Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, General, Volume I

852.24/631: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

London, May 9, 1938—6 p.m.
[Received May 9—4:30 p.m.]

387. Your 197, May 5, 5 p.m. The following is a brief chronological summary:

On November 4, 1937, the Non-Intervention Committee agreed to a resolution the main object of which was to secure the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain. This resolution was communicated on the same date to the two Spanish parties by the Chairman of the Committee. Towards the end of November replies were received from the two parties which asked for certain clarifications of the Committee’s proposals but were in general considered by the Committee as being of such a nature as to enable them to continue their task. Since that date the Committee has been engaged in working out a new resolution devised to put into practice (with slight modifications) the British proposals of July 14, 1937.⁵² The draft resolution consists chiefly of the following parts:

(a) A reaffirmation of the previous undertakings not to allow the despatch to Spain of war materials and volunteers.

(b) A scheme for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers. This involves the despatch of a commission to each side in Spain in order to count the foreign volunteers engaged.

(c) The conditions under which a limited form of belligerent rights will be granted to both parties in Spain.

(d) Provisions for the strengthening of the sea observation scheme and the restriction [restoration?] of the land observation scheme.

Specifically answering the three numbered queries in the Department’s telegram under reference:

(1) The principal difficulties of carrying out the plan are as follows:

In the British proposals of July 14, 1937, it was provided that a limited form of belligerent rights should be granted to both sides in Spain when “substantial progress” had been made in the withdrawal of foreign volunteers. The Committee has however not yet reached agreement upon the definition of the term “substantial progress”. In February 1938 the British Government in an attempt to overcome this difficulty put forward a proposal which, in effect, provides that a fixed number of volunteers should be withdrawn from the side having the smaller number of foreign volunteers, and a proportionately greater number from the side having the larger number, and that the withdrawal of this fixed number should be accepted as constituting “substantial progress”. This formula has now been accepted in principle by all the powers most directly concerned but whereas the British, Italian, German and French Governments have agreed that the fixed number should be 10,000, the Soviet Government is holding out for 20,000.

Another difficulty which has arisen more recently is the question of when the revised observation scheme should be put into force. The British plan of July 14, 1937, provided that observation on land frontiers should be restored at once. The Committee’s resolution, however, provided that land observation should be restored shortly before the withdrawal of foreign volunteers. Some governments maintain that the whole process of counting the volunteers would be nullified unless observation was restored before the count began. Others maintain that the resolution of November 4 has superseded the British proposals of July 14 and they accordingly desire to see observation restored at the latest possible moment before actual withdrawal begins. At the present moment negotiations are still being conducted with the object of reconciling these conflicting points of view.

A third difficulty is financial. The scheme for the observation of the Spanish frontiers is financed by the members of the Non-Intervention Committee, the greater part of the cost being borne by the British, French, Italian, German and Soviet Governments. On October 7, 1937, the Soviet representative informed the Non-Intervention Board that no payment would be made on the following day or on any date thereafter. As a result of this announcement other Governments also stopped contributing. The result was that in April 1938 the Secretary of the Non-Intervention Board informed the members of the Committee that unless the Boards received further payments it would be necessary for it to be wound up by the end of the month. In these circumstances the German, Italian and British Governments agreed on April 25 to pay the subscriptions due up to December 8, 1937, the French Government having already paid up to that date. The Soviet Government refuses to contribute further. The Governments concerned are now considering whether they will go on contributing as from May 1938 in spite of the Soviet Government’s refusal.

(2) There would seem to be nothing in the present situation in Europe which would specifically prevent the successful carrying out of the main objectives of the plan provided an understanding can be reached equally acceptable to Italy and France as to the exact conditions for withdrawal and for the tightening of control to prevent further influx of reinforcements.

(3) All countries members of the Non-Intervention Committee have agreed not to permit the shipment from or transit through their territories of arms or war material destined for either side in Spain. They have also undertaken to prevent their nationals from fighting on either side. The participating Governments are still bound by these undertakings. There is no precise information available as to the countries which have been guilty of infringement of the agreement not to ship arms. It is admitted and recognized, however, that there has been and in a lesser degree continues to be violation of this agreement by many of those countries who have pledged themselves in this sense.

