793.94 Conference/235: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)
73. With reference to Department’s No. 62, November 15, 7 p.m., paragraph 2, we suggest that the comprehensive resolution to be adopted by the Conference at the time of recessing might be in the form of a report to the participating governments.
The following memorandum, prepared by certain officers of the Department, is intended for your confidential information as of possible assistance in your participation in the drafting of such a report. While you will of course not take the initiative in the formulation of the report nor assume a position of special leadership in regard thereto, we feel that the report should not run counter to the points covered in the memorandum. The memorandum follows in numbered paragraphs.
1. The Conference at Brussels was assembled pursuant to an invitation extended by the Belgian Government to the parties to the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922. The Government of the Soviet Union, in response to invitation, also participated in the Conference. A stage has now been reached in the work of the Conference at which it appears desirable to draw up a report for submission to the participating Governments and to go into a recess.
2. The Conference met as set forth in the terms of the invitation “for the purpose of examining, in conformity with Article 7 of that Treaty, the situation in the Far East and of studying peaceable means of hastening an end of the regrettable conflict which prevails there”. With one exception, all signatories and adherents to the Treaty accepted [Page 206] the invitation and sent their representatives to Brussels for the purpose stated. Although an original signatory to the Treaty, the Japanese Government, alone among the parties to the Nine Power Treaty, declined the invitation. When the Conference convened, it expressed a desire that the Japanese Government participate in the Conference and it invited the Japanese Government to exchange views with representatives of a small number of powers, such exchange of views to take place within the framework of the Nine Power Treaty and in conformity with the provisions of that Treaty. This second special invitation was likewise declined by the Japanese Government.
The Brussels Conference has thus endeavored in every practicable way to secure Japan’s cooperation in efforts to bring about peace by agreement. Despite the efforts of the Governments represented at the Conference, there appears to be no opportunity at this time for the Conference to carry out its terms of reference insofar as they relate to entering into discussions with Japan contributory to effecting peace by agreement.
3. The principal factors which have created this regrettable situation were made clear in the declaration adopted by the Conference on November 15. On that occasion, the Conference made the following statement:
“… The Japanese concept of the issues and interests involved in the conflict under reference is utterly different from the concepts of most of the other nations and governments of the world. The Japanese Government insists that as the conflict is between Japan and China it concerns those two countries only. Against this the representatives of the states now met at Brussels consider this conflict of concern in fact to all countries party to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington of 1922 and to all countries party to the Pact of Paris of 1928, and of concern in fact to all countries members of the family of nations.”
Before concluding its present session, the Conference feels it to be its imperative duty to state, in a calm and dispassionate but comprehensive fashion, the facts and the circumstances of the present situation.
4. In the winter of 1921–1922 there were signed at Washington a group of interrelated treaties of which the Nine Power Treaty, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, constituted a vital unit. The agreements were the result of full and lengthy deliberations and were entered into freely. These treaties, especially the Nine Power Treaty, were designed primarily to bring about conditions of stability and peace in the Pacific area.
[Page 207]The Nine Power Treaty stipulates in Article 1 that:
“The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree: [Here follow the four numbered paragraphs of article 1.]”
Under and in the light of these stipulations and of the provisions contained in the other treaties, the situation in the Pacific area was for a decade characterized by a substantial measure of progress toward the objectives envisaged in the treaties. In recent years a series of conflicts between Japan and China has upset this whole favorable trend. These conflicts have culminated in the hostilities now in progress.
5. The Chinese Government, in its communications to the Conference, claims that its present military operations are purely in defense of its own territorial and administrative integrity and that it has been prepared from the outset of the difficulties with Japan to adjust such difficulties by negotiation and agreement in accordance with the principles of pertinent treaties and of international law. (Please check this statement with especial care inasmuch as the Department does not appear to have on record the texts of any statements made to the Conference by the Chinese Delegate.) Also, China approached parties to the Nine Power Treaty, as contemplated under Article 7 of the treaty, and stated its willingness to seek an adjustment of the situation by peaceful means.
6. The approach of the Chinese Government to the other signatories to the Nine Power Treaty is in entire conformity with the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty, which states as follows:
“The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.”
7. The Japanese Government, in its communications to the Conference, has affirmed that “the action of Japan in China is a measure of self-defense …” and that “the present conflict has been caused by none other than the Chinese Government, who for these many years have been engaged as a matter of national policy in disseminating anti-Japanese sentiment and encouraging anti-Japanese movements in China, and who, in collusion with the Communist elements, have menaced the peace of East Asia by their virulent agitation against Japan.”
Neither before nor since hostilities began did Japan communicate under Article 7 of the Nine Power Treaty with the other signatories to the Treaty nor approach them with a view to exploring means of [Page 208] adjusting its difficulties with China by peaceful means. On the contrary, Japan has proceeded to seek a solution by its own individual action and has declared the situation existing between itself and China as falling outside the framework of the Nine Power Treaty and the adjustment thereof as being, therefore, of no concern to the other signatories to the Treaty.
