Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1938, General, Volume I

863.00/1399: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Paris, March 10, 1938—7 p.m.
[Received March 10—4:44 p.m.]

368. I had a talk today with a member of the Austrian Legation. He told me that plans for Sunday’s plebiscite had been matured with the utmost secrecy and without consultation with any foreign government. He said that it was a bold and risky stroke but such were the only tactics which could save Austria. He said that the report which I had heard to the effect that Mussolini had been consulted before the decision was taken to hold the plebiscite is untrue. If Austria had consulted Mussolini he would probably have consulted Hitler and that would have been the end of the story. My informant said that the Austrian Nazis were disconcerted and furious. They had hoped to have a plebiscite on their own terms in April and by that time intimidation and boring from within would have gone so far that the result would have been in their favor. It is not yet clear what tactics the Nazis will follow. If they were wise they would vote in favor of the question under plebiscite saying that the formula was sufficiently broad so that they could support it. If, however, as is hoped will be the case, they abstain from voting or vote against the question then the results of the vote will establish clearly that only a small minority is opposed to Austrian independence. This would be an important moral factor in other countries in case Hitler should subsequently attempt to ride roughshod over Austria.

He said that the present political crisis in France was deplorable from the point of view of Austria. It was a further indication of the weakness of the countries opposing Hitler’s expansion in Central Europe and might encourage him to adopt brutal tactics again at an early date.

My informant said that Austria knew perfectly well that she could not count on any effective assistance from Italy. It is true that before Schuschnigg made his speech on February 23 [24] Mussolini had encouraged him to make a vigorous speech. However, Mussolini was using Austria merely as a pawn in blackmailing England, stating to Chamberlain that there must be an Anglo-Italian settlement so that Italy can be strong to resist Germany in Central Europe. Once he gets what he wants from Chamberlain he will again abandon Austria to Hitler whenever he can get a good price for it.

I have also seen today the Berlin correspondent of Havas who returned to Paris this morning but is being sent back to Berlin immediately to cover the German reaction to the announcement of the Austrian plebiscite. He said that anyone who believed that the events of February 4⁴⁴ had weakened the regime in Germany was greatly mistaken. In his judgment the country is solidly behind Hitler. He states that there are indications that the tactics of intimidation being used against Czechoslovakia are from the German point of view bearing fruit.

Copy to Berlin, Vienna, Praha.

Wilson

44. On February 4 the resignation of Field Marshal von Blomberg and General von Fritsch from their military posts was made public and Hitler declared himself Commander in Chief of the German Army. On the same day Neurath resigned as Reich Foreign Minister and was succeeded by Ribbentrop.