In connection with question (1) above the Foreign Office informed me in strict confidence that the French have made actually more difficulties than anyone else. They have in the first place declined to agree to close their frontier until the census of the volunteers had been effected. To this the Italians had made the obvious reply that it would be futile to count the volunteers on both sides in Spain while reinforcements from France were coming across the frontier. The French likewise have insisted that in regard to the naval control there should be observers in the ports as well as on the ships of the naval patrol. In the view of the Non-Intervention Committee this condition is utterly impracticable as neither side in Spain would permit observers in the Spanish ports. After endless bickering the French have now agreed to close their Pyrenean frontier under the international control for a period of 30 days after the census of the “volunteers” has begun. They reserve their right to reopen it if the efforts towards evacuation of volunteers does not make substantial progress. According to French explanations made to the British, the pressure on the Government is so great that it was not able to close the frontier unless substantial evidence can be produced satisfactory to the French public that Italian and German technicians and so-called volunteers are being effectively withdrawn. The British have now proposed a formula to the French which is designed to help the French Government save its face and make a showing to its own public. Unless the French are willing to accept this formula and to close effectively their frontier, the Non-Intervention Committee will be again faced with an impasse.

With reference to question (2) above the Foreign Office states that in reference to the withdrawal of Italian volunteers which was covered specifically in the exchange of notes attached to the Anglo-Italian Agreement on April 16 last,⁵³ the British can only proceed on the assumption that the Italians will loyally carry out their obligations and they have various indications which they say justify the belief that Italy will not obstruct a solution.

With reference to question (3) above the Foreign Office informed me that a very large amount of material has undoubtedly gone across the French frontier; some of it the Foreign Office believes to have come from Central Europe. The amount of material from Russia, which at one time was large, has greatly decreased in recent months.

In this general connection the following may be of interest:

Since the Committee was first organized Mr. Eden and later Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax⁵⁴ have repeatedly reaffirmed the duality of purpose of the British Government’s policy as regards Spain namely: (a) To limit or prevent foreign intervention and (b) at all costs to prevent the internecine struggle in Spain from enveloping Europe in a general war.

For example Mr. Eden stated in the House of Commons on November 1, 1937 (see Embassy’s despatch No. 3531 of November 5, 1937.⁵⁵ Hansard Col 591),

“We may have our own sentiments as to what we want to happen in this matter, but the main object has been to neutralize and localize this war and to prevent it spreading to Europe as a whole.”

In support of this position Mr. Eden then quoted M. Blum’s statement at Marseilles as follows:

“Call non-intervention a lie, a fiction if you like, but the fact remains that it has helped to stop a general war.”

On March 24, 1938 (see Embassy’s despatch No. 121 of March 31,⁵⁵ Hansard Col 1410) Mr. Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons:

“But serious as are these infringements, they do not alter the judgment of His Majesty’s Government that the policy of non-intervention, even though infractions of this policy may take place, affords the best means of avoiding a major conflagration.”

The whole question of intervention is thus seen as intertwined with efforts to preserve the peace of Europe and is therefore one of the principal points covered in the recent Anglo-Italian agreement. See remarks of Foreign Office on question (2) above. For the same reason it will doubtless be one of the principal points to be taken up in the forthcoming Franco-Italian discussions. Similarly, in any understanding which Great Britain may reach with Germany, with or without France and Italy, this question will doubtless have to be considered.

With all its faults non-intervention has contributed towards the preservation of peace in Europe. Settlement of the Spanish problem would seem to be an essential prerequisite to any scheme for general European appeasement. The injection of any new factor into this already overcharged and delicate situation, might have far-reaching consequences.

Kennedy

52. British Cmd. 5521, Spain No. 2 (1937): International Committee for the Application of the Agreement Regarding Non-Intervention in Spain, Proposals Submitted by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, London, July 14, 1937.
53. For correspondence concerning the Anglo-Italian Agreement, see pp. 133 ff.
54. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from March 1, 1938.
55. Despatch not printed.
55. Despatch not printed.