300.115(39) City of Flint/49: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State
820. I can readily understand the inability of the Department to comprehend the attitude and conduct of the Soviet Government in respect of the City of Flint and the difficulty of believing that a government in supposedly friendly relations with the United States should fail to comply with the most elementary amenities and to follow the accepted practices of international intercourse. The following observations which perhaps can be understood only by those who have been stationed in Moscow and who have had direct dealings with the Soviet authorities may be pertinent.
The concentrated and complex organization of the Soviet Government coupled with the deliberately inspired fear which is an integral part of this system creates a situation whereby only two or three men at the very top who are extremely difficult of access exercise all authority and makes the divulging of even routine information a matter of policy.
To this should be added the fact that the Soviet Government with its absolute control over all sources of information coupled with the entire absence of anything remotely resembling public opinion in the Soviet Union is rendered to a large extent immune from and indifferent to the foreign press and public opinion. This is accentuated by the ignorance of the present Soviet leaders of conditions outside of the Soviet Union.
The only factor which tends to influence the action of the Soviet Government in such cases as that of the City of Flint is fear of retaliation directly affecting some Soviet interest. In the present case in view of the close collaboration of the Soviet Union with Germany which is based on self-preservation and fear of German armed might, the Soviet Union has demonstrated by its actions that it clearly prefers to remain in the good grace of Germany even at the expense of the impairment of its relations with the United States choosing what appears to its leaders to be the lesser of two evils.
When it is recalled that the Soviet Union since the outbreak of the war has apparently been quite prepared to run the risk of war with England and France in pursuance of its collaboration with Germany, the most recent example of which is the Soviet note to Great Britain [Page 1000] in respect of contraband of war,85 it is not difficult to understand that to [the?] Soviet Government, doubtless in consultation with the German Government in respect of the case of the City of Flint, has not hesitated to run the risk of impairing its relations with the United States in order to satisfy Germany.
It has become increasingly apparent during the past 48 hours that the Soviet Government has been attempting by means of delay, evasion, and professions of ignorance to favor or protect the German position.