Japan now has large armies engaged in operations in Chinese territory and has effected military occupation of approximately 800,000 square miles of Chinese territory. Japan has also blocked the China coast to Chinese shipping. Japan’s governmental leaders have announced the intention of the Japanese Government to deal a decisive blow against the Chinese Government.
8. It will serve no useful purpose for the Conference to go into the question of anti-Japanese policy and practice in China or of the origins and extent of the various political movements in that country. We register, however, our considered judgment that the existence of a particular political movement within a country is a matter for regulation by the government of that country. To admit the right of a nation to conduct widespread military operations on the territory of another nation solely because of internal conditions existing therein is to open the way for recurrent intervention by any country in the affairs of others, and thus to create a constant cause of international dispute. Japan itself would certainly never admit the right of other nations to interfere in its internal affairs on the ground that conditions existing within its borders warranted such action.
Such affirmations as have been made by Japan as to China’s policy and attitude and internal conditions do not, in the opinion of this Conference, furnish evidence of a provocation sufficient to justify intervention on the plea of self-defense. Furthermore, the magnitude of Japan’s military operations in China, the duration of those operations and the purposes thereof already declared by Japanese public authorities give rise to the presumption of more far-reaching objectives than the limited one of self-defense.
9. Nor can we agree with the contention of the Japanese Government that adjustment of the present situation in China is a matter of concern only to Japan and China. The present conflict between the two countries is a matter of legitimate and practical concern, not alone to the governments and peoples of China and Japan but to all the many powers which have interests in China. In relations with and in China, the treaty rights and the treaty obligations of the powers party to the Nine Power Treaty are, in general, identical. These powers have in China rights and obligations, a considerable number of nationals, property, and substantial commercial and cultural activities.
[Page 209]Paragraph 4 of Article 1 of the Nine Power Treaty specifically obligates the signatories “to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.” Whatever may be the terms of final settlement between Japan and China, it cannot be denied that protracted and widespread military operations on Chinese territory, undertaken by one of the signatories to the Nine Power Treaty, do in fact, at least for their duration, create conditions under which special rights and privileges are assumed by the nationals and authorities of the country which engages in such operations; the rights of the nationals of other states are abridged; and their legitimate interests are impaired.
10. In the light of these facts and considerations, there is no line of valid reasoning which would support the contention of the Japanese Government that Japan’s action in China does not involve the principles and provisions of the Nine Power Treaty.
11. But even apart from the specific provisions of the Nine Power Treaty, the action of Japan in China raises questions of vital significance to all nations. The Conference deems it to be an important part of its task to bring these broader considerations to the attention of governments.
12. The Nine Power Treaty is a conspicuous example of numerous international instruments, by which the nations of the world accept self-denying rules in their conduct with each other. These various instruments constitute in effect solemn commitments on the part of nations to refrain from seeking political or economic domination over other nations; to respect the sovereignty of other nations; and to abstain from interference in their internal affairs. Together with the Pact of Paris, by the terms of which practically all nations of the world agreed “that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means,” these international instruments constitute a framework within which national security and international peace are safeguarded without resort to arms and within which international relationships can subsist and develop on the basis of mutual confidence, good will, equality of economic treatment, and beneficial trade and financial relations.
13. Whenever armed force is employed in disregard of these commitments, the whole structure of international relations based upon the safeguards provided by treaties and agreements is disrupted. Nations are then compelled to seek safety in ever-increasing armaments and there is opened before mankind the tragic vista of recurring armed conflicts with all their disastrous consequences for the wellbeing of mankind.
[Page 210]14. When any nation embarks upon military projects designed to place it in a position of dominant control over wide areas of foreign population and soil, such action creates everywhere a feeling of apprehension and uncertainty. It destroys confidence. It creates the need for armed defense against possible encroachment upon national sovereignty and independence and against possible interference with free internal development of national institutions. It tends to convert the whole world into a series of armed camps, to impair and distort international trade and other economic relationships, and to divert the energies of mankind away from activities designed to promote material and cultural advancement.
15. On behalf of the Governments represented, the Conference strongly reaffirms the principles and provisions of the Nine Power Treaty, as well as those other basic principles which are essential to world peace and orderly progressive development of mankind. The validity of these principles cannot be destroyed by force; their universal applicability cannot be denied; and their indispensability to civilization and progress cannot be gainsaid.
16. The Conference recommends that, during its recess, the participating Governments continue to watch the situation closely; to exchange views in regard thereto; and to hold themselves in readiness to explore with the two parties to the conflict all peaceful methods by which a settlement of the dispute may be attained, on the basis of the principles and provisions embodied in the Nine Power Treaty and in conformity with the objectives of that Treaty.
17. The Conference requests its Chairman to communicate this report not only to the participating Governments but also to all governments and thus to bring to their attention the considerations set forth above as to the vital need of keeping alive in every practicable and effective manner the basic principles referred to in the report with respect to the present situation, as well as to all situations which may seriously threaten international order and world peace.
(If the Conference decides to set up a committee for the recess period, it will be necessary to supplement accordingly the statements made in paragraphs 1 and 16.)