760F.62/634: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 31—3:15 p.m.]
846. I have just seen Lord Halifax. He told me that the cable he received from Runciman this morning is not quite so encouraging. Runciman says that Beneš is not going through as he should and Runciman told Halifax to twist Beneš’ tail which Halifax has just done with a cable. The Czech proposition was given to Henlein yesterday and they have asked until Thursday or Friday to give Beneš an answer. I hope to have a copy of the proposition tonight or tomorrow from Masaryk.
Public opinion here is definitely against going to war for Czechoslovakia. Halifax says that the French do not want to fight either. Halifax asked me what would be the reaction in America if the Germans went into Czechoslovakia, with the Czechs fighting them, and England did not go along. I told him a great deal would depend on the attitude the President would take as to whether he thought England should be encouraged to fight or whether he would contend that they should stay out of war until the last possible minute. Halifax told me he would keep in touch with me on this problem because it is obvious they cannot prepare for this emergency without tipping their hand to Germany. I asked him whether, with the information he has up to the minute, he thought Germany was bluffing. He says he does not think it is all bluff. He thinks that Hitler hopes to get everything he wants without fighting and that by taking advantage of the situation as he thinks he sees it, it might be as good a time as any to march.
I asked him how the Spanish situation was coming. He said there were no new developments. He thought that if the Czechoslovak matter was settled and out of the way they could look forward to peace for some time. He said that what is causing all the trouble with the Italians and the Spanish situation is that both the Italians and the English, when they signed the agreement, believed that the war would be over within 2 months. Halifax, therefore, does not take the hostile attitude toward the Italians that some people think perhaps he should take because, while the Italians agreed only to furnish supplies and equipment to their people who were fighting in Spain at the time the agreement was signed, he thinks now that they are doing that and probably adding on enough to offset what they think the Spanish Government are getting from France and Russia. He wishes it were not so but feels it is no reason to have a row about it yet.
[Page 566]I talked to him about the Jewish situation. He said he was not very well up on it except that Winterton6 had told him [apparent omission] do in Berlin about placing Jews in Rhodesia and Kenya, but just how many they cannot tell yet. He believes that as settlement is attempted on the Jews in Austria and Germany, other countries who want to get rid of their Jews will be encouraged to throw them out, hoping that America, England and France will find some way of taking care of them.
Vansittart is back more or less in favor here, I judge, and is being consulted a great deal on moves that are being made.
Halifax reiterated this morning that they are instructing everybody to make no more speeches on the German-Czechoslovak situation, believing that all has been said that should be said. He feels very strongly, as does Chamberlain, that silence on their part and hoping on our part will get the best results.
I would appreciate some opinion from you as to policy of handling the British attitude if Hitler marches and England decides not to. I think that Chamberlain and Halifax would appreciate your reaction and judgment as to what should be done on this as far as the United States goes.