wished. There were five divisions on the Polish frontier opposite the Teschen District for that purpose. Any gift of Teschen to Poland would mean something only if it were a gift, not to purchase Poland’s neutrality in case of war; but a gift which would be a part of the reorganization of real peace in Eastern Europe.
I asked him what he meant by this. He said that it was clear that there could be no peace in Eastern Europe until Poland and Hungary had a common frontier, and Poland was encouraged by France and England to build up a bloc consisting of Poland, Hungary and Rumania to resist further German advance eastward.
The Polish Military Attaché had stated to the French General Staff 3 days ago that if German troops should attack Czechoslovakia Polish troops at once would seize the whole of Slovakia and would give it to Hungary reserving for Poland only the Polish District of Teschen.
The Polish Ambassador went on to say that unless Poland should seize Slovakia and give it to Hungary Germany would be able to [Page 665] dominate Slovakia as well as Bohemia and Moravia since Czechoslovakia would be too feeble to make any resistance to German orders. It would bring intense danger to Poland to have Germany control this territory on her southern border. He could therefore see no solution of peace in Eastern Europe unless Czechoslovakia should be dismembered and the small remainder of Czechs remaining independent should be neutralized and forbidden to have any foreign policy of their own or any alliances.
I pointed out to the Polish Ambassador that this might in his opinion be the only solution for peace in Eastern Europe; but it was not a solution which would ever be accepted by France or England or the public opinion of the world. He nevertheless persisted in his statements that Poland would strive for this sort of a solution whether or not the Teschen District should be returned to Poland.
He was calmer than yesterday and assured me that Poland would not be the first nation to make war on Czechoslovakia. The Polish Ambassador added another disquieting statement. He said that the Czechs had been very foolish to close not only their frontier with Germany; but also their frontier with Poland and their frontier with Hungary. As a result Czechoslovakia was hermetically sealed since transportation facilities through the Czech-Rumanian frontier were so inadequate as to be worthless. It would not be necessary, therefore, for either Germany, Poland or Rumania [Hungary?] to cross the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. It would only be necessary for them to accept the closing of the frontiers which had been the act of the Czechs and keep those frontiers completely closed whether the Czechs wished to open them or not. He said that he was quite certain that neither Germany, Poland nor Hungary would consent to the opening of these frontiers until the Government of Czechoslovakia should have submitted absolutely to any demands which might be made upon it. He added that he did not think that the Czechoslovak State could continue to exist very long sealed in a bottle and stated that he was quite sure that neither France nor England could go to war with Germany, Poland or Hungary because those states refused to reopen frontiers which had been closed by the action of Czechoslovakia. He trusted and believed that Hitler would not precipitate war by marching across the Czech frontier. It was totally unnecessary. Czechoslovakia would die of asphyxiation and Germany, Poland and Hungary could do what they wished with the corpse.
Without referring to the Polish Ambassador’s remarks I discussed this possibility later with the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris. He admitted that Czechoslovakia today was completely cut off from contact with the outer world except by telegraph and wireless. I asked him how long he thought his state could hold together under such conditions and he said that he did not know. The question was obviously [Page 666] an intensely serious one. Nations had continued to exist for some time under complete blockade in war and I might be sure that Czechoslovakia would resist to the bitter end. I believe that this is so; but I am as yet unable to perceive the answer to this particular argument of the Polish Ambassador.
My conversation with the Hungarian Minister was much more satisfactory than my conversation with the Polish Ambassador. He assured me that his Government would not attack Czechoslovakia but pointed out that if his Government should be unable to obtain the Hungarian portion of Czechoslovakia while the Poles and Germans were receiving the portions inhabited by Germans and Poles no Government could live in Hungary. He intimated strongly that the present Government would be driven out by a Nazi movement which would attack Czechoslovakia at once and precipitate general war.