760p.6111/63
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat)
The Latvian Minister41 came to see me today. He was quite cheerful over the signature of the Russian-Latvian Pact, primarily for the reason that he had feared something worse. He regrets to see Russian garrisons stationed on Latvian soil but accepts it with philosophical resignation and concentrates his rejoicings on the fact that Latvia is still alive. He said that it would have been far worse had Latvia and Estonia been sold out by England and France during their negotiations with Russia last Spring. As it was, the two countries had signed agreements of their own free will which maintained their independence and in which Russia pledged herself to accept and not to overthrow their type of capitalistic government.
Incidentally, the Minister pointed out that Estonia got better commercial and transit terms than did Latvia. Just twenty-one years ago Estonia had gotten better terms from Russia by signing up first. It was a case, said the Minister, of the early bird getting the worm.
As to the provisions whereby Russia got the right to keep garrisons near the two Latvian ports, the Minister pointed out that the naval harbors were about five miles away from the main cities. Russia had always taken pains not to let members of her military or naval forces mingle with bourgeois populations, presumably fearing contamination. He, therefore, thought that these garrisons would keep entirely by themselves and not play any role with the local communities, the more so as they would be eternally suspicious of espionage.
As to Stalin, the Minister thinks that at the moment he is 90% a Russian and only 10% a Communist in his thinking. This leads him to think that Stalin may favor peace with a view to consolidating his gains. Were the Communist side of Stalin to gain the upper hand he would naturally seek to extend the war with a view to weakening all participants. The Minister feels that in the long run Russian and German interests will cause a clash but that (a) Stalin has been immensely impressed by German military might and (b) he would not want to see Germany disintegrate entirely as that would bring him right up against the British and French Empires.
The Minister did not consider that the moment for peace was opportune. He thought that Hitler sincerely wanted it but that with the present victory psychology in Germany he could not offer terms that would be considered for a moment in England or France. He thought that the moment would come for outside mediation only when all [Page 962] belligerents were out of breath, and not before. He drew a long analogy of the peace of Portsmouth,42 where he felt that American mediation had been perfectly timed.
- Dr. Alfreds Bilmanis.↩
- For the good offices of President Theodore Roosevelt, see Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 807 ff.; for text of the treaty of peace between Russia and Japan signed at Portsmouth, August 23/September 5, 1905, see ibid., p. 824.↩