760F.62/1061: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 25—9:15 a.m.]
1577. I have just read in Bonnet’s office the text of Hitler’s final note to Chamberlain. Bonnet had also the appended official map showing the districts demanded by the Germans.70 The gist of Hitler’s note was the following:
- 1.
- The Czechs must withdraw all their armed forces from territory in which there is 50% or more German population by October 1. This territory will be occupied at once by the German Army and the German Government will agree to have a member of the Czech general staff attached to the German general staff during the occupation.
- 2.
- In districts in which the population is less than 50% German there must be plebiscites under control of an international commission.
Hitler refuses to guarantee the limits of the Czechoslovak State remaining, unless the guarantee is participated in by the Polish and Hungarian Governments.
Bonnet said that he and Daladier would go to London this afternoon for consultation with Chamberlain and Halifax and added that he felt certain the British would not have invited him and Daladier to London today if the British Government had decided to refuse these proposals. He believed that they were being summoned in order to prepare a counterproposal to Hitler. He said [Page 647] that it was his conviction that the British Government would not go to war on behalf of Czechoslovakia and (since he personally desires to avoid war at all costs) he was much more cheerful than yesterday as he felt that his position would be supported by the British Government. He said that once again he had become somewhat optimistic and asked me if I shared his optimism.
I replied that I could add nothing to what I had said to him since the first moment when he informed me of the decisions taken in London jointly by the British Government, Daladier and himself last Sunday. I had pointed out at that time that by placing the entire affair on the basis of a cession of territory instead of the basis of plebiscites and by ignoring completely the Poles and Hungarians the British and French Governments were thrusting the Poles and Hungarians into Hitler’s camp and were placing themselves in a foul position before the public opinion of the world. I pointed out that Hitler had taken full advantage of this gross diplomatic error and now was in a position to say to the Poles and the Hungarians that it was he and he alone who would procure their minorities for them.
I called Bonnet’s attention to the fact that Hitler’s statement that he would not enter into a guarantee of the Czechoslovak State to be signed after the detachment of the German minorities unless Poland and Hungary should enter into the guarantee meant nothing more nor less than a flat demand that the Polish and Hungarian minorities should be returned to those states at once since it is certain that neither Poland nor Hungary will guarantee the frontiers of what remains of Czechoslovakia until they have received their minorities.
Bonnet said that he felt that the matter should be handled by successive steps. First the Germans should receive their minorities and then the Poles and Hungarians should receive theirs. He said that the French Government had already urged the Czechoslovak Government to hand the Teschen District to Poland and that he had some hope that the Czechoslovak Government would do so. He added that the British Government had informed the Czechoslovak Government that it would not enter any guarantee unless the Polish and Hungarian Governments also should enter the guarantee.
I asked Bonnet if he thought that there was the slightest possibility that the Czechoslovak Government would give up its frontier defenses and all the Sudeten regions of Czechoslovakia if in return it should not even receive a German guarantee for what remained. Bonnet replied that the Czechoslovak Government would be obliged to refuse at the beginning; but he felt that as the date of October 1 approached and as it became evident that the concentration of German troops on the Czech frontier, now amounting to 26 divisions, plus the Polish and Hungarian concentrations was overwhelming, the Czechoslovaks [Page 648] would accept at the last hour before October 1. He said that he was convinced that the Czechs would do this [because?] at the final hour the French and British Governments would inform the Czechs that they could expect no assistance.
I ventured to doubt the accuracy of this statement and pointed out to Bonnet that while there was no enthusiasm for war in France the entire country was ready to march to a man. He agreed to this; but said that he felt certain that Great Britain would not be ready to march and that when the British made it clear to the French Government that France would have to confront alone war with Germany and Italy the French Government also would refuse to assist Czechoslovakia. There is as I have pointed out a distinct difference between the points of view of Daladier and Bonnet; but I believe that if the British Government again should take the attitude that peace must be preserved at any price Daladier would not resist long. The ultimate decision will be made by the British Cabinet in London.
Osusky, Czechoslovak Minister in Paris, has just informed me that he has received by telephone from Praha from his Government the information that Hitler’s demands transmitted by the Czechoslovak Government cannot possibly be accepted. He added that this rejection will be communicated to the British and French Governments before the meeting of Chamberlain and Daladier this afternoon in London.
- See British Documents, 3d ser., vol. ii, map I at end of volume.↩