793.94112/53: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 9—5:15 p.m.]
588. My 581, September 6, 6 p.m.99 I had a talk this afternoon with Cadogan1 who has recently returned from a month’s absence.
1. He stated that the Cabinet yesterday had finally agreed upon a policy for the protection of British shipping in the Far East. The Foreign Secretary, he said, had for several days held the view set forth in your 374, September 1, 7 p.m. (my 573, September 2, 7 p.m.) but that in discussing the matter with other responsible Government Departments it became evident that they had different views. I gathered from Cadogan that the main objections came from the Admiralty who resisted making any sort of concession to the Japanese without notification and placing conditions on the ground that it would merely encourage the Japanese to demand and effect further illegal exactions. Although Cadogan stated that the American view had been that held by the Foreign Secretary for several days, he gave no indication that the policy finally agreed upon by the Departments and approved by the Cabinet yesterday did not have the full concurrence of the Foreign Office. He then outlined to me in detail as follows the plan which the British Government has adopted:2
The British Government has decided to advise its shipping in the Far East that if a vessel flying the British flag which is suspected of not being entitled to fly that flag is requested to stop by a Japanese warship it will do so under the following conditions:
- (a)
- If a British warship is present at the time she has instructions to request the master of the suspected ship to justify the right of the ship to fly the British flag;
- (b)
- If no British warship is present the British Government will not stand on their rights (there being genuine reason to suspect that the vessel is not entitled to fly the flag), if the Japanese board the ship and examine the certificates of registry, provided that an immediate report is simultaneously made to the British naval authorities. The British Government, however, reserves the right to claim compensation for damages sustained by the owners of British ships delayed or stopped under this procedure.
The British Ambassador at Tokyo is being advised by telegraph of the foregoing and instructed to inform the Japanese Government that while the British Government does not admit the rights of the Japanese [Page 455] Government in this matter it will in practice allow verification on the conditions formulated above but that it can acquiesce in no further interference.
Masters of British merchant ships will be advised that if they are requested to stop by a Japanese warship and no British warship is present they should allow the Japanese to board the ship and examine the certificates of registry provided that an immediate report is made to the British naval authorities.
2. Cadogan then said that he had just received information from the Chinese Ambassador here which caused him some concern. The Chinese Government, it was stated, intend to make an appeal at the present meeting of the Council of the League of Nations under article 17 of the Covenant,3 from which might arise great difficulties in the event that Japan under the procedure of the League should have to be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of the dispute, for if Japan should refuse, the contingent obligations of article 16 would arise. Although Cadogan said it was none of his business he expressed to the Chinese Ambassador his strong personal disapproval of such a line of action. If it is persisted in and the procedure of article 16 finally invoked, it would raise the gravest practical difficulties for the British Government in its relations with Japan. He suggested it might be helpful if our representative at Geneva were informed of this proposed move of China with a view to keeping in contact with the British delegation for mutual exchange of information. He emphasized the extreme moderation of the British Government towards the Japanese throughout the development of the present crisis and particularly in the case of the attack on their Ambassador in China. He referred to the interim reply which has been received from the Japanese Government to the British note on this outrage and said that he was not encouraged to believe that the final reply would be at all satisfactory.
While the British are of course vitally concerned in the protection of their nationals and material interests in China they are proceeding with the utmost caution and Cadogan practically admitted that they are in no position to send armed forces to the Far East in sufficient strength to command the situation. It appears to me that the vital necessity for Great Britain of not becoming involved in an armed conflict in Far Eastern waters at the present time is a paramount consideration in the formulation of British policy. Conditions in Europe and in the Mediterranean particularly are so full of potential danger that any policy other than one of caution and conciliation in the Sino-Japanese situation is virtually impossible.