852.00/8065
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 10.]
Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s despatch No. 417 of May 27, 1938, and previous correspondence concerning non-intervention, I have the honor to report that at a meeting of the Chairman’s subcommittee which met yesterday, it was announced that the total cost of the plans for withdrawal of foreign auxiliaries from both sides would be between £1,750,000 and £2,250,000. Of the total amount, it is estimated that £750,000 would be required to pay transportation of auxiliaries by sea to their own countries. This would be divided between the various countries in proportion to the number of auxiliaries involved. The secretary of the committee explained that a payment of £600,000 will be required on the day the plan is adopted and even before adoption a sum of £50,000 will be needed to provide for the despatch and accommodation of the commissions of three persons to each side in Spain. The other services to which the total cost of the plan would be devoted include the transporting of auxiliaries to base camps and maintaining them there for medical examination and other preparations.
According to the communiqué issued after the meeting, the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires stated that though his Government would be prepared to contribute to the cost of sending commissions to count the auxiliaries in Spain, they would not share in the main expense—that [Page 202] of transportation for the auxiliaries—on the ground that there are no Russians in Spain.
As regards the four other Powers, the Earl of Plymouth stated that Great Britain was ready to proceed with the plan, the French representative did not commit himself, and the Italian and German delegates said that they would refer the matter to their Governments.
On the day of the meeting, The Times published an obviously inspired leader admitting that the whole scheme of non-intervention amounts to no more than a limited control of intervention but expressing the hope that the Soviet Government will realize that half a loaf is better than no bread. The result of the sub-committee’s vainly striving for perfection or alternatively simply drifting, would almost certainly mean the greater influx of material and volunteers, the indefinite prolongation of the conflict and an enhanced risk of it spreading across the Spanish frontier. The Times says that the country which obstructs this British proposal will be assuming a heavy responsibility. After deploring the recent indiscriminate bombing by insurgent aeroplanes, the editorial states that the character of the Spanish people is such that they will never for long accept the dominance of foreigners and that there is no doubt about the desire of the Italian Government to get their men back to Italy, in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Italian Agreement and in fulfillment of the British non-intervention plan.
In a conversation yesterday with a member of the Embassy Sir Henry Chilton, the last British Ambassador to Spain, expressed the conviction that a Franco victory was necessary for peace in Spain; that there was not the slightest chance that Italy and/or Germany would dominate Spain; and that even if it were possible for the Spanish Government to win (which he did not believe) he was convinced that a victory for Franco would be better for Great Britain. He referred particularly to the fact that the withdrawal of Italian volunteers was holding up the Anglo-Italian Agreement.
Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy