793.94/10429: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State
[Received 12:46 p.m.]
26. My October 4, 8 p.m. Subcommittee last night adopted in rewritten
form part IV of its report. This is based on section 2 of the
provisions in my 24, October 4, 2 p.m., and subject to final
drafting changes will read substantially as follows:
It was decided this morning [that?] section 1 and section 3 of the Chairman’s draft conclusions [be considered?] in connection with the discussion of any recommendations and not allowed to constitute part 5.
[Page 55]Discussion was then opened on part V. Koo submitted the following proposal:
“The situation thus created in the Far East constitutes a case of external aggression against China, a member of the League of Nations, under article 10 of the Covenant and calls for a consideration of what feasible steps may be taken in the present circumstances with a view to bringing about its early termination and the preservation of China’s territorial integrity and political independence. The Advisory Committee will, of course, in conformity with its terms of reference, aid the members of the League in concerting their action and their attitude among themselves and with non-member states”.
Cranborne stated that there were two ways of proceeding, one under article 10 of the Covenant through the Council and the other under article 11, or the alternative article 3, paragraph 3, through the Assembly. He then circulated the following proposal:
“The establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments and the maintenance of a respect for treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another are among the fundamental purposes of the League. It has thus the duty, as well as the right, to attempt to bring about a speedy restoration of peace in the Far East. The powers who are signatories of the Nine-Power Washington Treaty of February 22 [6], 1922 and the Pact of Paris of April [August] 27, 1928, whether they be members of the League or not, have an evident interest in the observance of those treaties. They cannot, therefore, admit that the present dispute in the Far East, which has been shown to constitute an infringement of those treaties, is one which can as of right only be settled by direct methods between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. They are bound on the contrary to take the whole situation into the fullest consideration and, in particular, to examine any appropriate means by which peace may be reestablished in conformity with the principles of international law and the provisions of the treaties to which they are parties.
The question is what action would be—in the words of article No. 11 of the Covenant—wise and effectual towards this end.
The answer to this question by the Assembly, which acts under article 3 (3), might at the same time be regarded as rendering unnecessary any further recommendations under articles 10 or 11. In this connection it may be observed that articles 10 and 11 in no way limit the discretion of the League in the selection of the means to be adopted to carry out its provisions.
The Committee notes that under the Nine-Power Washington Treaty, the contracting powers, other than China, agreed inter alia to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and that all contracting powers, including China, agreed that whenever a situation should arise which involved the application of the stipulations of the Treaty and rendered desirable the discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the powers concerned. It appears, therefore, to the Committee that the most effective immediate step [Page 56] which the Assembly could take in the name of the League would be to invite those members of the League who are signatories of the Nine-Power Washington Treaty to initiate such consultation. The Committee would further express the hope that the states concerned would be able to associate with their work other states which have special interests in the Far East, to seek a method of putting an end to the conflict by agreement and, failing such a solution, to make other proposals to the Assembly should they consider it possible and desirable”.
A long discussion then ensued.
Koo pointed to Covenant obligations of League members. Peace had been disturbed and aggression occurred. He felt article 10 applied with particular relevancy and that both proposals should be taken into consideration.
A consultation of the signatories and adherents of the Nine-Power Treaty was an excellent idea and one of the ways which he hoped would prove effective but not the only way even for the present. The Washington Treaty cannot relieve League members of their obligations under the Covenant; certain members were parties to the Treaty but not all and the Covenant cannot be susperseded so far as the League and its members are concerned. He had therefore advanced his proposal as a practical method of dealing with the situation and hoped that it would supplement Cranborne’s.
China, he said, does not expect all pertinent articles of the Covenant to be enforced in the present condition of the world and in the light of Chinese experience. China realizes that the situation makes it inadvisable for the League to discharge all obligations now. Still the League can help recommend to members, (1) not to extend Japan any aid in aggression against China and, (2) not to take any steps to weaken China in action against Japan. Such recommendations might not lead to action by all League states but at least by a few.
While China favored consultation with Washington Treaty Powers, preparation he feared would involve too much delay in the face of the grave and immediate situation. He upheld action on both proposals.
Lagarde71 supported Cranborne. He was opposed to procedure by two contradictory methods.
Litvinoff pointed out that under Cranborne’s proposal League states not parties to Washington Treaty would be freed from further obligation; that in similar situations Washington Treaty signatories had taken no action; that interests of several signatories in the Far East had changed since 1922; and that he feared proposal involved merely delay and the eventual return of the problem to the Assembly. He strongly supported Koo’s proposal but would not object if parallel action by the League and Washington Treaty signatories were properly concerted.
[Page 57]Bruce supported Cranborne’s proposal. Peace was a matter of concern to League members and all others. Specific course of action was provided in article 17 alone but Japan would refuse to accept invitation under sub article section 3 of that article and articles 12 to 16 would come into effect. Chinese delegation realized that article 17 as a practical matter afforded no solution. If the Washington Treaty signatories should fail to put an end to the situation through agreement the Advisory Committee could make other proposals to the Assembly. The League remained seized of the problem. It must pledge its support for conciliation and its co-operation in any measures that may be proposed. Therefore the Advisory Committee and the Subcommittee must be kept in being. Consultation by the Treaty Powers offered the sole practical means of some prospect for possible assistance to China in the present circumstances.
Van der Straten72 urged consideration from a practical standpoint. The League was “absolutely powerless”. He supported Cranborne. He also accepted Koo’s proposal not to take any steps to weaken China but could not accept Koo’s other proposal as this was tantamount to a prohibition of exports to Japan.
The Swedish and Belgian representatives also agreed to take no steps to weaken China. Lagarde undertook to examine this sympathetically.
On further discussion Cranborne pointed to success at Nyon. In this case he said League was not best body to handle the matter. Litvinoff pointed out that League members seemed to think that sanctions must be universal. In certain cases sanctions, he said, could be effective if put into effect by part of the League members only. Bruce insisted that League itself can do nothing. The cooperation of certain non-member powers, he believed, was absolutely necessary and more likely if the procedure occurred outside the League. Cranborne suggested that before the close of this session, if instructed by the President of the Assembly, the League members signatory of the Washington Treaty could agree on their invitations to nonmember signatories before the close of the present session. Koo agreed to Cranborne’s proposal but insisted that it be parallel and merely supplementary of [to] League action. Article 10 was a specific obligation of League members and he insisted on some action. If the League did nothing it would be [“] a pathetic confession of impotence, a disappointment to China and to the millions supporting the League”.
It was then agreed to charge a Drafting Committee composed of the Chairman and the representatives of Great Britain, China, France, Russia and Austria to draft proposals for part V of the Committee’s [Page 58] report based on the suggestions made by the British and Chinese delegations including the Chinese draft resolution (my telegram 19, October 1, 7 p.m.). The Drafting Committee will also have to pass on the final texts of parts I, II, III and IV.
The Drafting Committee is meeting this morning with instructions to report as soon as possible so that the full Committee may meet and report by [to?] the Assembly.