863.00/1451: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:50 p.m.]
120. In separate conversations between the Counselor of this Embassy with the Chief of the Political Section of the Foreign Office, the Italian Counselor and the Austrian First Secretary the following was brought out concerning the Austrian development:
1. Chief of the Political Section: The notes of the British and French Governments to the German Government while neither joint nor identic were similar. The same is true of the German replies thereto which were made yesterday afternoon.
Weizsäcker64 characterized the British and French notes as “strongly worded protests”; they did not “ask anything” but protested against German action as violating the independence of a third state including the employment of military compulsion.
The German position [was] that this was not a matter for third parties but solely the concern of the German peoples. While the German Government thus regarded the protests as “inadmissible” it was nevertheless not unwilling to answer the point concerning the employment of military force. The notes thereupon express the German position in substance as follows:
A few weeks ago the Chancellor, apprehensive that the internal Austrian situation was becoming dangerous, invited the Austrian Chancellor to discuss the situation with a view to its being met by measures which through friendly developments would guarantee the interests of both states. The Berchtesgaden Agreement if loyally executed by Austria would have had this effect. Inconsistent with this agreement the Austrian Chancellor on March 9, without consultation with Germany and definitely outside of the terms of the Berchtesgaden understanding, undertook to project a plebiscite which in view of the shortness of the time allowed for its preparation and in view of other attendant circumstances was obviously not destined to obtain an expression of the majority desires of the Austrian people. This action not only produced a state of violent and dangerous excitement throughout Austria but having been taken without consultation with members of the Austrian Cabinet created a serious Cabinet crisis. The result was a change in the Austrian Government. It is not true that Germany employed forceful compulsion to bring about this change and it is further untrue as the former Austrian Chancellor is understood to have stated that the German Government served an ultimatum [Page 435] on the Austrian President that a new Austrian Cabinet should be formed in line with German stipulations. The truth is rather that the question of the despatch of German forces into Austria did not arise until the new Austrian Government had urgently requested the sending of German troops to restore order and prevent bloodshed. It was solely in response to a belief that bloody internal strife in Austria was an imminent possibility that the German Government decided to accede to the request of the Austrian Government. The only danger to peace which could now arise would be the intervention of third powers or the opposition of third powers to an expression of the principle of self-determination on the part of the German peoples.
Weizsäcker stated that no government other than the British and French had taken any action in this matter and added that the German Government had been specifically informed that the Italian, Polish, and Czechoslovak Governments would take no action.
In respect of future developments Weizsäcker expressed himself somewhat cryptically to the effect that the plebiscite in Austria mentioned in the German announcements would take the form of an “election” but he declined to expand on this.
2. Italian Counselor: Magistrati was surprisingly frank in expressing the Italian views on the Austrian developments. He recapitulated antecedent happenings by saying that Rome had not been consulted by Germany in respect of the Berchtesgaden conversations nor had Austria consulted Rome in respect of the project for a plebiscite. Had Vienna consulted Rome concerning the latter Italy would have strongly advised against any such action. He stated that in his view Schuschnigg had been lamentably unwise in the courses he had followed. He said that it should be recalled that the Berchtesgaden conversations took place only a few days after the events of February 4 which had shaken the German Government and that Hitler’s statements to Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden contained “elements of a bluff”. Had Schuschnigg contemplated resistance to the German demands he should have done so at that moment; but to accept these demands and then to go back to Vienna and to recant and to endeavor to overthrow his understandings with Germany was suicidal. Above all the announcements of measures for a plebiscite to be held in so short a time was not only impractical but gave an excuse for precipitate German action. Had Schuschnigg been wise he would have adopted a policy of moving slowly and cautiously on the theory that time might run in Austria’s favor and that any creation of an immediate issue could not but have unfortunate results.
The Counselor stated that Paris had asked Rome to join in the protest to Berlin. Rome had, however, perceived that events were moving too rapidly to effect any change in their course and that any [Page 436] such protest would be too late to be of value. He said that from a practical point of view the British and French notes were valueless but that he quite understood this action as animated by a desire “to keep the record straight” especially in view of legislative interpellations.
The Counselor then recounted the German project for Hitler’s candidature for President of Austria as reported in Embassy’s 119, March 12, 8 p.m.65 He said that President Miklas would remain in office and conduct the election. This was in line with Hitler’s policy when he had come into power in Germany to the effect that everything should be conducted along ostensibly legal lines. He stated that there was no doubt whatsoever but that Hitler would be elected President of Austria inasmuch as aside from the question as to whether the election would be “fair” the Austrian people would undoubtedly vote overwhelmingly on the side of a display of power. He did not know just what aspects the two Governments would present after Hitler’s election as President of Austria. He personally was inclined to believe, however, that Hitler would occupy solely the offices of Chief of State of Germany and President of Austria, that Goering might be appointed Chancellor of Germany and some Austrian as Chancellor of Austria and that Hitler would “rule” both states from Berchtesgaden. He further believed that Hitler would resist a “Prussianization” of Austria, would establish Austrian National Socialism as an Austrian affair and would restrain German National Socialists from intervening in Austria.
The Counselor stated in strict confidence that his Embassy had received word direct from Mussolini that Italy was standing entirely to one side in this entire matter. He understood that Poland was taking a similar position. He said that Goering had informed the Czechoslovak Minister here that “nothing respecting Czechoslovakia was contemplated” but the Counselor speculated as to how long this might last.
The interesting feature of the Counselor’s conversation was that while naturally he said nothing directly against the German Government or against German policy his entire attitude was far from being warm toward Germany and appeared to indicate not only a definite resentment and disapproval of Germany’s action but a degree of consternation in respect of the Austrian development. At a reference to a press report that German soldiers had shaken hands with the Italian brothers at the Brenner the Counselor winced.
3. Austrian First Secretary: Schwartzenberg states in confidence that his Legation had not only received no advices from Vienna concerning Schuschnigg’s measures for a plebiscite but had not been [Page 437] consulted in any way respecting Austrian policy vis-à-vis a possible German attitude. He was unable to account for Schuschnigg’s action but believes that he must have been badly misled by the acclaim which his speech had occasioned and ill advised by his circle of associates. He does not know whether or not Vienna received encouragement from other states. Schwartzenberg although an ardent advocate of Austrian independence feels that Schuschnigg’s policy was nothing short of madness. The Austrian Legation, aware of the temper of the German Government, had hoped that Vienna would follow the policy of playing for time. He perceives the present situation as a fait accompli and definitely believes that nothing whatsoever can be done to alter it.