740.00/456: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:45 p.m.]
215. Charles, British Chargé d’Affaires here, has shown the Embassy a draft of a summary from his point of view of the present Italian position vis-à-vis the international situation. He is telegraphing this summary to his Government. The summary in question slightly amplified by subsequent conversation follows. Charles finds that Italian policy has recently encountered many reverses. The quick decision hoped for in Spain has not materialized, Ethiopia is not paying dividends, the internal economic situation with particular reference to the wheat harvest is not satisfactory, propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding. Most important of all, according to Charles, Italy has definitely become the junior partner in the Rome–Berlin Axis and at present is in no position to resist German diplomatic pressure. For these reasons Charles considers that Mussolini is extremely anxious to render valid the Anglo-Italian Pact as soon as possible and is also courting Hungary and Yugoslavia in order to free his hands. Charles does not envisage a breakup of the Rome–Berlin Axis which is proving valuable to both partners but sees a desire on Italy’s part to restore the 50–50 basis rudely upset by the Anschluss. Although admitting always latent Franco-Italian hostility he sees the present press campaign against France as the result of German pressure to bring about a division of French attention during the present Czech crisis. In this connection he states that Blondel, French Chargé d’Affaires, informed him that when Blondel saw Ciano on May 8th the last day of Hitler’s visit in Rome, Blondel’s reception was so markedly cold in comparison with a previous meeting of a few days before that temporarily Blondel was at a complete loss to explain it. Charles does not believe that Italy wants war, is in a position to make war, or will seriously back Germany in any Central European adventure. He believes that there is still time not to break the Axis but to restore it to its proper proportions through a gesture from Britain notably putting [Page 72] into effect the Anglo-Italian Pact.7 He also hopes Franco’s reply to the Non-Intervention Committee’s note8 will not be summarily dismissed but will serve as a basis for further discussion. He fears, however, that France may tie Britain’s hands in this. He entertains little doubt as to the durability of Italian promises but feels that temporarily they can be trusted until a better bargain arises for Italy. In the meantime Italy’s “nuisance value” is worth placating. He feels that Berlin is of the same opinion except that momentarily Germany is in a position to exploit rather than placate the value last named. He does not exclude the possibility that an Italy checked at all points and rendered desperate might completely throw in her lot with Germany and if successful be content with a junior partner’s share in the profits. Finally he entertains little doubt of Italian reenforcements to Spain and read telegrams from British agents in Bengasi, Tunis and Naples on that subject. Bengasi and Tunis reported substantial withdrawal of garrisons from their respective areas while Naples claimed clandestine shipping of troops. To sum up Charles recommends to his Government a favorable opportunity to restore equilibrium in the Rome–Berlin Axis thus deterring Central European ambitions of Germany although Britain should not expect through this a lasting solution of Anglo-Italian issues.