740.00/461½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat)50

The French Ambassador called this morning. He said that the decision France had made had been a very painful one, but was due to the fact that France was not prepared to fight. Her inferiority in the air made this out of the question, and he only wished that the Government might be able to explain this to the people as the underlying reason, but doubted whether, as a practical measure, it could do so.

The Ambassador said he had been quite shocked at the tenor of some of the editorial comment in this country during the last forty-eight hours. He had little complaint to make of the New York Times or the Washington Post, but there were many editorials that were wounding him as well as a large number of letters, more or less insulting, that were being addressed to his Embassy and to the various French Consulates. He had reported briefly on these attacks to his Government in Paris, but urged them, under no account, to enter into polemics.

The Ambassador went on to say that while he had a high regard for Mr. Blum, he felt that his recent appeal to the President had been ill-advised.51

As a matter of fact Mr. Jouhaux had seen the President a day or two ago.52 The President had referred to this message of Mr. Blum’s but pointed out that he did not feel the situation warranted any initiative from him. Such an initiative, if not accepted, might make the situation even worse than it was. Mr. Jouhaux then asked the President if he could not summon a conference. The President had replied that the same considerations would militate against this, [Page 626] but that if England and France should summon a conference and invite the United States, he was prepared to accept. Mr. Jouhaux had then asked whether he might make use of this information. The President replied that it should not be given publicity, but that he might discuss it with his friends.

Mr. Jouhaux had naturally reported this to the French Ambassador, but upon being interrogated frankly admitted that he did not know what the President had in mind, whether it was a political conference, a disarmament conference, a conference for the humanization of war, et cetera. He did not know whether the President was thinking in terms of an immediate conference or at a later date, though the Ambassador added that if it were put off too long Germany would have had what she wanted. As Mr. Jouhaux was undoubtedly going to influence both the French and British in the direction of initiating such a conference, the Ambassador thought that it was very important to get the President’s ideas a little more clearly before his Government, and to that effect asked me to present this matter to the Secretary of State in order that the latter might be able to give him more specific information when he came to call on the Secretary, probably on Thursday.53

Pierrepont Moffat
  1. Photostatic copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.
  2. The “appeal” under reference was a signed editorial by Léon Blum, former President of the French Council of Ministers, in the newspaper Populaire, September 18, 1938.
  3. Léon Jouhaux, President of the Confédération Générale du Travail, was on a visit to the United States.
  4. See memorandum by the Secretary of State, September 23 (Friday), p. 638.