760F.62/401: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:10 p.m.]
899. François-Poncet, French Ambassador to Berlin, who has been in Paris for the past 3 days and will return tonight to his post, expressed to me this morning most serious apprehension with regard to the Czechoslovak situation.
He described at length his recent conversations with Ribbentrop and said that those conversations invariably ended by Ribbentrop striking the table and saying that Germany was now a nation of 75,000,000, with the strongest army in the world, which could crush any opposition, which it was entirely ready to use and would use in defense of the Sudeten Germans. François-Poncet said that he invariably reminded Ribbentrop that it was his duty as Minister for Foreign Affairs not to prepare war but peace and that if Germany should attempt to gain her aims by war she would get a reception from France and England which would surprise her and that the United States would be in the offing.
Poncet said that under such conditions as these it was of course extremely difficult to carry on diplomatic conversations. He was nevertheless about to make a final effort. He had suggested to the French Government during this visit that he should be empowered, on his return to Berlin tonight, to propose to the German Government that there should be an informal tripartite discussion between representatives of England, France, and Germany—preferably Henderson, Ribbentrop, and himself—to attempt to work out a settlement of the German-Czech conflict on the understanding that if it should be possible to reach agreement the Czechs would be told by England, France, and Germany unitedly that they would have to accept the settlement. Poncet said that he would approach this matter with the greatest delicacy and the utmost secrecy.
I asked him what basis of solution he would suggest. He said that he would suggest immediate and full autonomy for the Sudeten regions.
[Page 525]Poncet added that the German press had been instructed to keep excitement about Czechoslovakia at white heat and that he expected some sort of a political move by the Germans and the Sudeten against the Czechs about June 14 immediately after the results of next Sunday’s elections should become known. He thought that it was possible that the Sudeten might announce that since the elections were the equivalent of a plebescite showing that nearly 95 percent of the Sudeten were Nazis of Henlein’s party, they should be given immediate autonomy and if such autonomy should be refused they would take it. Poncet hoped that his diplomatic move in Berlin might anticipate and prevent such action by the Sudeten.
He went on to say that all his information indicated that Beneš would not offer the Sudeten a sufficient degree of autonomy to satisfy them even for a moment unless the greatest possible pressure should be placed on him. He alluded again to the possible danger that the Czechs themselves might decide that Czechoslovakia would never find a more favorable moment to fight than the present moment and might therefore precipitate an incident in the Sudeten regions which would bring the German troops across the border and force France to march.
Poncet said he feared equally that some Sudeten-German might decide to precipitate a war; or that some emissary of Goering might order the Sudeten leaders to precipitate war.
In conclusion Poncet said that he felt that we were just now beginning to enter a period in which war would be imminent for a number of months. He expected a series of crises. He considered it improbable that the Germans would provoke war deliberately before the 15th of July when their major crops would be harvested. A bloody incident in the Sudeten regions might, however, precipitate war at any time.
I saw Bonnet again last night at dinner. He had no further information with regard to any immediate concessions by the Czechs to the Sudeten.
In spite of the momentary calm I continue to believe that the situation is most serious. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that your speech at Nashville66 has been regarded throughout Europe as a powerful factor for peace. Bonnet, Poncet and other Frenchmen have spoken of it in the highest terms of praise and from a gentleman who has just come from Berlin, where he has close connections with the German Army, I gathered that your words had inserted a large question mark in the calculations of the German Government.
- Delivered at Nashville, Term., June 3; for text of speech, see Department of State, The Spirit of International Law (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1938).↩