793.94116/46¾
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The British Ambassador called to see me at my request. I discussed with him the two memoranda which he had left with me under date of June 3.68
With regard to the memorandum in which the British Government requested that the United States through its Ambassador in Tokyo take simultaneous action with the British Government in protesting to the Japanese Government concerning the recent bombing of Canton, I said to the Ambassador that the request which had been made of us in this connection by the British Government had been drafted before the British Government had learned of the public statement issued by the Department of State on June 3 condemning the bombing of civilian populations and of undefended localities. The Japanese [Page 207] Government, of course, had at once been apprised of this public statement issued by the United States, and in fact, the spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Office on June 4 had referred to it publicly. Furthermore, I added, the Department was informed by the American Ambassador in Tokyo that he had been told by his British colleague that the British protest had already been communicated by the latter to the Japanese Foreign Minister. In view of these circumstances, I said, it seemed to the Secretary of State and to me that for this Government now after a lapse of three days to reiterate to the Japanese Government a protest of which it had already been fully aware would seem to serve no useful purpose and, in fact, in my judgment would weaken the force of the statement already issued by this Government. The Ambassador seemed to be fully in accord with these observations and expressed his acquiescence.
I then took up the memorandum in which this Government was requested to designate an officer for appointment to an international committee composed of representatives of Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, and the United States which would reside in France and which would undertake to proceed to such places in Spain as suffered bombing attacks in order to determine whether or not the localities bombed were defended or undefended, and subsequently to make public its findings.
At the outset of our discussion of this memorandum I repeated to the Ambassador what I had said to him on two or three occasions in the past, namely, that while this Government was always willing to consider most carefully any request made of it by the British Government for the purpose of cooperation in the interest of the maintenance of peace and in the attaining of humanitarian objectives, nevertheless, it was very difficult for this Government to be helpful when these requests of the British Government were permitted to become public in the press before this Government had had an opportunity of making its reply or even, as in the present instance, of ascertaining the full details of the plan which the British Government had in mind. The Ambassador at once expressed his very hearty approval of what I had said, reminded me that he had communicated these views on several occasions to his Government, and said that he was at a loss to understand why the British Government permitted such a request to be published before we had had an opportunity of making reply. He said he fully understood our embarrassment and that he would even more emphatically urge upon his Government the need for refraining from this kind of procedure in the future.
I then said to the Ambassador that the Secretary of State wished me to let him know that before this Government could make any reply to the present request it seemed necessary to ask for clarification [Page 208] on certain points. I said the more important of these points were the following:
- First, had the British Government received any indication either from the Loyalist Government or from the Franco regime that they would agree to the plan proposed by the British Government; furthermore, was there any other background with regard to the formulation of this request which would be helpful to this Government in formulating its decision.
- Second, it was not clear to this Government how the officers selected by the four Governments named to become members of the commission could “commit no one but themselves” and we did not see either how it could be assumed that no “political considerations entered into this question”.
- Third, from the standpoint of practicability, I said, we were not certain that the length of time which would have to elapse before this commission could proceed from France to the scene of bombings—always provided the two factions in Spain agreed—would not give rise to the assumption that the authorities in the place which had been bombed could change the appearance of military objectives, and furthermore, whether it might not also be very difficult for the members of the commission to be permitted by the military authorities in each locality to see for themselves everything that really existed.
The Ambassador said that he would transmit these requests for clarification to his Government immediately and indicated to me off the record that in his own judgment the proposal had been hastily put together and had not been thought through. He said that so far as he himself was concerned, he could not see how officers appointed by governments to any inter-governmental commission could possibly speak only for themselves and be obligated not to commit their governments; nor could he see how no political considerations could enter into this proposal. The Ambassador said he would communicate with me as soon as he had received a reply from his Government.
- Only one memorandum of June 3 printed, supra.↩