760F.62/281: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 22—6:55 p.m.]
811. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Bonnet has just read to me a memorandum which the British Ambassador in Berlin presented to Ribbentrop last night. The memorandum stated inter-alia:
The British Government had been urging moderation on the Czech Government.
The French Government had informed the British Government many times in the past few days that if German troops should cross the frontier into Czechoslovakia France would carry out the terms of her alliance with Czechoslovakia, mobilize at once and declare war on Germany.
The German Government was aware of the friendship and close collaboration of the British and French Governments and it was impossible to conceal the fact that if France should be drawn into war by Germany attacking Czechoslovakia Great Britain would be obliged to support France.
The limits of a war started in this manner could not be predicted. Countries remote from the original site of the conflict would be drawn in at an earlier or later date. There was then a phrase couched in diplomatic language which meant, if it meant anything, that Great Britain would go to war in support of France immediately.
The memorandum ended with a description of the common interests of England and France and their common devotion to democracy and human freedom.
[Page 513]Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, reported that Ribbentrop became livid with rage on hearing the contents of this memorandum. He called Henderson’s attention to the fact that in addition to the two Sudeten killed yesterday the Czechs had wounded 80 more. He said that Great Britain should properly give her advice to the Czech Government and not to the German Government.
Ribbentrop finally concluded by saying that Germany would protect Germans on the Czech side of the frontier and that even though England were to take the course outlined in the British Government’s memorandum, Germany would not hesitate to make war any more than she had hesitated in 1914.
Bonnet said that during the whole of last night he had been in agony as he had feared that Hitler would order immediate mobilization of two German classes in reply to the Czech mobilization of two classes. He said that the British would press the Czech Government tomorrow to make really great concessions to the Sudeten. I asked him if Osusky, the Czech Minister in Paris, had informed him as he had informed me of the concessions that the Czech Government was prepared to make (see my telegram No. 808, May 21, 9 p.m.). He said Osusky had not given him this information and when I repeated to him the terms of these concessions he said that they would certainly be totally inadequate.
Bonnet said that the British Government would certainly press the Czech Government to make greater concessions than these and would demand that the Czechoslovak Government make concessions which would really satisfy for the moment both Henlein and Hitler. If the Czech Government should refuse to make such concessions after advice by the British, the French Government would say to the Czechoslovak Government that it fully supported these concessions and that the Franco-Czech Alliance51 would be placed in question if Czechoslovakia did not accord the concessions.
Bonnet, who was acutely disturbed, then implored me to have our Government do whatever it could to work out a solution of the conflict. He asked me if it might not be possible for our Government to instruct our Minister at Praha to call on Beneš and state that the Czechoslovak Government would not have the sympathy of the American Government if it should not attempt seriously to produce a [Page 514] peaceful solution of this conflict by making concessions to the Sudeten Germans which would satisfy Henlein and Hitler.
Bonnet then said to me that last night a telephone call had come from Charlottesville, Virginia, from the President to Daladier. Daladier had been unavailable and when he, Bonnet, had tried to get the President on the telephone at Charlottesville the reply had been that the President had already left for a fishing trip. I should be obliged if you would inform me whether or not this is true as I was unable to offer any explanation of the reason for the call.52
Bonnet went on to discuss the chances of France declaring war if the German troops should cross into Czechoslovakia. He was much depressed when I told him that Blum53 with whom I spent several hours today was passionately in favor of war and that Blum had predicted that all the Socialists would vote for war.
Bonnet said that the French Senate would vote unanimously against war. He feared, however, that the resistance of the Senate would be inadequate. If the Germans should mobilize the French would be obliged to mobilize. The Germans would probably then send an ultimatum to France. In the face of an ultimatum from Germany war would be inevitable.
Bonnet again urged that our Government should reinforce the British action in Praha. He added that he was more convinced than ever that a French attack on Germany at the present time would result in the destruction of France. Again he predicted that Paris would be destroyed meter by meter by German air attacks. The Polish Ambassador had just informed him that Poland positively would not march against Germany. Rumania would not march. France’s only assistance at the outset would be Negrin54 and Stalin55—a pretty pair!
I assume that the British Government is keeping you fully informed with regard to the efforts it is making in Praha and in Berlin. I believe that if the British Government should make in Praha as strong a démarche as it made in Berlin last night and if the Czechs should refuse to accede to the British demands the French would bring great pressure on Czechoslovakia.
But Beneš can throw the Continent into war by shooting some more Sudeten. And the question is whether or not he has decided that it is in the interest of Czechoslovakia to provoke war now, when the support of France and England is almost certain. From a mass of reports, verbal and written, I am inclined to believe that Beneš prefers [Page 515] war to real concessions. Under such circumstances I believe that a statement to Beneš by the American Minister in Praha of the nature suggested by Bonnet is fully justified. If Wilson in Berlin could inform the German Government that such a démarche had been made in Praha Ribbentrop might listen favorably to urgings of patience, in spite of the German Government’s hatred of the United States.
- Treaty of mutual guarantee, signed October 16, 1925, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv, p. 359.↩
- No further record regarding this matter has been found in Department files.↩
- Léon Blum, leader of the Socialist Party and former President of the French Council of Ministers.↩
- Juan Negrín, Spanish Premier and Minister for Defense.↩
- Joseph V. Stalin, Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party.↩