824.6363 ST 2/82
The Minister in Bolivia (Norweb) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 26.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that from certain statements made to me, and from other data coming to the attention of the Legation, it would appear that Minister of Foreign Affairs Finot’s foreign policy, particularly as affecting the Standard Oil Company of Bolivia, is motivated by, or based upon, the following premises:
Mr. Finot appears to be confident that no effective support for Bolivia’s position in the Chaco Peace Conference31 can be expected from the United States. He feels that it is evident from the nature of the participation of the United States in the steps taken to avert war in the Chaco and from its attitude during and following that war, the United States prefers not to take issue with the Argentine. While Bolivia has received considerable moral support and sympathy from Brazil, Chile and Peru, no one of these three powers, nor the three jointly, could possibly overcome Argentine influence and thereby offer anything concrete to Bolivia looking towards the settlement of the Chaco question. The only way the present Government can hope to obtain a sufficiently satisfactory settlement of the Chaco controversy that may save its face with the people of Bolivia is, therefore, through a rapprochement with the Argentine. It would appear that Mr. Finot’s contention is that the most plausible manner of attaining such a rapprochement would be for Bolivia to accede to the Argentine’s eagerness for access to the Bolivian oil resources. It will be recalled that when the Argentine Carillo mission was in La Paz one of the inducements offered in exchange for Argentine possession of the oil resources was the support of the Argentine Government in readily reaching a satisfactory solution of the long standing critical problem of the Chaco. For its support, I have been informed, the Argentine Government insisted on an agreement direct with the Bolivian Government for full possession of the Bolivian oil resources, the Argentine “Yacimientos Petrolíferos Argentinos” offering the Bolivian Government fourteen percent of the returns therefrom in lieu of the eleven percent under the present Bolivian-Standard Oil contract. Should Bolivia not agree to an Argentine oil concession, Argentina has intimated that it will not be favorably disposed, and Paraguay may eventually be allowed to obtain control of the fields. On the other hand, if Bolivia is willing to grant Argentina a foothold it will see to it that Bolivia does not lose the Chaco or at least any [Page 281] large part of it. In other words, in making the Standard Oil concessions available to Argentina, such action would guarantee Bolivia a powerful neighbor, who would never again let Paraguay menace its territory. My informant brought to my attention that in discussing this matter with the Minister of Foreign Affairs he pointed out to Mr. Finot that by such an arrangement what the Argentine had failed to obtain through the efforts of the Paraguayan Army during the Chaco War, the Argentine would be obtaining diplomatically.
If such is Señor Finot’s present reasoning, it seems safe to conclude that some very powerful influence must have forced him to put aside his personal dislike and distrust of the Argentine and Dr. Saavedra Lamas.32 Whatever has happened, present policies are obviously opportunistic, for Bolivia cannot, in the long run, hope to benefit from a program which aims at a special association with one of its neighbors to the disregard of the others, especially when that one country is Argentina.
Respectfully yours,