760F.62/1064: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 25—12:25 p.m.]
1580. The Polish Ambassador telephoned me at noon and said that he had a communication of the utmost importance to make to me at once and asked me to come to his Embassy as he had been working all night. I found him in his pajamas and a tense state of emotion.
Lukasiewicz said that he felt it necessary to see me at once because until the present moment he had stated to me consistently that it was his conviction and that of the Polish Government that there would not be general war in Europe. He now felt obliged to say to me that he and his Government were convinced that there would be general war.
He explained that it was now the conviction of the Polish Government that the question had become a larger one than that of Czechoslovakia. A war of religion between fascism and bolshevism was [Page 651] about to begin. Beneš had acted as he had because he was an agent of Moscow.
If German troops should cross the frontier of Czechoslovakia Polish troops would cross at once and would seize not only the Teschen District but also the entire eastern end of Slovakia in order to establish a common frontier with the Hungarians.
He believed that this would mean an immediate Russian attack on Poland. Poland did not fear such an attack. The Polish Government was confident that conditions in Russia at the present time were such that within 3 months the Russian Armies would be in complete rout and Russia would no longer preserve even the semblance of a state but would be a hell of warring factions.
I pointed out to the Polish Ambassador that this would mean for Poland war against her ally, France. He said no, that it would mean that Poland was taking her side against Stalin and bolshevism and that France and England and, presumably later, the United States would be playing the game of Stalin in order finally to make Stalin triumphant on the Continent.
I said everything possible in opposition to this statement. The Polish Ambassador remained completely unconvinced and went on to say that 3 days ago he had had a conversation with Bonnet in which he had said to Bonnet that he had done his duty fully as responsible official in Paris. The conduct of France vis-à-vis her Polish ally had been disgraceful. He had nothing more to say to the French Government and could have no further contact with the French Government unless the French Government requested it.
He added that in his opinion at the present time there was no way to save the situation except by the intervention of the Government of the United States; that we must persuade the French and British to give Poland a common frontier with Hungary and rely on Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia to resist German advance in Eastern Europe.
The Polish Ambassador indicated that he desired me to repeat what he had just said to me at once to the French Foreign Office. I did so immediately after leaving him by a telephone call to Léger.
I asked the Polish Ambassador if it were true that the French Government had urged the Czechoslovak Government to cede the Teschen District to Poland. (Bonnet told me this morning that the French Government has urged the Czech Government to do this.) The Polish Ambassador replied that the French were saying that they had done this but that it was an absolute lie.
I pointed out to the Polish Ambassador the ultimate consequences to Poland of war against England and France. He said that whatever were the ultimate consequences it was essential for Poland to let [Page 652] the world know that when the Polish Government announced a flat demand and a policy that demand and policy must be respected.
As indicated in my number 1579 of September 25, 1 p.m. I cannot see how the Czechs can accept Hitler’s latest demands and I believe that unless the wounded pride and neglected interests of Poland receive at once some ointment Poland will attack Czechoslovakia immediately after Germany attacks.