711.00111 Armament Control/Military Secrets/1902
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Controls ( Green )
The Soviet Ambassador called at my office this morning at my request. I handed him the note dated June 22, 1939,94 in regard to the destroyers and flotilla leaders which his government proposes to have constructed in the United States. I informed him that the Secretary had requested that I hand him the note instead of sending it by messenger in order that he might have an opportunity to obtain orally any supplementary explanations which he might desire.
Mr. Oumansky read the note. He then said that there must be some misunderstanding; that he had had a conversation with Captain Frolov in New York yesterday; that Captain Frolov had informed him of recent conversations with Mr. Gibbs of Gibbs and Cox, Incorporated, and that Captain Frolov had stated that the Navy Department’s decisions were such as would make it absolutely impossible for the Soviet Government to obtain satisfactory destroyers or flotilla leaders in this country. Mr. Oumansky added that he had been instructed by Mr. Molotov to inform this Government that his government would not be in anywise interested in purchasing destroyers of the Mohan class. He explained that the electric installation, the boilers and the propelling machinery of destroyers of the Mahan class were, in the opinion of his government, antiquated and would be entirely unacceptable.
I told him that I was very much surprised at his statements; that Mr. Gibbs had informed me that the plans which had been approved by the Navy Department would, with slight modifications which he thought the Navy Department would agree to, enable him to construct vessels which would be entirely satisfactory to the Soviet Government or to any other government. I said that it was my understanding that these plans called for a very modern type of vessel and I assured him that the only features in the design, armament and equipment of the very latest types of destroyers and flotilla leaders which the Navy Department would not permit to be incorporated in vessels constructed for foreign governments were features considered to be military secrets the safeguarding of which was considered to be essential to the national defense. I said that I understood that Mr. Gibbs and Captain Frolov were engaged in a careful study of the plans; that Mr. Gibbs was fully prepared to submit for consideration such modifications as Captain Frolov might desire to have made and that there seemed to be every reason to believe that matters could be worked out to the entire satisfaction of his government if [Page 888] his government did not insist upon the incorporation in the vessel of secret features which this Government was not prepared to release to any foreign power.
Mr. Oumansky intimated clearly that he believed that this Government was attempting to withhold from his government items of armament and equipment which it would be prepared to permit certain other foreign governments to obtain.
I told the Ambassador that he was completely mistaken; that the policy of this Government in respect to the release of military secrets was a policy of universal release and that any item which was released to such a government as that of Canada, for instance, with which this Government was on terms of the highest possible cordiality, would be released to his government. I cited the fact that every feature of the design for the destroyers which the Navy Department had communicated to the Government of Brazil in connection with the construction of destroyers for that Government could be included in any destroyers constructed for his government.
Mr. Oumansky returned several times to this point in the course of the conversation intimating rather clearly that notwithstanding my statements he believed that this Government was in some way discriminating against his government in this matter.
The Ambassador said that he would greatly appreciate it if he could obtain authorization to discuss this matter with Mr. Edison, Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
I told the Ambassador that I thought there would be no difficulty whatever in arranging for him to call on Mr. Edison, but that I believed that his conversation with Mr. Edison would be more effective if it were subsequent to the conversation which I understood that Mr. Gibbs was to have with Mr. Edison in the next few days.
The Ambassador said that he entirely agreed with what I had said and he arranged that I would call him by telephone later in the day after I had communicated with Mr. Gibbs.
I called Mr. Gibbs by telephone this afternoon and told him briefly of my conversation with the Ambassador.
Mr. Gibbs said that he could not understand why the Ambassador should have taken such a position; that he felt confident that the decision of the Navy Department with possible modifications in regard to the boilers to be installed—modifications which he thought the Navy Department would almost certainly agree to—would enable him to construct perfectly satisfactory destroyers and flotilla leaders, vessels which he described as “splendid boats”. I asked Mr. Gibbs when he expected to see Mr. Edison.
Mr. Gibbs told me that he had an appointment for June 27.
I called the Ambassador by telephone and told him that Mr. Gibbs expected to see Mr. Edison on June 27. I said that the Department [Page 889] would have no objection to Mr. Oumansky calling on Mr. Edison to discuss this matter and I suggested that he endeavor to make an appointment with Mr. Edison for sometime after Mr. Gibbs had had an opportunity to discuss matters with him.
Mr. Oumansky thanked me for the information and said that he would follow my suggestion.
Mr. Oumansky called me by telephone later in the day to say that he had reconsidered what he had told me in our conversations in regard to his calling upon Mr. Edison and that he now proposed to ask Mr. Edison to receive him and Captain Frolov before he saw Mr. Gibbs.
I told the Ambassador that the time of his conversation with Mr. Edison was a matter which he could determine in accordance with his own convenience, but that I doubted whether very much could be accomplished with Mr. Edison until after Mr. Edison had had an opportunity to discuss the technical details of the matters under discussion with Mr. Gibbs.
Mr. Oumansky said he might ask to see Mr. Edison twice—once before Mr. Gibbs called and again afterwards.
I called Mr. Edison by telephone immediately after my conversation with Mr. Oumansky and told him briefly of the various conversations reported in this memorandum.
While I was talking with Mr. Edison he interrupted to say that his aide had just informed him that the Soviet Ambassador was on the telephone and that he had told the Ambassador that he would speak to him after he had finished his conversation with me.
Mr. Edison said that if Mr. Oumansky requested an appointment before his appointment with Mr. Gibbs he would agree to see him but that he would have to “play dumb” as he certainly would not commit himself in any way before he had had an opportunity to talk matters over with Mr. Gibbs.
Mr. Edison agreed with me that it was unfortunate that the Ambassador had seen fit to inject himself into this situation at this time when matters seemed to be on the road to a satisfactory solution of all the difficulties with which we had been confronted.
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