793.94 Conference/88: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:15 p.m.]
846. 1. Yesterday afternoon I held a conversation with Wang Ching Wei, former President of the Executive Yuan, now occupying extremely important positions in the Party and Government. Peng, Vice Minister of Communications, interpreted and Peck was present.
2. Wang said telegram received from Hu Shih24 reported that the President in recent interview had offered the following advice, (a) that after stating China’s case at the Brussels Conference the Chinese [Page 103] delegates withdraw and (b) that China be prepared at the Conference to state China’s position in regard to the desire of Japan to cooperate in developing China’s natural resources. Commenting, Wang said that the Chinese Government appreciated this thoughtful advice and would be guided by it. He supposed that the first item was based on the supposition that Japan would it [sic] not be represented and on feeling that participation by China in the discussions without Japan would impart an air of partiality and would antagonize Japan. There now appeared to be hope that Japan would be represented. In regard to the second he said that China would welcome cooperation from Japan as from all nations in the development of natural resources in accord with the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty and in ways not harmful to but advantageous to both China and the nations concerned.
3. Wang said the Chinese Government thoroughly understood the motive which prompted the powers to show scrupulous regard for the sensibilities of Japan as exemplified in the wording of the invitation to the Conference extended by the Belgian Government and in the President’s advice to Hu Shih. At the same time he wished to point out that there was a moderate party in Japan which disapproved of the present ruthless hostilities conducted against China by the military faction. This moderate party was suppressed and lacked arguments with which to oppose the war policy which appeals to the Japanese public on grounds of Japan’s national welfare and need of self-defense. Wang urged that if other nations would exert some form of pressure on Japan to desist from attempted military conquest of China making it evident that the continued use of armed force would be seriously detrimental to Japan’s international position the moderate party would be strengthened in its efforts to demonstrate that the use of warlike methods would be prejudicial to Japan. A too conciliatory attitude on the part of other nations on the other hand would encourage the Military and weaken the moderate party. I replied that one school of thought in the United States sympathized with this line of reasoning but another school felt that combined pressure on Japan would support the contention of the Japanese military faction that Japan was fighting for her existence and that Japan’s only hope lay in demonstrated military supremacy.
4. Continuing his discussion of underlying principles, Wang refuted the Japanese contention that China had been obdurate and refused to settle outstanding issues through diplomatic negotiation. He recalled that in the face of repeated invasions and provocations China had continued to negotiate with Japan and that Chang Chun when Minister for Foreign Affairs had even discussed Hirota’s “three principles” with the Japanese Ambassador for more than 2 months, [Page 104] which discussions had failed partly because Japan insisted on acceptance in blank and refused to divulge what the “principles” would mean in actual application. He said that China had thus been conciliatory in the extreme but he felt that much good would now be accomplished if the friendly powers would warn Japan that the present policy was driving the Chinese people to fight in desperation to the bitter end and would moreover leave Japan with a heritage of international ill-will. I observed that I concurred in the views expressed but it must be accepted as a fact that Japanese policy is at present dictated by the military mind which seems to know only the two facts of victory or indivisible defeat.
5. On the subject of the Brussels Conference, Wang told me in great confidence that the British Minister for Foreign Affairs had assured the Chinese Ambassador in London that whatever plan the participating powers might evolve for the proposed settlement of the conflict would first be submitted informally to China and Japan in order to sound out their views. He inquired whether it would not be possible for the American Government at the present time to ascertain privately what terms of settlement would be accepted by Japan and he added that while the Chinese Government was prepared to go a long way to effect a settlement it was of great importance to China to learn whether the Japanese Government was intending to treat China as Italy treated Ethiopia, because China was not in fact a second Ethiopia and would fight for its independence. I returned an evasive reply.
6. Wang asked me whether I had any inkling of the nature of the plan which the President had in mind for possible adjustment of the controversy between China and Japan and I said I had no information on this point. He asked what I thought was the attitude of the Soviet Union toward a settlement of the controversy and he remarked that it was absurd for Japan or anyone else to infer that the Nonaggression Pact concluded between the Soviet Union and China in August meant that there was a military alliance between the two countries; the pact was in that respect negative in nature. I said I thought the Russian attitude was one of extreme caution not to become embroiled in the present hostilities and that while Russia was probably convinced that sooner or later there must be war between Russia and Japan, Russia wished to choose the location of the battlefield. Wang asked me what I thought was Germany’s position and I said I saw a change in Germany’s position from that which one would infer from the German-Japanese joint understanding against Communism.25 This change was indicated somewhat by the press comments appearing [Page 105] in German newspapers and might indicate both that the difficulties experienced by the Japanese Army in China lessened in German opinion the supposed value of Japan as an ally and also that German commercial interests did not relish the prospect of Japanese interference with Germany’s encouraging recovery in trade with China and Germany’s increasingly friendly relations with China.
Repeated to Peiping and Tokyo.
- Chinese professor of philosophy.↩
- Agreement signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 153; see also Foreign Relations, 1937, vol. i, pp. 605 ff.↩