760F.62/1750
The Consul at Geneva (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 22.]
Sir: As of possible interest to the Department, I have the honor to submit a summary of the views and impressions prevailing at Geneva concerning the general European situation following on the Munich Agreement.20
[Page 87]In attempting to sum up opinion in Geneva in regard to the present European situation immediately following the Munich Agreement, one is handicapped by the fact that opinion here is generally based upon widely varying guesses or interpretations of a number of unknown (at least in Geneva) factors. Among the factors upon which there is no authentic information available may be mentioned: (1) the actual amount of resistance passive or otherwise encountered by Hitler from the Reichswehr or from the German people when he was poised upon the edge of an outbreak of hostilities in Central Europe; (2) how exact was the report of widespread unrest in Italy and what credence may be put in such reports as the one which was current here to the effect that the King had refused to sign an Italian mobilization order; (3) is England as weak militarily as many reports would indicate; (4) how much effective military assistance was Russia willing or able to give in the event of French hostilities with Germany; and (5) was it because France was unable to count on immediately effective aid from Russia and England that she was forced, in spite of the opposition of certain members of the Cabinet and of a section of French public opinion, to desert Czechoslovakia and thus jeopardize the whole system of collective security and the network of collective alliances, including the one with Russia, which she had built up with such care since 1918. Another question which is “guessed at” from various angles is whether the four statesmen in Munich agreed upon or even discussed a basis for a general European settlement which would lead eventually to general disarmament and European economic and political appeasement, or if the conversations were confined only to the immediate matter at issue.
The first universal reaction here following the Munich Agreement was one of tremendous relief that war had been averted at a time when the situation was generally considered as hopeless. Following this first surge of relief there has now become apparent a tendency more carefully to evaluate the consequences of the Agreement.
Practically all observers agree that at the time of the Munich meeting things had gone so far that unless France and Great Britain were prepared to meet the substance of Germany’s latest demands, war was inevitable. Faced with this situation and with an issue that was a “bad cause” particularly in Great Britain, it is generally thought that an even greater sacrifice of Czechoslovakia was the only possible way out in the circumstances. In speaking of the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia as a sacrifice, it is pointed out that in spite of all denials to the contrary, the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in some cases goes even further than the Godesberg line set out in the “unacceptable” German ultimatum and that the only German concessions from the Godesberg ultimatum that can be ascertained are: (1) [Page 88] a delay in the occupation of the areas demanded; and (2) permission to the Czechs to remove some of their movable property from the occupied areas. It is felt that from whatever direction the results of the Munich Agreement are viewed, they can only be assessed as a personal triumph for Hitler, a diplomatic defeat for France and Great Britain, and a great step forward for a Germany which is expanding so fast that no one can foresee the limits of this movement or when or where the next blow will fall.
As to events leading to the Munich Agreement, there are wide divergences of views as to whether or not a firm attitude on the part of France and particularly of Great Britain for even the last six months, as opposed to Mr. Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement by negotiation beginning especially with the Anglo-Italian Agreement, would not have prevented Hitler from ever pushing things to the point that war or a “backdown” were the only alternatives left. There is even wider divergence as to what the policies of the democracies of Europe will be in the future.
With regard to the first point, most observers feel that neither Hitler nor the German people wanted war and that if the danger of war could have been clearly and forcefully brought home to Hitler before he had gone so far that a retreat was difficult if not impossible, he would never have brought matters to the crucial point. Many observers of this school of thought believe also that in the event France and Great Britain were not prepared to fight for the integrity of Czechoslovakia, they should have made this clear to the Czechs well in advance of the crisis, whereupon the Czechs would have been in a position to make their own terms directly with Germany, with the probability that they would have been able to reach a much less drastic settlement.
As regards the second point, some feel that the Munich Agreement is the forerunner of an attempt on the part of Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany progressively to settle all of the major causes of friction in Europe and that from now on a new era, permeated with the “spirit of Munich”, is about to dawn. These observers point to the statement signed by Hitler and Chamberlain at Munich21 following the signature of the Agreement itself; to the renewed conversations between France and Italy and the appointment of a French Ambassador to Borne; to the probability that the Anglo-Italian Agreement will go into effect following a partial withdrawal of Italian volunteers from Spain; to Chamberlain’s speeches indicating that the Munich Agreement is only the beginning of a move for some general European settlement; to signs that mediation in Spain may be becoming [Page 89] more and more possible; to the general opposition to war on the part of all peoples concerned, including the Germans and Italians; and finally they emphasize the important fact that for the first time since 1918 the states who “have” have been shocked into the realization that the only way to avoid war is to settle by speedy and friendly negotiations the just demands of the states that “have not”.
