124.611/127
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 20.]
Sir: I have the honor to report in regard to several instances in which the Soviet Government does not seem disposed to carry out understandings between it and the Government of the United States.
(1) I have reported so fully by cable in regard to negotiations growing out of the “verbal understanding” between the President and Mr. Litvinov 10 that I need not burden you in this despatch with further [Page 72] information concerning that matter. I have had no further conversations on the subject since my talk with Voroshilov, reported in my telegram No. 27, March 23, 3 p.m. My impression is that the Soviet Government will take no action until after the arrival of Bogdanov, If the Soviet Government maintains its present position, I feel that we should accept temporary disappointment rather than make any major concessions. I should be glad to know that this is the attitude of the Department.
(2) An even more extraordinary “misunderstanding” has arisen with regard to the property which was promised to us for the construction of our new Embassy. You will recall that I submitted a map to the Moscow Soviet, outlining a property at Lenin Hills on which we might wish to build. The Moscow Soviet replied that, in principle, it had no objection to giving us this property but that the new canal would run close to the property or even through the property, and that the Moscow Soviet was loath to give us any piece of property which might cause future complications. I asked the Moscow Soviet to determine at once just where the canal would go and whether it would pass by tunnel under the hill or through an open cut. We discussed the probable course of the canal at great length and I was left with the impression that the Moscow Soviet would give us the property.
Litvinov, however, telephoned to me and said that the Moscow Soviet was merely being polite and did not intend to give us the property. Therefore, when Stalin asked me if there was anything in the Soviet Union that I wanted, I told him that I wished that particular piece of property for the American Embassy and mentioned the difficulty of the canal; whereupon Stalin said: “You shall have the property”.
Litvinov telephoned me the next day to say that Stalin had given orders to the Moscow Soviet to give us the property we wanted. In order that we might be certain of our ground before approaching Congress for an appropriation, I obtained from Troyanovsky two letters in regard to the matter, dated February 8 and 12, 1934, the originals of which are in the Department.11 Relying on these letters I described the property to the President, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House, and to officials of the State Department precisely as I had outlined it in Moscow.
At five o’clock on March 25, Mr. Florinsky called on me. He prefaced his remarks by saying that he had something very unpleasant to say which he regretted greatly to have to bring up. He then announced that Troyanovsky must have deciphered incorrectly the telegrams which had been sent to him in regard to this matter and said [Page 73] that the Moscow Soviet would not give us the western half of the property I had chosen but only the eastern half, with additional land to the east. I replied to Mr. Florinsky that the matter was settled; that I had received a promise from Stalin and assurance from Litvinov that Stalin had given orders in accordance with his promise; that the agreement had been confirmed in writing by Troyanovsky; and that I could not agree to any alteration whatsoever in this agreement. I told him further that, acting on these promises, the President had approached Congress in the matter of obtaining funds for the building of the Embassy; that I myself had explained the matter in detail to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and that Congress had voted money on the basis of this explicit promise of the Soviet Government. I pointed out to him that it was not wise for the Soviet Union to create the belief in the United States that a promise of Stalin, backed by an assurance of Litvinov, plus a written confirmation by the Soviet Ambassador at Washington, was worthless.
I may add that the land to the east is not adapted to the buildings we hope to erect, as it lies below the level of the main road and has buildings in front of it on the river side. A portion of it would be excellent for a garage, servants’ quarters and various outbuildings, but as an Embassy site it is impossible.
I did not spare Mr. Florinsky’s feelings in my remarks on this subject and he left the Embassy with an appropriate humility and agitation.
The following day, Monday, March 26, I called at the Foreign Office and took up the matter with Divilkovski, who, owing to Litvinov’s illness, is acting as his personal representative. Mr. Divilkovski was much upset and said that he wished to show me copies of telegrams that had been sent to Troyanovsky in regard to this matter as he did not wish us to believe that the Soviet Government had been guilty of bad faith but that it had been simply a misunderstanding. I told him that I did not wish to see the telegrams.
Mr. Divilkovski then asked me to prepare a map showing precisely the property that I wished at Lenin Hills. He called yesterday at one o’clock and I gave him the map. He promised to take the members of the Moscow Soviet to the property yesterday afternoon and to attempt to overcome their objections. I told him that I could enter into no negotiations in regard to the matter; that it was a common occurrence for national governments to overrule municipal authorities when the municipal authorities wished to contravene engagements which had been entered into by the national government. I added that if the Moscow Soviet would not acquiesce it was necessary to order the Moscow Soviet to acquiesce.
[Page 74]I trust the Department will keep me fully informed with regard to any lease of this property which may be proposed in Washington as I suspect that there may be last minute attempts to wriggle out of the agreement. Our position in this matter is supported not merely by oral communications but also by written notes, and I think we should not budge one inch.
(3) In a separate despatch of this date12 I am reporting to you in regard to the unwillingness of the Soviet Government to carry out the verbal promise which was made to me by Grinko that the State Bank would supply us with paper roubles for the necessary minor expenditures of our staff at a fair rate of exchange.
In the course of our conversation on that subject yesterday, Divilkovski made it plain that, in addition, the Soviet Government does not intend to carry out its verbal statements with regard to consular fees. Both Grinko and Litvinov told me in December that the Soviet Government had no objection to our charging consular fees in the Soviet Union either in dollars or in paper roubles at a paper rouble rate to be fixed by ourselves in accordance with the rates outside the Soviet Union. In my previous conversations here with Litvinov and Divilkovski I have repeatedly restated this intention. There has been no objection. Yesterday Divilkovski said that his Government had decided that it would pay consular fees in paper roubles only at the rate of one thirteen (1.13) to the dollar. I told him that we expected to charge the Soviet Government fifty-five (55) to the dollar, or fifty (50), at least. He said that Troyanovsky was now in negotiation with the Department in regard to this matter and that he thought that the Department was disposed to accept paper roubles at one thirteen (1.13) to the dollar. I felt so sure that this statement was incorrect that I did not feel it necessary to telegraph the Department.
These three extraordinary incidents indicate clearly that oral promises of members of the Soviet Government are not to be taken seriously. I have the impression that the “misunderstandings” have been produced not so much by bad faith as by inefficiency. The members of the Soviet Government seem disposed to make promises without taking into consideration all the factors involved. There are several organs in the Soviet Government of negative authority which are in a position to prevent the carrying out of promises made by individual members of the commissariats.
Whatever the source of these “misunderstandings”, it seems to me that in every case understandings with the Soviet Government or representatives thereof should be made in writing or should be confirmed at a later date by a written document.
[Page 75]I have been somewhat emphatic in saying to the members of the Soviet Government in the past few days that they must understand that, if they wish to carry further the collaboration with the United States which was so happily begun by the President and Mr. Litvinov, this sort of “misunderstanding” must cease at once and the Soviet Government must show that it is indeed ready to cooperate with us. These remarks have had an agreeably lubricative effect. I am sure that the Department will feel that the same line should be taken with Troyanovsky.
Respectfully yours,