760F.62/597: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 24—5:15 p.m.]
815. My 799, August 19, 8 p.m.92 This afternoon I had a talk with Lord Halifax regarding the Czechoslovak situation. He said that their information from Berlin was very disquieting. Indications are accumulating that Hitler is planning to settle the present crisis in Czechoslovakia in his own way and if he can on his own terms before the end of September. The Foreign Secretary says he thinks that his informants may have reached over precision in their reports but nevertheless the developing situation is causing them great concern here. He is apprehensive that Hitler may attempt to force the issue before [Page 550] Lord Runciman can make his recommendations. Moreover the reports from Lord Runciman do not hold out very great hopes of a satisfactory outcome. Faced with this situation the British Government he said is in a quandary as to what is the wisest thing to do. If Hitler “collars” by force what he wants in Czechoslovakia no force which France, Great Britain, and Russia can assemble could possibly prevent his accomplishing his purpose. If the three countries moved after the event it would therefore mean a war of indefinite duration to force Germany to disgorge what she had taken, with no assurance even in the case of victory that Czechoslovakia could be reconstituted along the lines of its present set up.
As he sees it there are two major considerations involved in Great Britain and her associates bringing force to bear on behalf of Czechoslovakia. The first is the purely moral issue based on treaties and various international commitments about the meaning of which there can be no doubt. However, the moral issue involved in fighting or not to force Germany to disgorge a conquered Czechoslovakia is no greater than the moral issue involved with Japan in China, and Italy in Abyssinia. The second consideration would be the question whether France and Great Britain in their own self interest should join the issue immediately on Germany’s attacking Czechoslovakia, in an attempt to forestall a perhaps inevitable war with Germany in the future, a war which would have to be fought with a Germany that had accomplished her purpose in Czechoslovakia and mobilized in her favor the resources of all the Danubian countries. A war fought now, however, on the grounds of self interest would narrow itself down to Great Britain and France fighting for the Czechs as against the Sudeten Deutsch. This Lord Halifax thinks would be a most dubious issue on which to wage a war and he indicated that in his opinion the Sudeten grievances against the Czechoslovak Government are indeed very soundly based.
Lord Halifax said that he is now therefore confronted with the problem of whether to encourage the French immediately to implement their obligations to Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack by Germany or to discourage the French from such action. If Hitler risks the gamble that France and Great Britain will not fight, marches into Czechoslovakia and settles the issue by force and France, encouraged by Great Britain, then attacks Germany, Europe will have an immediate war on its hands which might last months or even years. Lord Halifax did not attempt to answer these questions and considerations nor did he say what his Government is going to do but stated them as propositions which are part of the background in their present dilemma.
As I understood Lord Halifax he endeavored to convey the meaning to me that although without any precise knowledge of what [Page 551] German intentions are he and his Government are more than apprehensive of an armed German move against Czechoslovakia and all alternative actions which suggest themselves are beset with dangerous possibilities. At present the British Government stands by the Prime Minister’s declaration of March 24 which was to the effect that the consequences of a German attack on Czechoslovakia could not be foreseen. Lord Halifax said that he thought it would be helpful in deterring Hitler if Lord Runciman could possibly issue some public statement before the Nazi Congress at Nuremburg in the middle of September to the effect that he believed there existed possible and practicable bases for a peaceful settlement between the Czechs and Sudeten Deutsch. He gave me to understand that this idea is being examined with Runciman now. He pointed out, however, the danger in such a statement if possible and practicable bases for settlement of the issue did not in fact exist and it is apparent that Lord Runciman has not yet been willing to declare to his government that they do exist. The background of this horrible situation Lord Halifax said is of course the mentality of Naziism which “comes from the devil” and that there might not be any lasting peace in Europe until that spirit is killed. They were dealing with a man who for all practical purposes is a madman and from that fact arises all of the uncertainty.
Lord Halifax spoke with warm appreciation of the President’s speech at Kingston, Ontario, and of your radio speech of August 16. He believed that these speeches had had a useful effect. He then said, but made it clear that he was not making any request, that if either you or the President could find it possible to make some further declaration directed toward the existing danger in Central Europe at some time before the Nazi Congress meets at Nuremburg he believed it might have a wholesome effect in restraining Hitler.
The Foreign Secretary is a calm personality not given to over emphasis or exaggeration. I believe that he meant to convey to me his sense that the situation at Berlin is not better but worse and is developing dangerously.
- Not printed.↩