300.115(39) City of Flint/36: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

809. Department’s 213, October 26, 1 p.m. In connection with our “legal contentions” I refer to the Department’s telegram 208 of October 24, 6 p.m., and 211 of October 25, 7 p.m., neither of which envisage unconditional surrender of the City of Flint to the American crew, our legal position being based on the applicable provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907. Thus far I have accepted for my guidance the concluding paragraph of the Department’s 211, October 25, 7 p.m.:

“Finally, you should conclude, if occasion arises, that it is the decided view of your Government that international law does not permit a neutral country to receive in its ports prizes of war except for the reasons stated in article 21 of the Hague Convention; that if the prize does not depart when the cause of its entry is removed, the neutral government must permit it with its crew to depart, and that your Government does not doubt that the Soviet Government will view the matter in this light and act accordingly.”

Having vigorously presented this view, with apparent success, to Potemkin, I am now somewhat at a loss as to whether the Department has changed its position and desires that I demand that the vessel be unconditionally turned over to the American crew—provided there is still time within which to effect such a demand. However when I see Potemkin today I shall make such a formal demand.

In view of the fact that the Tass report subsequently confirmed by Potemkin stated that the vessel was brought in to Murmansk due to the necessity of repairing her machinery it appeared to me that the facts in the case as represented by the Soviet Government fell within the scope of the position taken by the Department in the telegrams referred to above.

The “press reports as yet unconfirmed” to which reference is made presumably are based upon a Hearst story from its London correspondent which reached Moscow yesterday and was denied by local American correspondents. As the report at the time was completely unfounded, it appears to have been merely a lucky forecast of the action not taken until tonight by Soviet Government. In my daily discussions with Potemkin on the subject I have stressed to the utmost the urgency of obtaining the fullest information at the earliest possible moment. On each occasion I gained the distinct impression that [Page 994] in this as in other matters the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has had extreme difficulty in obtaining information from the authorities directly concerned. Both last night and tonight Tass communiqués were issued from Murmansk, in the one case within 1 hour and in the other case within 2 hours, after I left Potemkin and in neither case was he aware that they were to be issued or of the nature of their contents. Only yesterday I emphatically protested to Potemkin on my own initiative and before the receipt of the Department’s telegram under acknowledgment at the impropriety and discourtesy in releasing a Tass communiqué containing information of direct importance and interest to my Government which he had stated he was unable to furnish me at the time but had promised to furnish subsequently. In connection with the Tass communiqué issued tonight which was read on the Soviet radio about 1 hour after I left Potemkin, I at once tried to telephone Potemkin for confirmation and further details but was told that he had gone to his home in the country and could not be reached until morning. I should add that it is the objectionable practice here for Tass to publish information through the medium of communiqués before the representatives of interested governments are acquainted with the subject or contents.

As reported in my telegram 805, October 26, 6 p.m., I am continuing my efforts to establish telephonic communication with the Captain or a member of the American crew. The difficulties have been occasioned by the execrable Soviet telephone system and not by any governmental interference. I am endeavoring to charter a plane to be utilized by Ward or Bohlen unless the vessel and her American crew have sailed before the plane could arrive there.

Steinhardt