740.00/516: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 22—5:38 p.m.]
1347. I just saw Halifax to check up on what is going on. He had just finished talking with the author of the non-intervention report who reports that Franco will not agree to the non-intervention plan unless he receives belligerent rights. Halifax says that the Prime Minister has decided that here in England it is impossible to make the concession and that therefore things look very bad in Spain. If Mussolini would play ball they might be able to work something out but they are not at all hopeful and they are going to take this up with the French tomorrow but they believe that the final decision will be that the war goes on as is—no intervention.
On the German situation their Government reports and also their secret service reports give some hope that the attacks on the Jews is to take away attention from a rather pressing undercurrent of feeling about which Goering and Hitler are very uncomfortable. Halifax says of course with the storm troopers working the way they are and arresting everybody who might possibly be a sounding board for a disgruntled opinion they failed to see how anything can work out of it. He said it is his own speculation but I think it is a secret service report that Hitler has made up his mind to push on to the Ukraine at the first turn of spring. There is unquestionably amongst the authorities a very bitter hatred starting against Great Britain.
As to the Japanese, while they are thinking of what is to be said to the Japanese regarding the Yangtze River, he told me, off the record, that they would do whatever the United States would do but they would not take the lead in any plan. In other words, he feels that if the United States and England decide upon economic difficulties in the way, the situation might adjust itself, but Great Britain definitely will not do anything unless America tells them what they propose to do.
Regarding Palestine, he believes that nothing short of the Archangel can bring any order out of this chaos. He had a conference today on the subject and it is MacDonald’s30 plan to first talk with the Jews and then with the Arabs and then bring them together. Halifax and MacDonald have been advised by their representatives that the only basis on which the Arabs will settle is restricted immigration [Page 100] for the Jews and possibly a separate Arab state and if not an Arab state, a partition for the Arabs ruled by Jews, Arabs, and the British Government and this prospect, says Halifax, makes him ill.
As far as the French are concerned, the Franco-German agreement31 was almost ready for signature when either the Germans pulled back a little or the French decided to hold it for a more auspicious time for launching, but, at any rate, it is held up. Halifax said he has told Bonnet by all means to go ahead and sign the agreement. When Bonnet said that a great many people felt that if the French signed it it might mean that the English and French were not quite so enthusiastic about each other, Halifax told him that he would begin to worry about the French when the French began to worry about the English. As far as he could see they were both tied in together, whether they liked it or not, and he was not at all upset for fear that the French would leave the English tie up and go with the Germans.
He said that the main reason for the trip was for the sake of appearance, to ginger up the French because they were in a very low state, and third to bring pressure on them to buy airplanes; this is the most important. On the whole the prospect, everywhere he looks, including his own political situation here, is very dull and drab.
I do not know just what information you need to fill in any impressions you have there about these situations but if there is anything in particular that you are missing from here, if you will cable me, I will try to get it on his return from France.