863.00/1628
The Ambassador in Germany (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to set forth certain impressions of the popular reaction in Germany to Hitler’s triumph in Austria, particularly such overtones and variations of emphasis as are not disclosed in the controlled press which for the most part has provided only a monotonous abundance of uncritical and undiscriminating praise and adulation.
It may be said at the outset that the Austrian victory has been the greatest success achieved during the five years’ existence of National Socialist Germany, its appeal to the popular imagination having far outshone that of the victory in the Saar. Apart from the more naive who regard the Führer as infallible (and these are many, if indeed not the majority of the population), the intricacy and subtlety of Hitler’s diplomacy has not always been understood by certain sections of the public who have entertained misgivings and have had to endure much sacrifice before the advent of the latest crowning achievement in Austria.
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First place in the initial burst of popular exuberance over the conquest of Austria is perhaps taken by the feeling that Germany is now indubitably the most powerful nation on the Continent, if indeed not in the world in a military sense. Admiration is felt for Hitler’s diplomacy which, five years after his accession to the leadership of a weak and dejected nation, should produce such a success without the firing of a single cannon. Tribute is furthermore paid to Hitler’s historical mission in being able for the first time to lay the basis of a Pan-Germanic Reich motivated from Germany, an aim projected as far back as the Frankfort Parliament of 1848 which, however, no statesman in the intervening 90 years had been able to bring about. With an enthusiasm in no way impaired by the recollection that Austria itself was prepared for union with Germany following the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire after the War, the public, echoing the press, eulogizes Hitler as a greater German figure than either Charlemagne or [Page 463] Bismarck, and as a leader who, although he has been favored to some degree by fortune, has played out his fate with the stroke of genius to yield a victory of the first magnitude without loss of life by war.
In addition to these sentiments of patriotism and the natural response that success of the most brilliant kind evokes, there is a deeprooted popular conviction that Austria will be of very material benefit to the Reich. With a hope that outruns analysis of trade and economic problems the German public looks upon Austria as a promised land which will supply the Fatherland with milk and butter, will provide it with necessary timber and iron ore, and will open up a paradise for “Strength through Joy” vacationers. Leaving it to his leaders to work out the time and method the laborer feels that the union will inevitably result in an improvement in his standard of living, while German business men, in those lines not likely to suffer from Austrian competition, await impatiently the day when they will be able to expand their internal markets.
By what might be called the underprivileged groups in Germany, the conquest of Austria is received with somewhat mixed feelings. Many Catholics believe that the desire to placate the preponderantly Catholic Austrian public may lead to a better treatment of that Church and may indeed pave the way for an eventual settlement with the Vatican. Other Catholics, however, who are convinced that National Socialism is not to be reconciled with Christianity, mourn the disappearance of Austria as the last bulwark in Central Europe representing and embodying Catholicism in a form unadulterated by German National Socialism and Italian Fascism. The latter group regard it as of some significance that one of Hitler’s first actions was to appoint an anti-Catholic Gauleiter (Bürckel of the Saar-Palatinate) to manage the plebiscite and direct Party affairs in Austria. (While this consideration carries some weight, it would appear that Bürckel was chosen primarily because of his ability and experience gained in reincorporating the Saar within the Reich.) By the Jews, of course, the annexation of Austria is regarded as a catastrophe, while the small minority of intellectuals, completely impervious to patriotic pride, view it with despair as signifying the extinction of the last sanctuary where German tradition and culture had been permitted to survive the stultifying influence of National Socialism.
One of the prices to be paid under a dictatorship is the annihilation of a public conscience, and hence the mobilization of brute force to secure the Austrian triumph does not bother the general public overmuch although it has caused certain misgivings among the minority who still believe that adherence to the spirit as well as to the letter of the law in international relations is the best guarantee of peace. Even in these circles, however, indignation is mitigated by a feeling [Page 464] that Schuschnigg, as a minority dictator, employed bad faith to perpetuate his harsh and unpopular rule by an electioneering trick. In short, there are very few Germans, irrespective of association with the Party, who are not touched with pride at being a German—the older whose recollection of the post-War days of humiliation is still vivid, the younger whose imagination has been fired by National Socialist creed and accomplishment.
Whatever may now be the state of jubilation, the critical days and nights of March 11 and 12 yielded some tense moments. The fury of the German press attacks upon Schuschnigg and the termination of the late evening broadcast on March 11 with Seyss-Inquart’s request for troops, appears to have left Berlin, at least, in an atmosphere of eerie tension. Even the announcement of the next day, that the German troops had entered Austria and were being welcomed as deliverers of the nation, did not entirely reassure apprehensions. Foreign travelers returning to Berlin from other parts of Germany report that they were besieged with many questions as to what really was happening. (Even as yet, apparently, the German public does not accept uncritically the news furnished by the controlled press and radio.) In particular, the question was uppermost in many people’s minds as to what the other powers might do, as it appeared almost unbelievable to the German public that some form of intervention might not be attempted. It is not too much to say that the inaction of other countries has led to a feeling of revulsion and contempt for these countries, even including Italy, which is regarded as being outbluffed, and the growth of a belief that Germany is invincible and can work its will where it pleases.
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Respectfully yours,