760F.62/1090: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 25—7 p.m.]
493. Henderson returned from Godesberg last night. We had a talk this morning.
Henderson opened the conversation by stating that it is now 50–50 between a general war and peace. All depended in his opinion upon how the present memorandum is presented by the British and French Ministers at Praha to the Czech Government—in other words what the attitude of Great Britain and France is in this connection. If these two Governments make it clear to the Czechs that if this memorandum is rejected the Czechs cannot count upon British and French assistance the Czechs will probably accept. If, on the other hand, it is presented in any less definite way he fears that the Czechs will resist. Henderson stated emphatically that Hitler has not been seen bluffing. Henderson is convinced that Chamberlain’s first visit to Berchtesgaden prevented a German attack at that time and that Chamberlain’s second visit to Godesberg prevented an attack in retaliation for Czech mobilization.
Henderson was deeply perturbed at the growing opposition in Great Britain to Chamberlain. He feels that Churchill is ambitious to become Prime Minister and is seizing this occasion in an endeavor to throw out the present Cabinet and be summoned himself by the King. If Chamberlain falls Henderson says war is certain since a “war Cabinet” will follow, probably with Eden in the Foreign Office. The policy of such a Cabinet would be to serve notice at once on Hitler warning him not to act. This would be the signal, Henderson is convinced, for immediate action on Hitler’s part. Hitler would do nothing to provoke England or France but would immediately assault Czechoslovakia. Henderson further believes that if this matter is not settled by October 1, Hitler will then march into Czechoslovakia regardless of threats or risk of general war. Hitler has at last put himself into a position from which he cannot now retire.
Henderson urged me strongly to do what I could to emphasize to you that the overthrow of Chamberlain means war and that any public expression of sympathy with his objectives in this hour of [Page 655] uncertainty would greatly strengthen his hand in his struggle to keep peace in Europe.
Henderson says that in its essence the two plans are not profoundly different. The Czechs have accepted the first and it is incredible that having done so a war should break out over the method of application of a cession of territory already agreed upon in principle. The British plan had proposed outright cession of certain districts and plebiscites for more doubtful areas, this under international supervision. The Hitler plan proposed outright cession of certain areas and plebiscite for others and the entire area to be occupied by German forces as the Czechs retire.
Hitler proposed that plebiscites in the doubtful areas should be held not later than November 26 and that for this purpose German troops shall be withdrawn and the plebiscite held under international auspices or by a Czech-German commission. The plebiscite can be carried out in the same manner as the Saar plebiscites.75 Henderson states that the areas in question do not materially differ in the British and Hitler plans.
Hitler was motivated in rejecting the British plan and urging his own by (a) his conviction that the Czechs accepted the first plan with the idea that they could profit by the delay to sabotage the concessions made and (b) his fear for the safety of the Sudeten Germans within this area. He claims the only way in which he can assure himself of their safety is by actual presence of German troops as the Czechs withdraw.
In the course of the conversation Hitler gave Chamberlain his word of honor that if this matter were liquidated Germany would be “a satisfied power”. He said they would keep up their claim on Great Britain for colonies but that nobody could imagine a German mobiliization for this purpose and that they would be “satisfied as far as the continent of Europe was concerned.” After Hitler had refused Chamberlain’s memorandum on the grounds above outlined he presented an alternative memorandum. Chamberlain pointed out that it read like an ultimatum and Hitler thereupon stated that Chamberlain could change the memorandum in any way he saw fit if he did not alter the fundamentals, namely, prompt occupation by German soldiers of the disputed area. Any changes could be made in tone, et cetera. A number of changes were made and a number of statements were rejected from Hitler’s memorandum.
In the first conversation Hitler had been insistent in respect to the Polish and Hungarian claims in Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain had taken the position that they were there to discuss the Sudeten German question. In the subsequent conversation Hitler did not raise the [Page 656] Polish and Hungarian questions. The matter was only raised inferentially when guarantees for Czechoslovakia were discussed. Hitler declared he was ready to give any kind of a guarantee desired “after the questions of minorities have been settled”.
In closing our conversation Henderson returned again to the danger of war in a reversal of Chamberlain’s policy and expressed the urgent hope that some means could be found whereby the American Government in the first instance and the French Government also could express confidence in Chamberlain and hopes for his success in averting catastrophe.
I am the more impressed by Henderson’s conviction as to Hitler’s determination to take matters into his own hands if this problem is not settled satisfactorily for him by the fact that in the past Henderson has been dubious of Hitler’s intention to precipitate matters by launching attack. His present belief is undoubtedly aroused by the close contact he has had with Hitler in this recent series of discussions.
Repeated to Paris, London.
- January 13, 1935.↩