863.00/1425: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 12—11:15 a.m.]
114. Just saw Nevile Henderson. He read to me a telegram which he had just started drafting for his Government approximately as follows:
“Yesterday I did everything humanly possible to save Schuschnigg from the results of his incredible folly.”50
Henderson received instructions in the morning to protest and do what he could to avert the menace to Austria. He could not get in touch with anybody in authority until 5 o’clock, when Neurath51 received him. He put the matter vigorously to Neurath and followed this with a strongly worded note. Goering gave a party last night at which I saw him take off Henderson for an extended conversation. Henderson said that he had told Goering vigorously that this step disrupted the immediate hope of England and Germany finding a common ground; that knowing the Chancellor’s attitude towards the press he recommended that the press officers keep from him 99 percent of the world’s press in the next few days. Goering told Henderson that the Germans intended to withdraw their forces at the earliest possible moment order was established; that the Chancellor of Austria would then state that an election would be held under “fair and free conditions” as to the fate of Austria and that Germany would welcome in Austria the presence of the journalists of the world to see that this election was freely carried out.
Henderson said that this was another of the house of cards which had collapsed. The British had attempted over and over again to establish more cordial relations with Germany. He himself had last year arranged for the Neurath visit which was upset by the Leipzig episode;52 the Halifax visit was followed by a change in the British [Page 426] Government favoring more intimate contact with Germany and now he feared that this policy was again shattered.
He saw nothing whatever to do except to make the best of this situation and try to prevent Beneš53 from encountering a similar fate. They must not repeat the folly of urging Beneš not to make concessions and to stand pat. It was incredible to count on help from England or even France and Beneš would be wisely advised—and he hoped he would be so advised—to make his own peace with Germany. No more disservice could be done than giving any encouragement to Beneš such as was probably given to Schuschnigg to stand pat and resist.
Henderson said that he alone had borne the brunt of this battle. François-Poncet had merely called on him in the evening and written approximately the same note in French that Henderson sent in in English. The lack of a French Government has paralyzed him. Henderson felt that the final loser among the big powers of Europe in this matter was Mussolini; that Italy “thrust thereto by the British Government” had turned towards Germany and was now about to pay the penalty by having this mighty neighbor on its flank. If the Axis remained Italy would be the tail of the dog. If it was dissolved Italy would be the first to be menaced by the present condition.
- This apparently refers to document printed as No. 49 in Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1989, 3d ser., vol. i, p. 25. The first two sentences read: “I greatly regret failure of my efforts to prevent series of events as regards Austria. It can however be stated that everything that could be done short of direct threat of force, was done here to save Austria from consequences of Dr. Schuschnigg’s ill-conceived and ill-prepared folly.”↩
- Baron Konstantin von Neurath, President of Hitler’s Privy Council; replaced as Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs by Joachim von Ribbentrop in February 1938.↩
- Alleged attacks by Spanish submarines on German cruiser Leipzig in June 1937.↩
- Edouard Beneš, President of Czechoslovakia.↩