760F.62/827: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:45 a.m.]
1465. The news of Chamberlain’s visit to Hitler has been received by all circles in France except the Communists, other agents of the Soviet Government and certain Jews, with intense satisfaction and a relief that approaches gayety.
The Humanity the Communist organ contains an extremely sour comment by Peri but the Socialist Populaire contains an editorial of wholehearted approval by Blum. The rest of the press applauds.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of course delighted. The chief aim of Bonnet’s foreign policy has been to engage England’s intervention in the affair of Czechoslovakia. Before Daladier and Bonnet took office the British had refused consistently to become seriously involved. Chamberlain’s personal visit to Hitler is therefore a personal triumph for Bonnet and he is gleeful. As I informed the Department last night by brief telegram after finding a conversation with Mr. Messersmith unsatisfactory due to atmospheric conditions, Bonnet feels that the danger of general European war has disappeared.
The story being circulated by the French press that Daladier suggested Chamberlain’s visit to Hitler is untrue.
As I informed the Department Daladier telephoned to Chamberlain and suggested that there should be a conference of representatives [Page 601] of England, France and Germany, His conversation with Chamberlain was most unsatisfactory due in part to Daladier’s total lack of knowledge of English and Chamberlain’s imperfect knowledge of French. Yesterday afternoon all Bonnet knew was that the British thought some sort of a conversation should be held with the Germans. The British Ambassador informed me last night at about 9 o’clock that he had communicated Chamberlain’s intention to visit Hitler in Berchtesgaden to Daladier only at 8 o’clock.
It is certain that the French Government will support any arrangement that Chamberlain may be able to make with Hitler. As I have pointed out repeatedly to the Department in my telegrams since the beginning of last May the only reason why the French have been ready to go to war on behalf of Czechoslovakia is because of the point of honor involved. The feeling here today is that Chamberlain will take care of that point of honor completely and that the French Government will be justified in the eyes of its own people and the world in following his lead, whatever that lead may be and however unpalatable to Czechoslovak authorities.
In considering French opinion it must be remembered that the number of persons who believe that France should fight in order to maintain her traditional power and prestige in Central and Eastern Europe has diminished steadily during the past year. Aside from a few permanent officials of the Quai d’Orsay and Paul Reynaud28 there are almost no persons in positions of influence who still feel that France should fight to uphold this traditional policy. Moreover, the conviction that the Treaty of Versailles is one of the stupidest documents ever penned by the hand of man is now general, although not admitted by men like Mandel29 who share responsibility for its terms. Both Daladier and Bonnet fought the Treaty of Versailles and wrecked their careers temporarily by telling the truth about the treaty when the truth was unpopular. Both are convinced that the treaty must be revised and at bottom regard an alteration in the Czechoslovak State as a necessary revision—the necessity for which they pointed out nearly 20 years ago.
Daladier, for example, said to me a few days ago that he had had a considerable argument with Mandel who had wished him to mobilize the French Army which he had ended by saying to Mandel that he did not intend to sacrifice the entire youth of France merely to whitewash the criminal errors that had been committed by Mandel and his friend Clemenceau and the other members of the Big Four during the conference which produced the Treaty of Versailles.
Both Daladier and Bonnet have said to me recently that as soon as the Czech affair is settled they hope to enter at once into negotiation [Page 602] designed to bring together Germany and France in genuine friendship. They hope that these negotiations will result in cooperation between Germany, France, England and Italy and that peace may be established in Europe. It is now their hope that Chamberlain’s talk with Hitler may be the beginning of this negotiation.