863.00/1414: Telegram
The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 11—3:30 p.m.]
24. The Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a representative to me this morning with the information that mobilization of the class of fifteen has been ordered in Austria; that Germany has closed the German-Austrian frontier; that it is believed Germany is prepared directly to intervene in Austria; that the fact that Reichenau has been sent into the region adjoining Austria is regarded as particularly significant and that the movement could only be stopped by support of Austria by the Great Powers. Authorities here think France and England understand this and may have already made their position known in Berlin. They say Schuschnigg declaration for a plebiscite came as a complete surprise to this Government. The Berchtesgaden Agreement has not been effective. The Nazi pressure continued and even after Schuschnigg’s declaration of February 20 that Austria would not go further than the Berchtesgaden Agreement the Nazi pressure continued. Seyss-Inquart acted too independently and not in harmony with Schuschnigg who was at last forced to seek cooperation of the Austrian Social Democrats (trade unions) whose help he can now count on. He then ordered the plebiscite with a view to clarifying the situation. The speed with which the move was made, the unpreparedness of the Nazis and the exclusion of youngsters from voting give conditions favorable for success. Reported the Nazis will not participate. If Schuschnigg wins, however, the Nazi pressure from Germany will continue and there will be no absolute victory. If Schuschnigg should not win Foreign Office believes he will resign and chaos is expected in Austria. Authorities believe that Anschluss may yet be avoided if a real interest in Austrian independence is manifested by the Western Powers and particularly by Italy which they understand approve Schuschnigg’s move. Confidentially they regard the plebiscite as a violation of article 88 of the Saint-Germain Treaty.47
There seems to be no fear of a German attack on Czechoslovakia but the developments in Austria have revived the uneasiness here which had largely subsided and there is now an undercurrent of much anxiety. The Foreign Office is convinced that the Czechoslovak basis of settlement was discussed between von Ribbentrop and Halifax yesterday. However, it claims to be fully satisfied with Chamberlain’s recent statement identifying himself with Eden’s previous statement regarding Great Britain’s interest in Central Europe. It is claimed [Page 421] that French declaration of loyalty to Czechoslovakia automatically assures Anglo-French cooperation. While there is a hopeful attitude toward Anglo-Italian negotiations Foreign Office officials are skeptical in regard to Anglo-German negotiations because they are convinced Great Britain cannot afford to give Germany a free hand in Eastern and Central Europe.
Late advices received here of Austrian mobilization indicate that primary purpose is to preserve order during Sunday plebiscite.
I have found no evidence that Monarchist restoration in Austria is regarded seriously here.
Copies to Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna by mail.
- Signed September 10, 1919, Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910–1923 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. iii, pp. 3149, 3181.↩