793.94 Conference/311
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Wilson) of a Conversation With the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Suma)
Following the discussion on salmon fishing,94 Mr. Suma asked if he could see me alone. He stated that he would like to have a frank and private conversation.
He told me that they had received a message concerning Mr. Hirota’s interview with Mr. Grew; Mr. Hirota felt that the Japanese people had been of the opinion that of all the great powers the United States had, up to October 5th, maintained the attitude of most scrupulous neutrality; that certain episodes such as stopping the sailing of the Wichita95 had been considered friendly by the Japanese people; however, the Chicago speech of the President and the association by the State Department of the United States with the action of the League had shaken Japan’s belief in our friendly attitude; nevertheless, the President had followed his Chicago speech by a fireside talk,96 which had done much to restore the friendly sentiments of the Japanese for us; the Japanese Government, Mr. Suma continued, had felt that we went to the Brussels Conference both because we were obligated under the treaty and because we wanted to keep association with the great states of Europe and take no step on our part that would shatter the peace structure. This was comprehensible. [Page 195] What was difficult to follow was the apparent leadership that the United States was taking in the Conference.
The Japanese Government would be ready and willing to entertain suggestions from Mr. Grew and, of course, from our Government in any form it chose to present them; it could not, however, accept suggestions from an organization of states, some having no immediate interest, all of whom have condemned Japan, and would be ready and glad to entertain suggestions, as he said, from us alone; he felt that if the Brussels Conference had not taken place, with the military situation as it is, it was very probable that peace negotiations would already be underway; Chiang Kai-shek, he believes, would be ready, if he could save his face, to talk, as would other members of the Chinese Government, but the attitude of the powers at Brussels had not only made this talk difficult, but had, he feared, postponed the possibility of embarking upon them.
Mr. Suma asked me specifically whether I thought that, in some circumstances, the American Government could play the role in this conflict that President Theodore Roosevelt had played in 1904.97
I said that I would like to answer him first on the historical side of this matter. Mr. Hirota had told Mr. Grew that he was informed that we had been the instigators of the Brussels Conference. I wanted to assure Mr. Suma, and this assurance Mr. Grew would give to Mr. Hirota, that there was not a word of truth in this statement.
In respect to our attitude, I said I had no intention or thought of making any apology therefor; it was clear and unequivocally expressed in our public statements; it was an attitude supported by our public and one which we felt was the only one compatible with dignity and self respect; how, I asked Mr. Suma, could the United States refuse to follow its treaty obligations and communicate with the powers of the Nine Power Treaty; how could we, without stultifying ourselves and violating our principles, fail to make a declaration following that of fifty odd nations at Geneva that Japan’s acts were not in accordance with the terms of the Nine Power Treaty; 999 Americans out of 1,000 so believed and such belief had to be given vocal expression by this Government.
Now, to come to his specific question as to the opportunity for playing a mediating role. I said I had no instructions from my Chief and I could give him only an instantaneous and unconsidered reply, but as for me I thought it would be very difficult for us to make any suggestion, bound as we were by our own principles and obligations of the Nine Power Treaty, which the Japanese Government, in its present temper, would consider for a minute; our ideas [Page 196] of how this conflict should end were, I felt, widely divergent from theirs.
Mr. Suma then spoke about the resolution. I told him that Mr. Hirota had spoken to Mr. Grew about “joint action” and that the only thing we could find in the resolution which might have given rise to this phrase was the last paragraph, which dealt with a “common attitude.” Mr. Suma asked whether I thought such attitude would prejudice the possibility of offering advice to the Japanese Government and perhaps playing the role of Mr. Theodore Roosevelt later. I said we were now entering upon the realm of wildest speculation, that I could not tell, of course, what the powers would adopt as a “common attitude” nor could I tell what events might bring about, but that it was conceivable that, at some stage of the proceedings, we might be helpful; certainly we were disposed to be helpful at any opportunity that looked promising to aid in bringing about an end to the struggle in any fashion which was compatible with the obligations that we had undertaken.
Mr. Suma then gave me an explanation, which is needless to repeat as we are familiar with it, for Japan’s reason for not accepting the invitation to the Nine Power Conference. I told him that whether or not the Conference had made a mistake in inviting Russia or whether or not they had made mistakes in procedure or in organization, I deeply deplored the fact that the Japanese Government had not seen its way to accept, or at least to collaborate with members of the Conference; I said that such acceptance would have been an indication of the type of peace that they were willing to make, a peace compatible with their and our treaty obligations. Mr. Suma replied that he sincerely believed that if conversations could be begun with the Chinese, the world would be astonished at the moderation of the terms which Japan would be ready to accept; unfortunately, the longer and more bitter the conflict, the more risk there was that moderate terms would disappear from the minds of a fighting nation, but if conversations could be begun now, it was not too late to reach a reasonable settlement.
- See telegram No. 307, November 19, 6 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 761.↩
- See statement of September 14, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 201; also post, pp. 520 ff.↩
- Radio address of October 12, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 400.↩
- Reference to good offices in ending the Russo-Japanese War in 1905; see Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 807 ff.↩