Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume IV

793.94 Conference/247: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 16, 1937—1 p.m.
[Received November 16—10:34 a.m.]

544. My 543, November 15, 7 p.m. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to come to see him at his official residence at 9:30 this morning and he talked to me along the following lines:

1. Reports received from the Brussels Nine Power Conference indicate that the draft resolution submitted to the Conference provides for united action against Japan. The Minister does not know whether the draft which he has seen was passed by the Conference without alteration or amendment. If the clause for united action remained in the resolution as passed, he fears that it will have a very unfortunate effect on Japanese public opinion. He interprets the term “united action” as envisaging some sort of economic boycott or other sanctions. Pie said that any such united action far from helping to terminate the hostilities would actually result in prolonging them indefinitely.

2. The Minister said that according to the information which he has received through the diplomatic representative of “a certain power” the Unitd States Government not only took the initiative in convoking the Conference but is also taking the lead in Brussels (I here interrupted the Minister to interpolate the information which we had received from the Department and also the gist of the statement made by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons to the effect that the initiative for calling the Conference had been taken by a group within the League of Nations of which the United States is not a member and that the United States when asked where it felt the Conference should be held had merely suggested Brussels as the rendezvous. The Minister repeated, nevertheless, that his information was to the effect that the United States had been the real leader from the start.) Mr. Hirota said that he hoped that I would bring the views in paragraph 1 to the attention of our representatives in Brussels.

3. Mr. Hirota then said that these rumors of American initiative were bound to appear soon in the Japanese press and that this would have a most unfortunate effect on Japanese public opinion. The Japanese public hitherto has felt that Great Britain is the country which has been foremost in endeavoring to develop a solid front against Japan but that if the Japanese press now reported the United States as taking the leadership in Brussels the onus would be largely transferred to the United States.

4. The Minister said that good relations with the United States as he had often told me was his fundamental policy and that he greatly “feared” the results of such a change in Japanese public opinion.

5. Up to the moment of the President’s speech in Chicago on October 5 the Japanese public had felt that the United States was the only country which had been genuinely impartial during the Sino-Japanese hostilities. All of the other countries, he said, for one reason or another had special interests in China and their impartiality was therefore doubted. The position of the United States in the estimation of the Japanese public, however, was such that it was generally felt that the United States might play the same role in helping to terminate the present hostilities as it had played in the Russo-Japanese War⁸⁹ as being the most impartial of all Japan’s friends. The President’s Chicago speech had temporarily modified this view but the fact that in his recent speech opening Congress⁹⁰ the President had made no reference to the Far Eastern situation made the Japanese public feel that perhaps the United States is not so rigid in its attitude as had been feared.

6. Mr. Hirota then said that the Japanese military movements in China are progressing favorably and there is no need for the army to go much further than it has already gone although they will be perfectly capable of doing so if they consider it necessary. In China’s own interests now is the time to bring about peace. The Chinese Government is considering evacuating Nanking to some other capital and this, the Minister said, will be a very foolish move. As a matter of fact Chiang Kai Shek’s position is far from secure and some of the principal generals are already forming an opposition. If peace is made now the Japanese demands will be “reasonable” and not a foot of Chinese territory will be taken by Japan. If, however, the warfare continues, the present attitude of the Japanese Government may no longer apply and more drastic terms may result in view of the increased sacrifices involved.

7. If the United States wishes to help, the best thing it can do is to persuade the Chinese Government to open negotiations with Japan. As soon as there is some indication that such negotiations will be acceptable to the Chinese Government, Mr. Hirota would send a representative to Shanghai to talk with a representative of the Chinese Government either in public or in strict secrecy as the Chinese Government might wish. (Mr. Hirota, having mentioned the continued presence of the Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo, I took this occasion to inquire whether diplomatic channels would not therefore exist which could be utilized along the lines of Mr. Hirota’s suggestion. Mr. Hirota merely assented that these channels did exist but made no further comment thereon.)

8. When Mr. Hirota had finished the foregoing statement, I repeated it to him, point by point, and inquired whether I had correctly understood everything that he had said. The Minister assented. I said that I would promptly report the conversation to Washington. I then said to the Minister that I hoped that he would do his best to prevent the Japanese press from publishing unconfirmed rumors concerning the attitude of the United States and, in any case, that he would endeavor to calm such adverse press reactions against the United States as might occur, especially until my Government’s reaction to our present conversation had been ascertained. The Minister replied that he agreed with me as to the importance of this and that he would do his best.

9. Commenting on the foregoing conversation I fully realize that we in Tokyo are unable to see the whole picture of the situation as the Department sees it. We realize that a negotiated peace at the present moment might be held to be more in the interests of one of the combatants than of the other. What follows is therefore presented as a discussion of the situation on the basis of evidence available to us and on the assumption that an early peace is desirable from all points of view.

10. Yoshizawa⁹¹ has told us in confidence that the position of the Japanese Government is that it is prepared to consult either individually or collectively with the United States and Great Britain and other powers having substantial interests in the Far East, but that it will not respond to invitations to consult with these or other powers within the framework of any system of collective security, whether it be the League of Nations or the Brussels Conference. We feel that even if the inclusion in the Brussels Conference of such countries as Mexico and Bolivia was unavoidable, the presence of Soviet Russia effectively removed any doubt which the Japanese Government might have had as to its decision not to consult with that Conference.

11. We learn also from Yoshizawa that on this account even the leaders in the army believe that no settlement reached with any Chinese personage other than Chiang Kai Shek could reasonably be expected to be a final settlement. In view of the statement made to me by Hirota with regard to the anticipated evacuation of Nanking and to the insecurity of Chiang’s position, it may be of interest to cite the statement made to us by the same informant that the Japanese Government feels that an opportunity to talk peace terms with Chiang may be lost if the Chinese Government is driven from Nanking into the remote and inaccessible interior. Yoshizawa stated that in such eventuality maintenance of order would require the formation of a new Chinese régime and it was believed that in those circumstances the Chinese Government where it still remained under the influence of Chiang or whether as seemed likely it had fallen into the hands of the radicals would maintain resistance indefinitely.

12. Notwithstanding the optimistic estimates of foreign observers with regard to the efficiency of the Chinese forces in the Shanghai area, the time may be approaching when a negotiated peace might have to be indefinitely deferred. From current evidence there appears to be possibly impending that situation in China which we had envisaged in putting forward our recommendations as to the attitude of our Government (our 321, August 27, 4 p.m.⁹² and letter to the Secretary dated September 15, 1937⁹³).

13. I had previously made Hirota aware that our Government would view with strong distaste any proposition from Japan calculated to secure the assistance of the United States in legitimizing the results of a Japanese military victory and I assume that Hirota in making today’s approach is fully aware of your position.

14. Present evidence indicates that if our Government were to insist that efforts toward peace be made within the framework of a system of collective security, whether of the League or of the Nine Power Treaty, force and only force could be effective.

15. With reference to paragraph 2, 1 expect that Craigie, and perhaps the French Ambassador, will continue to strengthen the impression in Japan that it is the United States which took the initiative and is really most instrumental in trying to create a common front against Japan, thereby greatly injuring our influence and interests here.

Grew

89. See Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 807 ff.
90. Dated November 15, Congressional Record, vol. 82, pt. 1, p. 5.
91. Seijiro Yoshizawa, Director of the American Affairs Bureau, Japanese Foreign Office.
92. Vol. iii, p. 485.
93. Ibid., p. 525.