793.94 Conference/176: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 3—3:02 a.m.]
10. I had a long talk this morning with Eden. He explained that Great Britain was seriously worried over the course of events in the [Page 146] Far East; at the same time she felt herself threatened in Europe as well as the Far East and did not see any lifting of the clouds in the near future. The more she examined the question of lawlessness in the world the more she reached the conclusion that only by Great Britain and America standing shoulder to shoulder could the present threats be dispelled. He had no doubt that eventually the democracies would wake up but whether or not it would be in time was a question that was preoccupying him. In the circumstances he stated that Great Britain would be willing to go just as far in the way of positive action in the Far East as the United States but no farther. For obvious reasons the British Government has been playing down its willingness to assume so strong a position particularly as it could not judge how far America could be willing to go. He added, however, that the assurance he had given us was not given lightly and represented the considered views of the British Government.
I told Eden that we had no intention of taking the lead; that I thought neither should follow the other; that all of the powers including the small ones should participate actively in the deliberations; that I felt it desirable in the interest of a constructive solution for us to cooperate and endeavor to work along similar lines; that I could not agree to our taking joint action but that this did not preclude independent action along parallel lines. I felt that we should concentrate every effort on exerting moral pressure so as to bring about peace by agreement and that until this had been earnestly tried and had conclusively failed we could not even consider what we might do from that point on. Eden agreed although he urged that we should not waste too much time over the early phases of the Conference. I went on to explain that there was a large body of public opinion in the United States which felt that our interests in the Far East were much smaller than Great Britain’s and that the latter being unable to protect her own interests was trying to maneuver us into “pulling her chestnuts out of the fire for her.”
Eden said that he knew this feeling existed even though he greatly deplored it. I went on to say that if by any chance the two Powers should pursue policies which provoked retaliation it seemed that the United States would have to bear the brunt. Eden denied this and said that although the bulk of the British Fleet had to remain in Europe none the less Britain could and would send some ships to Far Eastern waters and that fortunately Singapore is now completed. He said he thought in fact that the moving around of a few ships would have a good effect on our efforts for a peaceful solution. Furthermore, he added, the British Admiralty felt that the power and effectiveness of the Japanese Navy was greatly exaggerated by the general public both in Great Britain and the United States.
[Page 147]Eden summed up the British position by saying that they would neither attempt to take a lead nor to push America out in front; that if constructive efforts failed he would be willing to join fully in direct pressure on Japan although he would not embarrass us by advocating it if the idea was unwelcome; and that he could make us a promise that he would not only second any initiative of the United States during the Conference but that British policy would be based upon American policy during the present crisis.
I summed up the American position by saying that we were going to make a genuine effort at the Conference to produce some constructive result; that in the process public opinion would be crystallized; that we did not view the problem as merely a Far Eastern one but as a world problem where the forces of peace and order had a direct interest in combating lawlessness; that President Roosevelt’s Chicago speech had been an effort to make clear to the public that America’s interests were directly affected by international anarchy; and that if our attempts at a constructive solution by agreement failed we would have to be guided thereafter by developments and by public opinion in the United States.