863.00/1448: Telegram
The Minister in Yugoslavia (Lane) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:20 p.m.]
29. Stoyadinovitch expressed himself substantially as follows to me in interview this morning on developments in Austria.
As the situation is due to a National—or National Socialist—revolution and is hence internal Yugoslavia does not intend to meddle in the matter. Schuschnigg had only one-third of the people on his side and was fearful of the result of the proposed plebiscite as is shown by his having limited the suffrage to men of 24 years and older, the younger men being pro-Nazi. If Austria wishes to join with Germany in accordance with the principle of nationalities as outlined by President Wilson in his fourteen points58 it is not up to Yugoslavia to object. Schuschnigg’s recent steps, of making an inflammatory speech immediately after the Berchtesgaden conversations and then calling a plebiscite, were very impolitic. Yesterday’s action does not constitute an invasion of Austria; the German troops were sent because Austria (he did not say Austrian Government) desired and requested them. Hitler will shortly visit Vienna leaving Goering in Germany as both cannot be absent from the country simultaneously.
The question is whether European equilibrium can be maintained. This is up to the Great Powers, not up to Yugoslavia. Italy does not like the situation but Italy has in Germany her strongest advocate in the matter of the recognition of the conquest Abyssinia. For Italy the matter of Ethiopia is all important. It is not worthwhile for Italy to make trouble with Germany for the sake of Austria. Austria being German in race would never fight against Germany at this or at any other time. Between Abyssinia and Austria, Italy naturally chose the first, “a big mouthful which must be digested”. Although Italy knew as did Yugoslavia that the Anschluss was imminent it was kept ignorant of the exact plans for consummation, the step having been precipitated by Schuschnigg’s policy. (Presumably German Minister advised Stoyadinovitch as he advised me (see my telegram of February 17, No. 20 and my despatch No. 144, February 2159).) Neither Great Britain nor France will go to war over Austria. France especially is at present in such an uncertain political state that no concerted action is possible. As to the future there is little danger of Hitler’s proceeding further, at least at present. If steps similar to those adopted in Austria are taken with respect to Czechoslovakia Germany would have to risk war with France. It is doubtful [Page 432] that Germany would take such a step. Furthermore the recent construction of Czechoslovakian fortifications against Germany was not an academic gesture. Czechoslovakia would undoubtedly strongly resist a German attack. The logical next step of Germany would be towards the south and first with respect to German minorities in Italy. Such a move would automatically reunite Italy, France and Great Britain. A move against the Polish corridor would likewise upset the balance of power a condition which Germany cannot afford. At present with the aid of Italy she is the most powerful country in Europe. But if Italy, Great Britain and France should present a united front Germany could do nothing. In the event of a German attack on Italy, Yugoslavia would be an ally of Italy and would resist “jusqu’au bout”. For Yugoslavia the key to the situation is Italy’s attitude. France and Great Britain are responsible for present situation particularly Great Britain. If Eden had as a practical necessity recognized the conquest of Abyssinia Italian-British relations would not have become strained to the point that Germany’s move against Austria could have been made without resistance on the part of Italy and Great Britain. The British attitude of talking like professors to other countries has irritated everybody. (He clearly indicated that he personally resents the British attitude towards Yugoslavia.) The Prime Minister recently endeavored to blame him for the German strong attitude and threatened him that [apparent omission] counteract the German-Yugoslav friendship a triangle would be formed composed of Praha, Budapest and Vienna. Yesterday’s steps show how effective such a threat would be.
Germany will probably now make an insistent demand for the return of her colonies and will, because of present situation, probably be able to bluff the other powers.
There will be no troop movements in Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia remains with her arms folded.
As will be noted Stoyadinovic’s statements regarding German policy towards Austria were guardedly worded. The Prime Minister probably realizes that he is blamed by many here for having been taken in by Hitler and hence as having contributed, however unconsciously, to the recent move against Austria. The general attitude in Belgrade although [that of?] calm awakening [is] bitterly critical of the German step. Even subordinates of Stoyadinovic cautiously indicate their disapproval of his policy which if not openly pro-German certainly leans in friendship towards Berlin and Rome. Copy to Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Vienna, Budapest, Praha, Warsaw.
- Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement I, vol. i, p. 15.↩
- Despatch not printed.↩