793.94 Conference/274: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 19—3:50 p.m.]
45. Your 68, November 16, 9 p.m., and 71, November 17, 7 p.m., and 72, November 17, 8 p.m.3 The first indication I have been given of unsatisfactory news dispatches from here has come in your 64, November 15, 9 p.m. I have done and shall do everything possible to give the press appropriate guidance both as to fact and as to interpretation. At the same time I should say that my surprise is not that there have been some unsatisfactory news stories but that there have been apparently so few.
To understand what has happened in regard to this Conference it is necessary to distinguish between what some press stories or editorials may say and what have been the official attitudes and efforts as known to us and shown in the records. In broad outline the Conference has gone through several phases. Before and at its beginning there was in Europe in some quarters at least great expectation of American leadership; also probably hope and intention to push us out in front. At the Conference from the first and throughout other delegations, especially the British, the French, and the Russians, have advanced the view that nothing short of some form of pressure action would do any good and have taken the position that their Governments are prepared to embark upon some such action provided the United [Page 213] States would cooperate therein. (None of them except the Italians and finally with an indication of doubt the Norwegian, Swedish and Danish, have appeared at any time to hold the view that discussion of pressure measures would be outside the terms of reference or appropriate sphere of the Conference.) However, I successfully declined to be put out in front and insisted that I would not discuss even the possibility of pressure measures until every possible effort had been made to bring Japan into negotiations. The Conference then proceeded with such an effort. When that effort had failed other representatives tried to induce me to discuss possible cooperative pressure measures. This I still declined to do except academically and in terms of some future possibility. Then others tried to bring about a recess. That, acting under your instructions, I blocked in order to keep the Conference longer in session for the moral effect of its being so. There was thereupon set an interval of a week before the next meeting because the British, the Belgians and the French were preoccupied with public matters elsewhere. The next meeting is to be on Monday next.
When the Conference closes with a tacit decision against consideration of measures of pressure either positive or negative there will inevitably be made by every power represented a natural effort to divert from itself the onus of charges which will be made by those who believed in and wanted pressure action attributing responsibility for what those critics will declare to be the “failure”. Incidentally it must be taken into account that in different quarters there are different concepts as to where measures of persuasion leave off and measures of pressure or of positive action begin. In many minds the mere holding of a conference is construed as a measure of pressure. The Japanese for instance seem to consider it so. In the field of measures of pressure there is room for substantial distinction between negative measures and positive measures.
Our delegation has at no time contemplated [or?] suggested any measures which we would regard as involving positive action and we have at no time initiated consideration in Conference circles of any measures of pressure.
As regards other delegations whatever may be various motives and objectives of their Governments respectively, none has at any time suggested that the United States act alone or assume an outstanding responsibility. In their discussion of possible resort to pressure methods, what they have suggested has been cooperative effort. They have stated that their Governments are prepared to proceed toward and embark upon such measures if the United States can and will cooperate but that they cannot do so if we cannot and will not cooperate. The British delegates especially Eden in particular have adopted my view that whatever decision is arrived at should be on the [Page 214] basis of a conclusion reached in common, with attribution neither of credit nor of blame to any one power.
I understand perfectly and I accept without question your conclusion that with public opinion as it is at home you cannot adopt a position different from that which you are taking. Nevertheless, we should not disregard the fact that whatever the reasons and however conclusive the explanations—quite apart from any diplomatic procedures—inasmuch as other powers have advocated cooperative use of pressure and the United States has declined even to consider such a course the decisions made by the Conference, in the negative, will unquestionably be regarded by many as having been determined by the attitude of the United States.
I shall of course do everything possible to prevent misrepresentation and criticism adverse to the interests of the United States. I hope that we will be able to meet adverse criticism by insisting that we came here to participate only in efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement by agreement and that we have not been and are not prepared to consider questions of positive measures of coercion and that if through a failure to have brought about a peaceful settlement by other processes such measures may need to be considered, this, nevertheless, is not the time nor place to embark upon discussion of them. By following that course we would also avoid giving the impression that we are definitely opposed to taking up any such question hereafter.
I believe and I suggest that in whatever we say we should in order to be fair and to be on sure ground avoid discussion of “responsibilities” and refrain from attribution thereof to other powers.
- Telegram No. 72 not printed.↩