700i.6111/72
The Minister in Latvia (Wiley) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 25.]
Sir:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The several articles of the mutual assistance pact26 provide for mutual aid, including military assistance in the event either of direct [Page 950] aggression or threat of aggression on the part of “some great European power” (Germany?) against the Baltic maritime border of the contracting parties or against their land frontier through Latvian territory. The foregoing is supplemented on the part of Estonia by the cession of naval and air bases on a leasehold basis on the Estonian islands of Saaremaa (Oesel) and Hiiumaa (Dagö), as well as in the port of Paldiski (Baltiski). For the protection of the aforesaid bases the Soviet Government obtains the right to maintain garrisons. Further, the pact in question “shall in no way infringe upon the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, particularly their economic systems and political structures”. Finally, the text of the treaty provides that it shall enter into force upon the exchange of ratifications, which is to take place at Tallinn within six days of signing. Its validity shall run for ten years and if not denounced it shall be automatically extended for a subsequent period of five years.
The Soviet [trade] agreement, according to the Estonian press, provides for an increase in exchange of commodities between Estonia and the U. S. S. R. of four and a half times. Moreover the U. S. S. R. will grant transit possibilities for Estonian commodities on Soviet railways and waterways to Murmansk, Soroka (on the White Sea) and to Black Sea ports. The details of Estonian concessions to the Soviet Union are to be elaborated by the meeting of technical commissions which I understand are to meet within twenty days of the signature of the pact of mutual assistance. I was informed by the Estonian Foreign Office that the pact could and probably would be ratified by the President27 alone, who was qualified to take such action under the constitution.* So far as Estonia was concerned there was no desire to delay matters and it was foreseen that the carrying out of the Estonian-Soviet agreement would proceed promptly and smoothly.
In conversation with several officials of the Estonian Foreign Office some further information was gleaned:
The maximum number of Soviet troops to be stationed in naval and air bases would, in accordance with the agreement, not exceed 25,000. They would be introduced only gradually as the work of constructing the naval and air bases proceeded.
Notwithstanding the far-reaching character of the concessions which Estonia was rudely forced to grant, there was, nevertheless, a substantial feeling of relief in Estonia. The realization of Estonian fears had been less severe than had been dreaded. The wife of one of the leading Estonian actors in this drama was even jubilant and [Page 951] expressed the warmest gratitude to Germany for having rescued Estonian “independence”. The attitude, however, of Foreign Office officials was more realistic. At best, they say, Estonia has obtained only a breathing spell of uncertain duration.
The Estonian-Soviet agreements appear to represent a foreign political paradox. Reliable information confirms the impression that Germany is far from pleased by this new advent of the Soviet Union into the Baltic. Indeed the text of the mutual assistance pact would seem to be directed specifically against Germany. No elaborate process of elimination is required in order to identify the only possible “aggressor” as the Reich alone.
The treaties of peace conferred on defeated Germany a position of preeminence in the Baltic, with Soviet Russia hemmed in within the bottleneck of the Gulf of Finland. The tearing up of the Treaty of Versailles.28 together with the German campaign to establish a new order of things in Eastern Europe seems to have been successful in reviving the Russian position to an extent where the Soviet Union may in the near future be able successfully to challenge the German position in the eastern Baltic. The Department will note that the port of Paldiski and the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa are strategically placed to dominate the Gulf of Riga and the Gulf of Finland and to threaten the Gulf of Bothnia as well. Moreover Estonia is presumably only the starting point. Other concessions are supposedly to be demanded from Latvia at once. Finland too will clearly be asked to contribute, and possibly Lithuania.
The Soviet-Estonian trade agreement may also be directed against Germany. The granting of transit facilities to Estonian exports via Murmansk and Soroka as well as the Black Sea ports would seem at least technically to present a possibility for Estonian trade to evade the operation of the German blockade. This may be borne out by press reports that M. Maiski has just informed Lord Halifax of Soviet willingness to renew trade discussions with Great Britain.
Simultaneously with the conclusion of the Soviet-Estonian agreements, Herr von Ribbentrop conducted negotiations in Moscow which were designed to convey the impression of intimate political and economic collaboration between the U. S. S. R. and the Reich. The truth of the matter may be that Soviet policy remains unchanged and continues to be directed with the full force of Soviet suspicion against all the great powers of Central and Western Europe, including Germany. Perhaps, as stated to me by a high official of the Estonian Foreign Office, Soviet preoccupation is centered chiefly in the German [Page 952] Reich for fear of a general peace move at the expense of the U. S. S. R. or defeat of the Western Democracies. My informant believes that in the latter event the Soviet Union foresees that Germany would turn from the West and push East. He pointed out that Soviet preventive tactics in Poland, particularly along the southern boundaries would confirm this thesis, since, obviously, Soviet policy not only impinged on the German position in the north but was likewise directed to impede the progress of Mitteleuropa policy towards the southeast.
Respectfully yours,
- Between Estonia and the Soviet Union.↩
- Konstantin Päts.↩
- He did not avail himself of this authority for the ratification of the German-Estonian pact of non-aggression. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- On March 16, 1935, Germany unilaterally repudiated the military and naval restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and reintroduced compulsory military service. For text of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, p. 55.↩