724.3415/3842: Telegram (part air)

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

168. Consulate’s 160, June 12, 4 p.m., paragraph 3.95

1.
Identic letters enclosing a draft report on the situation are being despatched by Najera today to all governments previously consulted except Germany and Japan. The letter to the United States I understand is being mailed directly to the Secretary of State. This letter embodies expressions similar to those cited in the second part of paragraph 5 of my 151, June 9, noon, and terminates as follows:

“The governments will moreover be able should they so desire to proceed to direct exchanges of views with one another more particularly as to the manner in which the conditions that some of them have laid down might be fulfilled with a view to generalizing the action already taken by other governments”.

The enclosed report referred to above comprised the following:

(a)
—A summary of the situation based on the replies received to date—though couched in different terms the information thus given apparently differs in no material way from that already transmitted [Page 268] to the Department in my series of telegrams relating to the replies received.
(b)
—General—A part of this restates the states of paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 151, June 9, noon, and the remainder is included in more compact form in the text of the “model reply” discussed below. In addition a recommendation is included along the lines of paragraph 2 of my 151.
(c)
—As an annex, the text of the model which the governments may use in their discretion in communicating their replies—with the following exceptions—this text is the same as the text of the draft “obligation” transmitted in my 144, June 8, 1 p.m. (see also my 151, paragraphs 5 and 7): paragraph 1 now reads: “the government of”; in paragraph 2 omit “nearly”; in paragraph 4 insert after “Council” the words “or the Assembly” and for the words “airplanes, airplane motors” substitute “aircraft, aircraft motors”. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are omitted. Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 now read as follows:

“Seeing that the consultations initiated in pursuance of the Council resolution of May 19, 1934, show that agreement upon the principle already exists among a large number of governments.

Announces its intention of taking immediately on its territory (announces that it has taken or that it will take) on its territory as from (blank date) adequate measures for the purpose in view, subject to the right to reconsider its position in case another government should omit to take or to enforce the necessary measures;

Expresses the hope that other governments which have announced their readiness to join in these measures will immediately take measures to this effect and that the governments of countries which do not manufacture arms will take measures to prevent their territories being utilized for the supply of the articles enumerated above”.

2.
With respect to the preoccupations expressed in my 160, June 12, 4 p.m., paragraph 2, I feel from the situation here that the phrase “arms and munitions” in our reply to the League’s original communication might well stand for the present as an adequate definition of the scope of our embargo measures. In other words, that an attempt now to interpret or define elements of that reply might lead to the difficulties I have discussed in previous communications. On the other hand the letter addressed to the Secretary referred to above although not definitely calling for reply might nevertheless be employed as a basis of a reply and should the situation at that time suggest that a more comprehensive definition of our embargo measure would serve a useful purpose such a definition could be embodied in such a reply.
3.
After watching developments here and noting the expression of opinion of a large number of officials I venture to express the thought that to obtain in advance a unanimous technical agreement, as has been attempted in a matter in which precedents are so lacking as in [Page 269] an arms embargo employed as a sanction, might be more difficult than to obtain the actual practical execution of an embargo. Should a majority of the great powers and a substantial number of the smaller powers each improving measures that they found possible to take now institute a practical embargo the self-interest of these powers to bring pressure on the recalcitrant states together with a possible mobilization of public and press opinion against so tangible a matter as the actual shipment of arms on the part of a few states might bring into line the powers which under present conditions are reluctant to institute such measures. The obvious annoyance of the Japanese here at what they term the action of Italy in endeavoring to place the responsibility on Japan for the failure of a universal embargo is a case in point.
Gilbert
  1. Not printed.