Another group of observers regard the situation following the Munich Agreement as at best only a temporary détente. When they speak of Hitler’s assurances that with the acquisition of the Sudeten area in Czechoslovakia his last territorial ambition in Europe is satisfied, they enumerate the many previous occasions upon which Hitler or one of his lieutenants had given similar assurances after having carried out some new and dangerous policy which resulted in a further expansion of the influence or prestige of the German Reich. They point to the recent German loan to Turkey, the series of economic conversations in the Balkans and Hitler’s Sarrebrück speech as indications that he will pursue the same policy in the future as in the past and say that if France and Great Britain will not fight for Czechoslovakia there is a strongly decreasing probability that they would fight for Memel for example or for Danzig or the Polish Corridor, or for Rumanian oil and wheat or even for the Ukraine, although this last might bring on a conflict with Russia with incalculable consequences. Before Czechoslovakia was dismembered, they say, France and Great Britain had every chance of winning a long war. Without Czechoslovakia, with Russia retiring more and more from European affairs and with the small states in Central Europe coming increasingly under German political and economic domination, when some issue immediately vital to Great Britain and France does arise, will they not find that the odds have decisively turned in favor of Germany even in a long war? This group feel that the odds are in favor of the rapid expansion of German influence and strength and that as a result, Germany will become the dominant power on the Continent. France, bereft of her allies in Central and Eastern Europe and more and more divorced from Russia, will rapidly sink to a third-class power, while Great Britain, forced to acknowledge German supremacy on the Continent, will have to make the best deal possible under the circumstances and await the slow forming of the inevitable balance of power which has historically followed the overexpansion of any one power or group of powers in Europe. As a further indication against the probability that any general settlement by negotiation is possible under the present circumstances, these observers also emphasize the continued and feverish plans for rearmament not only in Germany, but also in France and Great Britain. They feel that unless these powers are able to [Page 90] agree to stop pouring billions of dollars annually into rearmament, no settlement with any hope of permanent success is possible. This type of opinion sees only few factors as a possible barrier to the rapid expansion of German power to an almost unlimited extent, the most likely being the possibility that Italy may be “bought out” of the axis. In this case, German expansion not only might be slowed down but even definitely checked. Observers point to Hitler’s continued references to his great, good and only true friend, Mussolini, as an effort to keep Italy in line until something can be found to give her an acceptable pound of flesh in return for services rendered and disappointments suffered in the service of the axis.
As regards Russia, qualified observers here regard one of three alternatives possible: (a) that Russia will withdraw almost entirely from European affairs and will devote herself increasingly toward the Far East; (b) that a Russo-German alliance, the result long dreaded by France, will take place; or (c) some of this group believe that Hitler’s final aim is to attack Russia when he feels secure enough in the West to do so in the belief that German efficiency and organization will be more than a match for Russian numbers and resources.
Italy’s position following the Munich Agreement is the subject of considerable speculation. The majority of people feel that Italy has received very little and even that there is little that Hitler can give her that will satisfy her for her recent disappointments. Mussolini has undoubtedly obtained much personal prestige for his part in the Munich arrangement, but certain observers feel that with increasing unrest and hardship in Italy, Mussolini must either receive something very substantial from Hitler, or must gradually break away from the axis in the hope of substantial financial assistance from Great Britain and possibly France.
With regard to Spain, it is generally thought here that either mediation will become possible once foreign volunteers can be withdrawn from both sides, or that some means will be found so to strengthen the Nationalists that they can bring the present war to a speedy and successful conclusion.
