711.00111 Armament Control/Military Secrets/2138
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Controls (Green)
The Acting Secretary of the Navy spoke briefly to the Secretary this morning in regard to the Navy Department’s anxiety lest the building [Page 897] of destroyers in this country for the U. S. S. R. might, in the present crowded condition of the shipyards, interfere with the carrying out of our own program of naval rearmament and our recent program of shipbuilding for the American Merchant Marine. He suggested that, in view of these facts, we should consider whether or not it was advisable to inform Gibbs & Cox, Incorporated, naval architects, that there had been a change in the policy of this Government in respect to the proposed construction of destroyers in the United States for the U. S. S. R. and that this Government did not look with favor upon the proposed transaction.
The Secretary asked Mr. Edison to discuss the matter further with me with a view to arriving at a mutually satisfactory solution of the difficulty.
After we left the Secretary’s office, I outlined to Mr. Edison the considerations opposed to an expression of a change of policy in this matter which were set forth in my memorandum of September 6. I suggested that the Navy Department, in replying to our letter of September 98 transmitting copies of the revised plans and specifications for destroyers and flotilla leaders prepared by Gibbs & Cox, Incorporated, should restrict itself to dealing with the specific question of military secrecy in its relation to the national defense. I said that if the Navy Department were to add any suggestion in such a letter that there should be a change of policy on the part of this Government in respect to the proposed construction of vessels of war for the U. S. S. R. an embarrassing question would be raised, as, in accordance with the established interdepartmental procedure for dealing with matters relating to military secrets, the Department would feel constrained either to transmit the Navy’s observations to Gibbs & Cox, Incorporated, or to enter into a discussion with the Navy Department as to the advisability of doing so. I said that at the present juncture, in view of the international situation in Europe, I did not believe that it would be advisable for this Government to inform Gibbs & Cox, Incorporated, that there had been any change of policy as any statement on this subject would necessarily be transmitted by Gibbs & Cox, Incorporated, to the Soviet Naval Mission. I said further that, if Mr. Edison felt that he must record in correspondence the Navy Department’s anxiety in regard to the possible overcrowding of our domestic shipbuilding facilities, he might deal with this phase of the question in a separate letter addressed to the Secretary for his confidential information. By following this procedure the question of whether or not any statement of this kind should be transmitted to Mr. Gibbs would not be raised. I added that, if the Navy Department felt that the matter was sufficiently serious to make necessary some [Page 898] action at this time, he might take occasion in conversation with representatives of American shipbuilders to discourage their entering into contracts to construct vessels of war for the U. S. S. R. until the immediate emergency had passed.
Mr. Edison said that he would follow my suggestions.
It would seem that anything which the Navy Department may feel it necessary to say to the American shipbuilders with a view to discouraging them from entering into contracts to build naval vessels for the U. S. S. R. would probably be unnecessary to accomplish what the Navy Department has in mind as neither the Navy Department nor the Department of State has received any indication that any American shipbuilder is disposed to enter into such a contract.
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