760F.62/528: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 29—5:10 p.m.]
699. Embassy’s 679, July 26, 6 p.m.80 A member of my staff was given the following outline of the background leading up to the selection of Lord Runciman as mediator in the Czech Sudeten dispute.
The Foreign Office said that ever since the crisis at the weekend of May 21 the Czech Government on the one hand and the Sudetens on the other had been jockeying for position and it had become increasingly clear that sooner or later they would take position which will in fact constitute a deadlock, the results of which could of course be very serious. The Foreign Office had considered the matter of an international commission but for a number of reasons this had not been adopted. The Foreign Office had gradually come to the conclusion that it would be necessary for an Englishman to undertake the task of mediation and Lord Runciman who in every respect was most admirably qualified agreed to undertake it.
On July 18 the British Minister in Praha was instructed to take the matter up personally with Beneš. In these instructions it was pointed out that the French Government had been urging that concrete proposals be made to the Czech Government but the British Government was against taking this line. The position of the Czech Government and the Sudetens indicated that they were approaching a deadlock. Should the Czech Government ask their Parliament to adopt the nationality statute as a whole, this might lead to a plebiscite which, in view of the delicate situation, would raise a number of problems which would be extremely difficult to surmount. The British Government had decided to select a person of outstanding repute to undertake investigation and mediation. Both sides must agree to facilitate his task. Should the Czech Government refuse this offer, with all the dangers inherent in the present situation, the British Government would have to consider whether it must make the response [Page 538] of the Czech Government public, with the attending explanations that the British Government had not yet approached the Sudetens. The British Government agreed to press the German Government to be helpful. If both sides accepted the suggestion, the idea would be a joint announcement by the Czech Government and the Sudetens. Lord Runciman was ready to proceed to Czechoslovakia when the deadlock appeared to be imminent.
On July 23 the British Minister put the proposal to Beneš, who was very upset. The Minister withdrew to let Beneš consider the question. A short time after, the British Minister was handed the Czech Government’s reply.81 This in substance accepted the proposal and asked that Lord Runciman be sent at once. (It will be noted above that the British proposal was to send Lord Runciman when the deadlock became imminent. The Foreign Office said they were quite agreeable to advancing the date of Lord Runciman’s departure but this forced them to move more quickly with the other parties concerned than they had originally intended).
The British Minister was then instructed to get in touch with Herr Kundt, Herr Henlein’s representative, and handed him a brief written statement of the function which Lord Runciman would fulfill as investigator and mediator and invited the Sudetens to cooperate and facilitate this mediation. The Minister reported on July 26 that, in a cautious reply, Herr Kundt stated that he welcomed an objective study of conditions. This has been taken by the Foreign Office as an acceptance on the part of the Sudetens.
On the same day the British Ambassador in Berlin explained to Weizsäcker the steps taken and pointed out that the German Government had always stated that they were in favor of any agreement which was mutually agreeable to the two parties. The British Ambassador expresses the hope that the German Government would give its help and advice to the Sudetens. The British Ambassador warned Weizsäcker that it was feared that a leak to the press might lead to an announcement before the German Government’s reply could be made. (Lord Runciman’s mission was announced that afternoon in the House of Commons). Weizsäcker replied that he personally was in favor of this proposal but that he must, of course, refer the inquiry to his Secretary of State.
On July 27 the British Ambassador reported that Herr Ribbentrop had given a discouraging reply, objecting to Lord Runciman’s mission on the grounds that the matter had been made public. The Foreign Office said this was “childish”.
Asked whether the Foreign Office thought the matter had been referred to Herr Hitler, they said it was impossible as yet to tell. They [Page 539] did not, however, regard Herr Ribbentrop’s attitude as a serious obstacle in itself. They felt that the German press comment has been good and the German Embassy in London was well disposed.
Lord Runciman is leaving on August 2, assisted by R. J. Ford who served on the Simon Commission to India and lately on the Standstill Agreement, and by Ashton-Gwatkin, who is being detached temporarily from the Foreign Office “and its payroll” for this purpose.
In reply to an inquiry the Foreign Office said that the French Government had been helpful and had approved this plan but they had to be careful because they were in the awkward position of laying themselves open to being charged by the Czechs with trying to use this as a pretext to get out of their alliance with Czechoslovakia.
The Foreign Office said that should the President or the Secretary feel that he could make some public statement expressing approval of Lord Runciman’s mission this would have a favorable effect on world opinion and Lord Halifax would naturally be much gratified.