724.3415/4210: Telegram
The Ambassador in Brazil (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:50 p.m.]
255. The Minister for Foreign Affairs expresses himself as perturbed by the League’s activity in the Chaco question, first of all because he fears it threatens the normal development of the system of settling American problems among ourselves.
While he recognizes the obligation of the League to take cognizance of the conflict when brought to its attention by a member state, he feels that a sense of reality would have dictated a postponement and [Page 94] the exertion of League influence to back up our efforts to secure acceptance of the formula and the cessation of hostilities. If this course had been taken he believes we could have succeeded.
Instead of this the League seems to be taking over the whole range of the problem and entrusting its solution to a committee composed arbitrarily of non-American powers—Russia, China, Ireland, Sweden, et cetera. Past experience gives ground for fearing that under such conditions the matter will be handled in a legalistic and oratorical way which is calculated to lose sight of the more realistic aim of stopping the war. Briefly, he feels the interjection of the League can only serve to deter a solution.
Comparing past League efforts with purely American efforts, he feels experience has shown that we understand our own problems better than they are understood at Geneva and that we can settle American conflicts better and more expeditiously among ourselves than can be hoped for if duplicate negotiations afford the parties an opportunity to alternate between the two and thus complicate and prolong the discussion, as is being done at the present time.
He therefore suggests that you may be willing to give thought to the desirability of some broad statement, speech, or other pronouncement, stressing the importance we attach to settling American problems in America. He recognizes of course that this is both delicate and important but feels that it calls for consideration.
It is his idea that such a step would be welcome[d] rather than resented by most of the American Republics if the statement brought out the idea of association and partnership which already exist. His thought is that at the start the basis of our relations was the Monroe Doctrine67 which as enunciated was of course unilateral—but a unilateral obligation rather than a unilateral assertion of a privileged position for ourselves. It was unilateral because the United States was the only country in this hemisphere able to stand on its own feet at that time. The United States assumed this responsibility as an emergency measure in order to gain time for the newly independent countries to get their growth and in the hope that as time went on other American countries would develop strength to share the responsibility we had assumed for their benefit. This is so obvious that it has perhaps not been stated often enough. However we have spontaneously recognized the fact that others have attained their majority by seeking their help in settling American problems. Experience has shown better results from this method than from any other.
From the Brazilian-American point of view the Minister said “so long as Brazil and the United States are not members of the League of [Page 95] Nations we should not permit any intervention of non-American states in the handling of purely American problems”. The Minister has not sought to indicate the time, nature, or ostensible occasion for the suggested pronouncement, all would be determined by developments; but the Minister is anxious that you should be turning the general idea over in your mind.
It is clear from the sober and measured way in which the Minister talked that this has been the subject of considerable thought and discussion. He kept stressing the view that the present problem is more fundamental than any question of procedure in handling the Chaco problem and raises the question as to whether the Monroe Doctrine is to develop into an all American principle or whether we are going to allow it to be undermined by non-American handling of American affairs.
If such a pronouncement is made it would have to be made by the United States but the Minister feels that he could follow it up by a statement of his own, confirming and supporting it.
I venture to point out that the foregoing are the views of the Minister uncolored by comments of my own. In view of the importance of his message I have this afternoon gone over this telegram with him in order to make sure that his opinions were accurately reported.
He would welcome an expression of your views.
- See section entitled “Official Statement of and Commentary Upon the Monroe Doctrine by the Secretary of State”, Foreign Relations, 1929, vol. i, pp. 698 ff.↩