711.00111 Armament Control/Military Secrets/1703
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Controls (Green)
Mr. William Francis Gibbs, of Gibbs & Cox, Inc., naval architects, called at my office this morning. He referred to his letter of April 10, 1939,80 transmitting plans for destroyers and said that he intended to send me early next week plans for destroyers of another type81 which the Soviet Government also desired to have constructed in this country.
I told Mr. Gibbs that the plans when received would be transmitted without delay to the Navy Department.
Mr. Gibbs said that the only obstacle of importance which he expected to encounter in constructing vessels of war for the U. S. S. R. was in connection with obtaining ordnance. He said that there were, of course, several American companies which could construct naval ordnance if they could obtain the necessary plans and specifications but that, as the construction of naval ordnance had for a number of years been a government monopoly, no company was at present in possession of the necessary plans and specifications and, in order that the vessels which he proposed to have constructed for the U. S. S. R. might be armed, some arrangement would have to be made by which the Navy Department would make plans and specifications available to American manufacturers. He said that he had discussed this matter with officers of the Navy Department and had gained the distinct impression that the very strong opposition on the part of some of those officers to the sale of any arms to a. communist government would operate to prevent the Navy Department from making its plans and specifications available to a manufacturer who proposed to use them for the construction of ordnance for the U. S. S. R. The officers with whom he had talked had expressed the opinion that the Navy Department would probably be unwilling to take this action. They had even [Page 875] expressed doubt as to the legal authority of the Navy Department to do so and had spoken of the possibility of their being subjected to all the pains and penalties of the Espionage Act82 if they were to place confidential plans at the disposition of American manufacturers.
Mr. Gibbs explained that this attitude of the Navy Department placed him in a very embarrassing situation as he had Admiral Isakov and eight other Soviet naval officers on his hands and as he was not able to give them any assurance that, if vessels of war were built in this country for the U. S. S. R., ordnance for those vessels could be obtained here. He said that Admiral Isakov had called on the Secretary of the Navy83 and other ranking officers of the Navy Department and had drawn unwarranted conclusions from the general statements made to him to the effect that the Navy Department would cooperate in the construction of naval vessels for the U. S. S. R. in so far as the laws of the United States permitted. He said that he had been trying to explain to the Admiral that these general statements made on the occasion of courtesy calls were not sufficiently definite to be relied upon as assurances that plans for ordnance would be made available to American manufacturers. He said that he proposed to write a letter to the Secretary of State asking for a definite answer as to whether the Government would be willing to place plans and specifications for ordnance at the disposition of American manufacturers on the understanding that they would use them for the construction of guns for installation on vessels of war to be built for the U. S. S. R.
I explained to Mr. Gibbs that I had often noted in conversations with some officers of the Navy Department some confusion in regard to the provisions of the Espionage Act relating to the revelation of military secrets. I said that, as those provisions had been interpreted in practice, the decision as to what did or did not constitute a military secret was a matter within the jurisdiction of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy; that no court would be likely to question the decision of either of those officials on such a point; and that, as a matter of fact, both of them released from the ban of military secrecy half a dozen or more items every week in order that these items might be exported. I said that there was no doubt but that the Secretary of the Navy could, if he wished to do so, release plans and specifications for ordnance. I informed him that the War Department had recently taken the attitude that the release of plans and specifications to American manufacturers to enable them to manufacture for foreign sale was in many cases definitely advantageous to this country. The idea of the General Staff of the Army was that building up of private facilities for manufacture in those cases outweighed any disadvantage resulting from the release of what had formerly been considered [Page 876] military secrets. I informed Mr. Gibbs that it was my understanding that, if the bill now pending in Congress “To authorize the Secretaries of War and of the Navy to assist the governments of American republics to increase their military and naval establishments, and for other purposes” were enacted, the Navy Department would probably make plans and specifications for certain types of ordnance for use on destroyers available to American manufacturers in order that they might construct ordnance suitable for installation on destroyers built for certain American Republics, and I pointed out that one provision of that bill stipulated that any military secret released to the government of an American Republic should one year thereafter be considered to be universally released. I suggested that, instead of raising this question formally in a letter at this time, Mr. Gibbs might wish to consider the advisability of taking the matter up informally with Mr. Edison, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, as soon as he recovered from his present illness.
Mr. Gibbs said that he would follow my suggestion. He emphasized the fact that the Soviet mission had no intention whatever of insisting upon having the destroyers being constructed for the U. S. S. R. armed with the very latest type of naval guns and that the mission would be satisfied if ordnance not of the very latest type could be obtained.
Mr. Gibbs commented at some length upon the lengths to which the Navy Department attempted to carry the idea of military secrecy. He said that he had designed 68% of all destroyers built in this country since 1932 and that every single feature of every design he had made was still labelled “secret” by the Navy Department. Nevertheless, some important features of these designs were incorporated, with full explanations, in text books used at the Naval Academy and on sale in several bookstores in Annapolis.