724.3415/3703: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 19—8:57 p.m.]
85. 1. The following appear to me to be the chief factors which governed the Council action in the Bolivia–Paraguay dispute described in my 83, May 19, 10 p.m.65
From a technical point of view this procedure was devised to escape the difficulties under the unanimity rule (article 11 of the Covenant66) through the adverse positions certain to be taken either by Bolivia or Paraguay or by both.
More fundamental political considerations were, however, undoubtedly operative. Opposition developed to such a sanction as the proposed embargo being taken against both of the belligerents as [Page 240] contravening the prevalent conception that the value of sanctions as an element of security lies in their special applicability against the belligerent which has been determined to be the aggressor or otherwise primarily responsible for a conflict. It is, of course, evident that in this case the Chaco Commission had in effect placed the blame equally on both disputants and thus sanctions might in such circumstances be invoked against both and still presumably be in harmony with this conception. Nevertheless, such action was opposed as creating a precedent tending to undermine this principle. Czechoslovak officials expressed this view frankly in informal conversations and presumably advanced it officially in private discussions. It appears that Italy also supports this general contention. To what extent Czechoslovakia in this also reflects the views of other League states is not clear but probably at least the other Little Entente countries. In any event, aside from the opposition of the disputants it would probably have been impossible to obtain direct and unanimous Council action on the embargo proposal.
There are also intimations that these and perhaps other states are for commercial considerations unfavorable to an embargo and some doubt is even expressed as to whether certain states will give completely acquiescent reply to the Committee of Three’s telegram. The best opinion appears to be, however, that such states will stop short of being placed in an isolated position in such a connection.