800.51W89 U.S.S.R./43a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt)

64. Yesterday, with Moore and myself present, Troyanovsky, who had sought the interview, talked with the President and was told that the negotiation should not be transferred to Washington but continued at Moscow, particularly in view of the fact that you and Litvinoff are thoroughly familiar with all that occurred here last fall, and the interview ended with that understanding. The President could not well decline his request out of hand but made it clear to Troyanovsky that what the latter suggests is the slowest method because on every proposal that might be made in Washington we should have to consult you and he would have to consult Litvinoff.

During the conversation, Troyanovsky said that, if $75,000,000 in payment of the debts is unsatisfactory, Litvinoff is prepared to increase the amount. On this point the President was very clear in showing the effect of the devaluation of the dollar on the minimum and maximum totals discussed last fall. Furthermore, the President stressed the fact, as something he must always bear in mind, that any debt agreement will be subject to the Senate’s approval. Troyanovsky submitted a copy of Mr. Ughet’s memorandum of January 10, 1921,20 mentioned in Litvinoff’s note to you transmitted in your 44 of April 8, 8 p.m.

There was some, but not definite or important, mention of interest rates and other details, and it was explained to Troyanovsky that the matter of debts and the matter of contemplated credits are so linked together as to make it unreasonable for the Export Bank to engage in transactions in advance of a debt agreement satisfactory to the President.

There is really nothing concrete to say except that the President leaves the negotiation in your hands without having made any committal [Page 88] or statement conflicting in any way with what you have done or anticipating what you may attempt to do.

Various considerations which may influence Litvinoff, as, for instance, his apparent failure to obtain a loan from Sweden, and the present Japanese situation you, of course, fully appreciate.

We assume that you will bring the negotiation to a climax as soon as possible and that, if Litvinoff remains obdurate, you will wish us to acquiesce in Troyanovsky’s request that the negotiation be further carried on here.

Hull
  1. Not found in Department files.