In regard to the foregoing views, while there are no indications here as to what Germany’s next move will be, it is presumed that a number of specific questions will be dealt with before even discussions of a general settlement will be possible. Should the situation develop so far as to permit such discussions, however, it is believed here that early in any negotiations toward a European settlement, Great Britain and France will be called upon to make important concessions to Germany and Italy, the most likely of which appears to be colonies. In return for such concessions, Great Britain and France could ask for (1) a return of Germany and Italy to the Geneva system; (2) a limitation [Page 91] and eventual reduction of armaments; (3) a return of Germany and Italy to normal economic relations with the rest of the world. A return of Germany and Italy to Geneva would appear to be out of the question for the present and even if possible, would probably be meaningless unless it were followed by a substantial reduction of armaments. Many observers here believe that Chamberlain’s objective is to secure a limitation and reduction of armaments and it is pointed out that the strain on Germany and Italy of their present rate of armaments is becoming serious. On the other hand, it is believed that Germany would make any agreement concerning armaments contingent upon similar action by Russia, while Russia in turn would not agree to any reduction or even limitation so long as the present situation in the Far East continues. Any immediate hopes for substantial action in the field of disarmament would therefore appear to be very dim. Finally, a great many observers believe that Germany will not reverse her policy and endeavor to re-establish normal economic relations with the rest of the world, as the autarchical process has already been carried too far, and in view of the recent increase of German economic power, it offers too great a promise for success for Germany to make the many sacrifices and dangerous readjustments which would be involved in a return to normal economy. It is believed, however, that there is some hope of persuading Italy to adopt this course. If a settlement of the Spanish question can be obtained, it is believed that Italy could gradually be brought into the European economic system. It is pointed out that Italy obviously does not have the resources for successfully developing a closed economy. As the poorer of the two countries of the axis, the strain of the present armaments program coupled with the enormous expenditure on the Ethiopian campaign has placed Italy in a desperate position. It is not thought, however, that the Rome–Berlin axis would be openly broken, but rather that Italy would gradually become a partner with France and Great Britain in opposition to German economic expansion in the Balkans. The recent German loan to Turkey is said to have caused great concern in Italy and there would appear to be little prospect of Germany’s conceding the exploitation of any substantial portion of the Balkan area to Italy. Italy’s role for some time is seen here as likely to be that played by Mussolini at Munich, namely, while ostensibly maintaining the Rome–Berlin axis, Italy will endeavor to act as mediator between France and Great Britain on the one hand, and Germany on the other, and will endeavor to collect from both sides for any agreements achieved. This is far from a recreation of the Stresa front, but it is believed here that it offers some hope of keeping the expansion of German power within certain limits.
[Page 92]For my own part, while it is difficult and perhaps somewhat dangerous to make predictions regarding a situation which is continuing to develop so rapidly, I am inclined to the opinion that under existing conditions the Munich settlement can only lead to a temporary détente, and that we may expect a recurring series of crises within the relatively near future which may or not lead to war in Europe. Many factors may unexpectedly affect or even completely change the existing situation. There are, for instance, the personal factors affecting both Hitler and Mussolini, who after all may well disregard what public opinion exists in Italy and Germany and be governed entirely by personal ambitions, leading their countries into courses they would not follow if the people were free to decide, courses contrary even to the national interests. Among these factors I have already discussed the views held here concerning the possibility of detaching Italy from the axis. Another uncertain factor of fundamental importance is Russia and the future relations of Russia with other states of Europe, particularly Poland. Due to fear of Bolshevist power and influence on the part of important elements of public opinion in Western Europe, in the Balkans, and in countries bordering on Russia, the latter has not played the role in the European balance of power which that country would have played under other conditions. The Balkan countries which in normal circumstances would have been expected to look to Russia for protection against Germany have, through an aversion to the Soviet régime, been loath to establish intimate relations with that country. The right, and even the liberal elements in England and France, not only have been uncertain of Russian fidelity, but also have been averse to soliciting her assistance under any circumstances. This has tended to paralyze these countries in any attempt to take a strong stand against Germany. Naturally any development which brought about a change in this attitude toward Russia might radically alter the entire international situation. In this connection, the importance of Polish-Russian relations is difficult to overestimate. A rapprochement between Poland and Russia, either through German pressure on Poland, a change of government in Poland, or an evolution of the regime in Russia, would likewise greatly modify the political and military situation. At the moment, therefore, the developing international situation can only be viewed with guarded pessimism, but always with the hope that Germany’s legitimate aspirations may be gradually and peacefully satisfied by negotiation and that a strong and determined policy on the part of Great Britain and France, a policy made absolutely clear before other crises occur, may yet serve to prevent demands so exorbitant that even a world war is considered preferable to their acceptance.
Respectfully yours,