740.00/501: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 28—3:34 p.m.]
1260. I have just had a talk with Halifax and he showed me the confidential report that Bonnet had given to Phipps25 on François-Poncet’s talk with Hitler.25a Bonnet told Phipps that nobody in France had seen it except himself, Daladier and the President.26 It had not been circulated at the Quai d’Orsay and Halifax told me he had shown it only to the Prime Minister and not to the Cabinet. It is very interesting in that there is no mention of Hitler’s denouncing the British naval agreement27 which Hugh Wilson reported as having [Page 96] been told him by the French Counselor, but it is very clear that evidently a lot of things were said about which they neglected to advise Hugh. First of all, Hitler said that he wanted to make a Franco-German agreement to set out definitely the French borders against which there never would be any aggression. He wanted to make a Franco-Anglo-German agreement setting out the Belgian borders. He wanted to have a meeting of economic experts to discuss trade and finance. He assured the French that he wants nothing in Spain, although he expects Franco to win and feels that his victory is much more to France’s advantage than the opposition’s victory. He is very bitter at the attack made on him in the British Parliament and feels that after all Munich has not accomplished very much. He did not request that the Franco-Russian agreement be called off. He felt that the British and French had made a mistake in guaranteeing the Czechoslovak borders without knowing what the borders were to be. He was disgusted with the Polish and Hungarian demands against the Czechs but he prided himself on the fact that he had kept a four power meeting from being called, which would have added fuel to an already smouldering fire because he and Mussolini would have had to side with the Poles and Hungarians and the French and English with the Czechs and this was something he did not want to happen. He is for limitation in the use of bombers and is perfectly willing to make an agreement against open town bombing. He would be agreeable to reasonable limitation of arms at once. On the question of colonies he said that, as he had already said publicly, there was no hurry; a matter of 3 or 4 years would be satisfactory. He asked Poncet to give these statements to the French and the English and said he would give them to the Italians.
Halifax also discussed the question of colonies with me. He said they are in a turmoil about the possibility of giving up the colonies. If they give them up and put the missionaries and the anti-Germans and different classes of people who are unfriendly to Germany back into the hands of the Germans, they will have another mess on their hands. I judge from what he said that they have no great objection to turning back colonies to the Germans, but the basis on which to do it is disturbing them very much. One plan has been that they will put up to the Germans that it be left to arbitration and there is nobody they believe could arbitrate except the President. Halifax admits that it is a rotten job for the man who takes it and that he personally would not like any part of it. Then, as to whether they would give the east or west part of Africa and they are also concerned about the road to India and Australia, particularly if trouble should ever crop up with Mussolini and lose the Mediterranean. Halifax told me that [Page 97] when he visited Hitler, the latter told him he considered the granting of colonies to Germany would serve as a hostage to future peace, because as long as the Anglo-German naval treaty was in effect, they would never have strength enough to be serious contenders in such a far off place.
Incidentally at Berchtesgaden Hitler insinuated to Chamberlain a similar condition might possibly arise that would make it necessary for him to renounce the naval treaty, but Chamberlain turned it aside and started to talk about something else.
Halifax enjoined me very carefully to ensure that my message was only seen by the President and Secretary.
- Sir Eric Phipps, British Ambassador to France.↩
- For further documentation on François-Poncet’s talk with Hitler, see Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, 3d ser. vol. iii, pp. 244–245; 618–619.↩
- Albert Lebrun.↩
- June 18, 1935; see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. i, pp. 162 ff.↩