711.00111 Armament Control/Military Secrets/1841
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Controls (Green)
Mr. William Francis Gibbs, of Gibbs & Cox., Inc., naval architects, called me by telephone from New York this morning. He referred [Page 880] to our recent conversations in regard to the plans which he had prepared with a view to the construction of destroyers and flotilla leaders in this country for the Government of the U. S. S. R. He said that the Department’s letter of May 20, transmitting the Navy Department’s decisions in regard to the first set of his plans, had reached him this morning. His comment was that the Navy Department expressed itself in Delphic language and that the Department’s letter, based upon the letter from the Navy Department, contained a number of statements susceptible of a variety of meanings. He felt that the Navy Department’s decisions reflected the opposition of some of the subordinate officers in that Department to any sales of arms to the U. S. S. R. He said that these decisions of the Navy Department were in direct conflict at several points with the decision in respect to the plans for a battleship communicated to him in the Department’s letter of June 17, 1938. He explained that there were a number of items of equipment included in the plans for the battleship which he had been authorized to communicate to agents of the U. S. S. R. which he was now prohibited from using in the destroyers and flotilla leaders which he proposed to have constructed.
Mr. Gibbs said that he intended to come to Washington this week to discuss the whole matter with Admiral Leahy, to point out the discrepancies between the statements made to him in respect to the construction of a battleship and the decisions now made in connection with destroyers and flotilla leaders, and to attempt to ascertain just what the Navy Department meant by certain statements made in the letters relating to the plans for the two latter and whether there was any use for him to proceed with his negotiations with the Soviet agents. He said that he had already taken up by telephone with the Navy Department the paragraphs in its decisions relating to destroyers of the Mahan type and had been told that those paragraphs did not mean what they said; in fact, he had received assurances that the Navy Department would write another letter to the Department of State restating the paragraphs in question and giving them an entirely new meaning and one much more favorable to his project.87
Mr. Gibbs said that, unless I perceived some objection, he intended to give copies of the Department’s letters informing him of the decisions of the Navy Department to officers of the Russian mission [Page 881] (Admiral Isakov has already sailed) and at the same time to give them a written statement of his estimate of the present situation in respect to the possible construction of destroyers and flotilla leaders. He read me that statement over the telephone. It conveyed the idea that he believed that it was still possible for him to design destroyers and flotilla leaders to which no objection would be made by the Navy Department and which would be satisfactory to the Soviet Government.
Mr. Gibbs said that he intended also to advise the Soviet agents to take up once more with this Government, through diplomatic channels, the question of the attitude of this Government toward the construction of vessels of war in this country for the U. S. S. R. and to attempt to ascertain whether this Government was really willing to permit such construction.
I strongly advised Mr. Gibbs not to advise the Soviet Agents to take this matter up through diplomatic channels. I said that there was no change in the position of this Government since it was communicated to him and to the Soviet Ambassador in June 193888 and that I thought it possible that any technical difficulties which had arisen might be ironed out in conversations between himself and officers of the Navy Department.
Mr. Gibbs called me again by telephone this afternoon. He said that he had just shown officers of the Soviet naval mission a copy of the Department’s letter of May 20 and had a long conversation with them in regard to the situation. He said that they had expressed surprise that the Department’s letter had referred specifically to the plans and had not stated definitely that this Government would have no objection to the construction of destroyers in this country for the U. S. S. R. Mr. Gibbs said that he had replied that there was no mention of this Government’s attitude in respect to construction because that was not the question at issue but the Soviet officers expressed anxiety lest after all questions in regard to the plans had been straightened out with the Navy Department, objection might then be raised to the construction of destroyers in accordance with those plans. He asked me to confirm what he had said.
I told Mr. Gibbs that his statement was accurate, and I added that there was no requirement in law that the construction of vessels of war for foreign governments should be approved by this Government if they were constructed within treaty limitations and in accordance with plans involving no military secrets of interest to the national defense.
- In a letter of June 3, 1939, Mr. Gibbs was informed that a letter of May 29, 1939, from the Acting Secretary of the Navy had requested the deletion in earlier letters referring to the Mohan class of destroyers of the word “original” and the expression “dated 1933,” and the substitution of the words “as built” for the expression “dated 1933.” (711.00111 Armament Control/Military Secrets/1843)↩
- For the letter of June 17, 1938, to Mr. Gibbs, see p. 699; for the note of same date to the Soviet Ambassador, see p. 701.↩