760F.62/973: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 21—4:40 p.m.]
983. I just left Sir Alexander Cadogan. When I arrived they were translating the communiqué from Praha and before I left they brought it in. He read it and prepared to take it to the Cabinet now in session at 10 Downing Street. It is not satisfactory. Hodža56 says he is having trouble with the leaders of the political parties and while he hopes to have them straightened out this afternoon, he can give no definite acceptance of the British-French plan. Cadogan was evidently disturbed. He will advise me later today or tonight just what happens on this last note.
He told me that at the conference with the Prime Minister this morning the question of what attitude the Prime Minister would take if Hitler attempted to bring up Polish or Hungarian minorities and Chamberlain has decided he will not discuss anything but the Sudeten situation on the ground that Hitler had made it clear that this was a racial problem, with which point of view Chamberlain has some sympathy. If Hitler insists on talking of these new issues, Chamberlain will adjourn the meeting57 and return home.
Public opinion here, I think, is probably a shade against Chamberlain’s plan and there is definitely opposition in the Cabinet unless Chamberlain brings back some commitments from Hitler, such as demobilization, a larger percentage of votes in the Sudeten area to carry” the plan, some idea of his future steps and two or three others which have not yet been formulated. If Chamberlain does not get these, there is liable to be a break in the Cabinet.
I asked Cadogan about the guarantee to the Czechoslovak State after this Sudeten split up and he told me that England would be [Page 632] a participant in this guarantee for protection against aggression but they did not bar the discussion of the minorities for some peaceful means of secession, so it looks to me that this probably won’t mean very much.
I don’t think they are misleading themselves into thinking that there is not always a possibility of a war at some time hereafter, but Chamberlain and his advisers are hoping that something can happen before the actual war takes place. He also told me that he did not believe it possible for England under peace time operations to ever catch up with Germany’s preparations for war, where the whole influence of the state is behind it, which gives more or less official evidence to the fact that time is not the only needed element that Britain wants for catching up with Germany.
In various ways the leaders of the House still sounding out public opinion and I get the impression it is not particularly helpful to their ideas. Chamberlain still feels strongly that a war is the end of this present civilization—that Communism or something worse is liable to follow.
I am expecting to see some of the Cabinet around 7 o’clock. If anything develops I will cable.
In most gatherings that we attend here the English are spending most of their time apologizing to us for the way England is acting and while if war were declared they would go, they would still be hollering murder because they had to fight for Czechoslovakia. So it looks to me like a pretty tough situation here which will affect public opinion in your favor. You are damned if you do and damned if you don’t.