[Enclosure—Memorandum]
Buenos
Aires, November 29, 1937.
At a time when it appears that the fundamental negotiations may be
begun with some hope of success, for the Conference to accuse
Paraguay of insubordination and to place the responsibility on that
country for any incidents which might occur in the Chaco would not
be in keeping with the role of a mediator and might prejudice the
success of our final negotiations. Therefore, providing Bolivia’s
juridical position in this security question can be entirely
protected and providing that no serious incidents occur in the
Chaco, it would be advisable for Bolivia to agree to the modus vivendi at least for such time as would
indicate whether it was workable or not.
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Bolivia’s juridical position may be thoroughly protected by
- (a)
- The projected Conference note to Paragray including such
alterations in the last paragraph thereof as may seem
desirable;
- (b)
- A separate exchange of notes between the Bolivian
delegation and the Conference entirely clarifying the
position of all parties concerned. In such an exchange of
notes, Bolivia could emphasize her conciliatory spirit in
trying, once again, to adjust security matters in contrast
with a certain degree of intransigence on the part of
Paraguay.
Major Weeks, U. S. Army, is acknowledgedly a competent officer whose
opinion is worthy of special consideration by reason of his service
for sixteen months in the Chaco, as a member of the Neutral Military
Commission and the Special Military Commission, as well as a
Conference Observer. He has reported that the essential requirements
for the maintenance of a minimum of security and tranquility in the
Chaco are:
- 1.
- Withdrawal of troops to adequate distances on each side of
the intermediary line.
- 2.
- Limitation of the number of troops or police permitted to
remain within the aforesaid withdrawal area.
- 3.
- That any “destacamentos” within that area or concentration
of troops in the rear of that area are not to be moved
excepting in accord with the Military Observers.
- 4.
- That the Military Observers may be empowered to endeavor
to adjust any incidents which may arise and in case of
necessity should they be unable to do so, the aforesaid
incidents to be referred to the Peace Conference.
- 5.
- No shooting for any reason whatsoever to be allowed within
one to two kilometres on either side of the intermediary
line.
It will be noted that the “disposiciones” or modus
vivendi cover the question of withdrawal of troops by
fixing certain concentration points for them. The limitation of
number of troops is also provided for in the limited number to be
allowed in the “destacamentos”.
The third and fourth points similarly are covered in the modus vivendi and Dr. Zubizarreta has assured
the Conference committee with whom he negotiated that the fifth
point could readily be handled by the Military Observers in
consultation with the commands in the Chaco.
Therefore, while there is no equivalence between the April 23
Regulations and the modus vivendi, and the
latter document admittedly does not clearly define matters by laying
down “lines of withdrawal”, specifying the exact number of police to
be allowed within the area, etc., nevertheless the modus vivendi, if carried out in the spirit as well as in
the letter, will prevent all contact between Bolivian and Paraguayan
posts or patrols and accomplish the same ends as the Regulations.
There is every incentive for Paraguay to comply with the
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spirit as well as the letter
of the modus vivendi and Dr. Zubizarreta has
assured the mediatory delegates that in actual practice the
provisions of the April 23 Regulations will be carried out. That is
to say, the Military Observers, in consultation with the commands,
will locate concentration points behind the lines of withdrawal or
separation. “Destacamentos” similarly will be placed at ample
distances from one another and will be limited in number to probably
less than the 500 police allowed in the Regulations. Furthermore,
Dr. Zubizarreta declares that every liberty of transit will be given
over the Villa Montes-Boyuibe road.
Both Bolivia and the Conference repeatedly have emphasized the urgent
need for a security system in the Chaco (see Dr. Alvéstegui’s note,
August 5, 193730); hence, for Bolivia now to leave matters in their
present status would indicate that previous insistence on
implantation of a security system was unwarranted and would make
both Bolivia and the Conference appear as having been unduly
alarmist.
In any event, as long as Bolivia’s juridical position is fully
protected, it is certainly worth while giving the modus vivendi a trial, since, if it is found impracticable
it can readily be cancelled and the situation returned to the status
of October 20 without detriment to the prestige plus the fact that
Bolivia, by acceding to the modus vivendi on
this trial basis, would once again have demonstrated cooperation and
an earnest desire for peace which could not do otherwise than
strengthen that country’s position before the world at large and, in
particular before the Hague Court if, as and when the question were
ever presented there.
