300.115(39) City of Flint/60: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

831. City of Flint. The conflicting actions and inconsistencies of the Soviet Government summarized in the Department’s telegram number 216 of October 27,7 p.m., the deliberate failure of the Soviet authorities to furnish me satisfactory information and to keep me informed and the evasions and obstructions to my communicating with the American crew will not be difficult to understand when examined in the light of my telegrams over the past 2 months in which I have emphasized that the Soviet Union has been, and is acting in fact, if not in law, as a silent partner of Germany in the existing conflict.

Reduced to its simplest terms, I am of the opinion that when the City of Flint arrived at Murmansk the German prize crew claimed the right of entry on the basis reported in my 829 October 29, 8 a.m., but that the examination of the vessel by the Soviet authorities disclosed that the actual conditions did not bring the vessel within the scope of article number 21. The Soviet Government thereupon proceeded to intern the German prize crew pending consultation with the German Government. I have little doubt that the German Government counseled the [Page 1004] Soviet Government not to challenge the grounds of entry, even though they might not be sound or sufficient, but to release the German prize crew and permit them to take the vessel to sea.

The Soviet Government was then faced with the necessity for deciding whether it would proceed in accordance with international law, keep the German prize crew interned, and release the vessel to her American crew; or become a party to a conspiracy to protect Germany’s interests. The decision was disclosed when a Tass communiqué was broadcast to the world at 1:30 a.m. on October 26, announcing the release of the German prize crew from internment and at the same time stating that purpose [of] entry had been damaged machinery.

I consider that the deliberate withholding by the Soviet Government from me of information in its possession while keeping the German Embassy here fully advised is corroborative evidence of Soviet-German collusion in this matter.

In pursuance of the plan it was essential that the American crew should not be allowed ashore and that the Soviet Government should employ its absolute control of passengers of sailing vessels and transportation to prevent the American Embassy from getting into communication with the American crew since to have permitted such communication would have been to run the risk of the exposure of the entire scheme.

Had it not been for the immediate and vigorous reaction of the American Government, and the mistrust of the course and intentions of the Soviet Government which I clearly expressed to Potemkin on more than one occasion, I am inclined to believe that the Soviet Government might even have concurred in an attempt to sequestrate the vessel indefinitely at Murmansk under article 22 of the Hague Convention, notwithstanding the non-judiciary [?] to this article.

There is nothing contained in the Department’s telegrams up to and inclusive of 216, October 27, 7 p.m., which I did not say to Potemkin, supplemented by additional observations on my own initiative.

The issue appears to narrow down to whether there actually was machinery damage sufficient to constitute unseaworthiness, that being the only reason officially advanced by the Soviet Government for the entry into Murmansk. This seems to me to be a question of fact as to which the eventual testimony of the American members of the crew will afford the evidence most acceptable to our Government inasmuch as I cannot conceive of the Soviet Government permitting Soviet citizens to give evidence to us, and as any evidence so obtained would, moreover, be worthless, as it would be fabricated by the Soviet Government, which has developed this practice to a high degree.

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I appreciate the seriousness of charging what amounts to a conspiracy between the Soviet and German Governments, but on the basis of a thorough and objective review of the events of the past 4 days and nights I feel justified in arriving at such a conclusion. Furthermore, such a conspiracy would be quite consistent with the past course of the Soviet Government.

As I have advised the Department a Tass communiqué this morning announced the departure of the City of Flint from Murmansk “on the evening of October 28”. (My information, however, which I have been unable to confirm, is that the vessel actually sailed from 12 to 18 hours earlier.)90 I understand that before putting to sea she was fully provisioned and furnished with navigation charts of the territorial waters along the entire Norwegian coast, to obtain which may well have been the principal object of her entry into Murmansk, particularly as an authoritative source has advised me that such charts were refused at Tromso.

Steinhardt
  1. Telegram in three sections.
  2. Compare the fourth paragraph of the supplementary statement by Captain Joseph A. Gainard, transmitted from Bergen by the Minister in Norway in telegram No. 10, November 9, 1939, 11 a.m., p. 1012.